



Eighth Regional Aviation Safety Group — Pan America Annual Plenary Meeting (RASG-PA/8)
Medellin, Colombia, 25 June 2015

Agenda Item 4: RASG-PA Project Reports
4.3 Development of Metrics to Measure the Institutional Strengths of Civil Aviation Authorities

DEVELOPMENT OF METRICS OF INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES

(Presented by Secretariat)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	
This working paper presents the draft of the report made on the metric developed to measure the institutional strength of CAAs for it analysis and corresponding comments.	
Action:	The Meeting is invited to comment on the information provided in this working paper.
<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safety
<i>References:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RASG-PA ESC/19 Meeting (April 2014) • RASG-PA ESC/17 Meeting (June 2013) • RASG-PA ESC/15 Meeting (October 2012)

1. Introduction

1.1. During the Fifteenth Meeting of the Regional Aviation Safety Group – Pan American Executive Steering Committee (RASG-PA ESC/15), held in Santiago, Chile, on 21 October 2012; it was highlighted the importance of CAAs’ institutional strength for safety. The institutional weakness of a single CAA can generate a negative impact in a whole region.

1.2. Thus, during the Nineteenth Meeting of the Regional Aviation Safety Group – Pan American Executive Steering Committee (RASG-PA ESC/19), held in Lima, Peru from 8 to 9 April 2014 it was approved the Decision RASG-PA/ESC/19/5 - Development of metrics to measure the institutional strengths of civil aviation authorities; by which the Project started for the development of metrics to measure the institutional strengths of Civil Aviation Authorities.

1.3. Research trends at global level on institutional strength of national regulators are focused on two major paradigms of action: "independence" and "capability" as essential attributes in the optimal institutional performance.

1.4. In this sense and focusing only on the paradigm on independency; under the hypothesis that greater "institutional independence" better "organizational performance"; a methodology used internationally to measure the strength of a regulator was identified. This methodology is based in a social scientific analysis developed by PhD Fabrizio Gilardi, who makes a trustable diagnosis on independence indices of governmental regulators.

1.5. The methodology developed by Gilardi argues the **delegation of regulatory tasks in favour of independent agencies** as a necessary condition for greater credibility of governmental regulatory institutions. Therefore, the independence of the regulatory agencies is measured through the following 5 large variable:

- Status of the agency head
- Status of the members of the management board
- Relationship with government and parliament
- Financial and **organisational** autonomy
- Regulatory **competencies**

1.6. These variables are displayed in a survey containing 21 questions, whose ponderation and subsequent average create an "independence index" as an organization diagnosis.

2. Analysis

2.1. The vision of the RASG-PA project is take the initial steps for generating a globally recognized metric on the institutional strength of a civil aviation authority, being understood that a stronger institutional strength, will lead to more improvement in safety aviation.

2.2. As noted above, for this study a worldwide proven tool was used that is the method of Gilardi; which is based on making a survey of the regulatory agencies and through these results calculate an index of independence.

2.3. The Project based in the above-mentioned, forwarded the survey to the Civil Aviation Authorities and was circulated to the NAM/CAR and Region's States during 2014 collecting responses from 29 States, 13 SAM and 16 NACC and was processed according to Gilardi's methodology. The results are presented in the Appendix to this working paper.

2.4. In general, the trial made has shown that it is feasible to use the metric for measuring the independence of the CAAs; and as a result one of the weakest points of States is the appointment of the Director; which consequently may affect in some manner the continuity and reliability of implanted systems.

2.5. However, it is important to remark that the data have been collected through a survey, so provides values of perception; therefore studies should be continued under these parameters but reinforcing the method with interviews and research case-by-case to validate the answers; this would provide a more contextual metric in the State and its governmental structure.

2.6. In this sense, the "Report of the results on the study of the index of independence in the civil aviation regulatory agencies of the Pan-American Region" is attached for comments on the outcomes of the study and to identify opportunities for improvement in it.

2.7. Considering that in many parts of the world are implemented technical cooperation project for institutional strengthening of the Civil Aviation Authorities and that one of the fundamental pillars for the safe and ordered growth of the civil aviation for the benefit of the economy and society is the existence of a strong and independent aviation authority, and that at the moment there is a globally recognized way of measuring it, RASG-PA is requested to consider the adoption of the following conclusion:

CONCLUSION

ESC/8 – XX –

DEVELOPMENT OF A METRIC ON INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH OF CAAs

Request the ICAO Air Navigation Commission to consider the feasibility of developing a methodology globally acceptable to measure the institutional strength of the CAAs. Contemplate whether ICAO or any other institution in cooperation with ICAO takes note of the outcome of the RASG-PA project and identifies improvement opportunities.

3. Conclusions

3.1. The meeting is invited to:

- a) Take note of the information contained in this working paper;
- b) analyse and provide comment and suggestions relevant to the Report of results on the study of the index of independency of the Civil aviation regulatory agencies in the Pan-American Region attached; and
- c) evaluate and approve the proposal of conclusion of paragraph 2.7, if deem convenient.

DEVELOPMENT OF METRICS ON INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES

Report on the Results of the Study on Independence Indices of Civil Aviation
Regulatory Agencies in the Pan American Region

*REGIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION SAFETY
GROUP-PAN
AMERICA (RAGS-PA)*

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1. PRESENTATION

In October 2012, the Regional Aviation Safety Group – Pan America (RAGS-PA)¹, recognising the importance that an institutionally strong civil aviation authority has for safety, unanimously agreed to create the “Pilot Project for the formulation of regional metrics on the institutional strength of civil aviation authorities (CAAs)”.

A well-funded institution, with sufficient flexibility to adjust its regulations to the changing environment of civil aviation, attract talent, retain highly-qualified human resources, train personnel, maintain a suitable operational structure, and meet its mandate in an independent manner, is one of the fundamental pillars for the safe and orderly development of civil aviation.

In the civil aviation environment, the organisational elements of regulatory agencies are subject to a structural and systematic analysis through the safety oversight audits (USOAP) conducted by ICAO. USOAP audits cover various organisational aspects; however, some key elements for ensuring the strength of a CAA could be overlooked. It has been noted that, in some cases, the good results achieved by an Administration can vanish if a change in government is made that dramatically affects its institutional performance.

“Capacity and independence are the pillars of regulatory management”

Global research trends concerning the institutional strength of national regulatory agencies focus on two major action paradigms: “independence” and “capacity” as essential features of optimum institutional performance.

In this project, a specific element of institutional strength is identified: “independence”, conceived as a cross-cutting feature of any State-owned regulatory body.

HYPOTHESIS:

“The greater the institutional independence, the better the organisational performance”

This pilot project proposes some metrics to specifically measure the level of independence of CAAs, with the purpose of getting feedback for improving the process and developing globally-accepted

¹ The Regional Aviation Safety Group – Pan America (RASG-PA) was created in 2012. It was established as a focal point to ensure the harmonisation and coordination of safety efforts aimed at reducing aviation risks in the North American, Caribbean (NAM/CAR) and South American (SAM) Regions. More information can be found in <http://www.icao.int/rasgpa/Pages/default.aspx>

metrics on the strength of civil aviation regulatory agencies. These metrics could be used in any technical cooperation project aimed at the institutional strengthening of a CAA.


To this end, all CAAs of the Pan American Region were invited to respond to a survey on their “independence indices”, following a model developed by Dr. Fabrizio Gilardi in *“Delegation in the Regulatory State: independence Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe.”* This model has been used in various sectors and in various countries, and is the result of many years of research on the topic. The survey contains 21 questions and creates some metrics on the level of independence of regulatory agencies in different types of industries worldwide.

The results of the responses obtained from 29² CAAs are presented and analysed below.

² The case of Chile is not included because most answers were missing and therefore the assessment was dismissed due to its significant impact on trend variation.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An analysis was made of these 29 civil aviation authorities of the Pan American Region using the “**Gilardi Index**”, based on the identification of the level of independence of regulatory agencies, from the point of view of their institutional framework. The results of this analysis are presented below.



The scientific method used has been applied in various parts of the world on different types of regulatory agencies. This first exercise with aviation regulators has a very concrete purpose: **create a tool to measure the organisational strength of a CAA.**

Thus, the “Gilardi Independence Index” must not be construed as a global indicator of CAA performance, but rather as an **organisational diagnostic tool** that shows an essential structural element of any regulatory institution: its level of independence.


The vision of the project is to develop a process using a dynamic, globally-accepted methodology that can be used not only by States to generate changes in their CAAs, but also by donors that invest in capacity-building projects, and to identify the safety risks of aircraft operations.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: “INDEPENDENCE INDEX”

The methodological proposal of Gilardi is the result of a long tradition of research on the so-called “ARI’s” (independent regulatory agencies) that dates back to the 70s. In this regard, the author seeks to identify the level of independence of a regulatory organisation, that is, its independence in terms of appointment of personnel, direction, and, in general, with respect to State powers and changes in government.

Based on the above, Gilardi³ conducted a cross-cutting study of different types of regulatory bodies in Europe, confirming that **the greater the organisational independence of State regulatory bodies, the greater their political credibility**. The study was conducted in 17 countries and in 7 different regulatory fields, an element that was considered to be important for the scientific reinforcement of this research.

Within this context, Gilardi’s independence index consists of 5 variables, shown in the graph below, which group 21 indicators that have been translated into 21 questions on the level of independence of each variable. The variables are described in detail in Annex 1.



³ Gilardi used as a basis a research study conducted in 1992 by Cukierman on central banks, available in: Cukierman, Webb y Neyapti. Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and its Effect on Policy Outcomes, The World Bank Economic Review, 1992.

Thus, the resulting independence index is presented in a numerical range from 0 to 1, obtained from the following formula:

$$\text{Gilardi's index} = \left(\frac{A}{6} + \frac{B}{6} + \frac{C}{4} + \frac{D}{4} + E \right) / 5$$


where A:

$$A = X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6$$

$$B = X7 + X8 + X9 + X10 + X11 + X12$$

Thus, the final result is presented in a range from 0 to 1, where 1 means absolute independence and 0 means absolute dependence in terms of institutional decision-making and structure.

The value of each of these variables was obtained through a regional survey (see Annex N°1) that each authority has responded to the best of its ability; the index is the result of the answers provided by the States, noting that these have not been audited or verified.



3.1. IMPACT OF VARIABLES: RELEVANCE FOR CIVIL AVIATION

As already stated, the basic argument used by the author is that a higher level of independence in regulatory bodies serves as a shield against future changes in public policy, something prevalent in regional policy.

Consequently, applying the Gilardi methodology, an analysis was made of the primary data obtained in the questionnaires sent to 45 regulatory bodies of the Pan American Region, which covered 5 organisational elements:

- A. Status of the Director of the Agency:** based on the assessment of the term of office⁴, the authority responsible for appointing and dismissing the director, but also on the possibility of renewal, and exclusivity of the position. In this regard, the assessment must be strict in terms of the complementarity of the variables that make up the category, where the scenario of absolute independence involves an appointment by a board or administrative council for a period of more than 8 years, with no possibility of arbitrary dismissal, as well as a position of absolute exclusivity but non-renewable, where independence is a formal requirement for the appointment.

- B. Status of the Members of the management board:** As in the case of the director, the variables that determine this category are also the term of office, appointment, exclusivity, renewal, and formal independence (the questions are the same). But this is a particular variable because it refers to a group of representative members of the public and private sectors acting as collegiate and independent bodies.

⁴ From 8 years or more up to indefinite periods, where the longer the period the more stable the position.

- C. Relationship with Government and Parliament:** this refers to the type of relationship that exists between the CAA and the central government and the parliament or congress, assessed on the basis of the level of independence formally declared or not in its by-laws, the obligations of the authority with respect to the central government or parliament, and the possibility of the authority's decisions being overruled by different levels of government.

- D. Financial and organisational autonomy:** Category involving the origin of the budget, where a higher level of independence is related to funding from outside the organisation, but with absolute control over budgeting, and full autonomy in personnel policies and organisation.


- E. Regulatory competencies:** Finally, this category refers to the exclusive regulatory competencies of the authority, that is, it receives the highest score when the CAA is the only one that regulates the sector, but the score drops when its regulatory duties are shared or evaluated by other independent institutions or the parliament or government, and the agency is considered to be absolutely dependent when the CAA has only consultative competencies.

The following graph summarises the meaning of all the categories assessed:

The status of the Director of the CAA refers to the level of independence in his/her appointment, an important variable to maintain the general autonomy of the agency

The independence of the Executive and/or Legislative powers in the appointment of its Members of the management board is of vital importance to serve as counterweight of the general decisions of the institution

Relationship that is important for the decisions made by the regulatory agency due to possible interference by such powers in response to specific political interests or the industry




4. PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS OBTAINED, BY STATE

STATE	A ⁵	B	C	D	E	INDP.
1	0.59	0.55	0.79	1	1	0.79
2	0.33	0.5	0.88	1	0.75	0.69
3	0.2	--- ⁶	0.63	0.89	1	0.68
4	0.5	0.26	0.83	0.71	1	0.66
5	0.63	0.62	0.58	0.46	1	0.66
6	0.75	0.75	0.63	0.58	0.5	0.64
7	0.48	0.5	0.88	0.83	0.38	0.61
8	0.73	---	0.38	0.5	0.75	0.59
9	0.38	0.21	0.79	0.58	1	0.59
10	0.12	0.12	0.88	0.83	1	0.59
11	0.53	0.37	0.38	0.58	1	0.57
12	0.08	0	0.94	0.75	1	0.55
13	0.7	---	0.5	0.58	0.38	0.54
14	0.45	---	0.83	0.61	0.25	0.54
15	0.23	0.27	0.63	0.44	1	0.51
16	0.44	0.11	0.21	0.75	1	0.5
17	0.29	0.04	0.5	0.58	1	0.48
18	0.73	---	0.44	0.25	0.5	0.48
19	0.2	0.18	0.75	1	0.25	0.48
20	0.47	---	0.63	0.46	0.25	0.45
21	0.5	0.5	0.46	0.67	0	0.43
22	0.38	0.38	0.54	0.46	0.25	0.4
23	0.29	0.29	0.33	0.58	0.5	0.4
24	0.33	0.4	0.71	0.25	0.25	0.39
25	0.21	0.67	0.33	0.46	0.25	0.38
26	0.2	0.52	0.38	0.33	0.25	0.33
27	0.45	0.38	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.33
28	0.17	---	0.44	0.46	0.25	0.33
29	0.25	---	0.25	0.51	0.25	0.32
AVERAGE	0.40	0.39	0.58	0.60	0.60	0.51

⁵ A: Status of the CAA Director; B: Status of the CAA Members of the management board; C: Relationship between the CAA and Parliament and Government; D: Financial and organisational autonomy; E: Regulatory competence.


⁶ Variables that were not completed were not considered in the general average, pursuant to the original methodological model proposed by Gilardi.

4.1. RESULTS IN THE SAM REGION



MEAN INDEPENDENCE
INDEX IN THE SAM
REGION:
0.49

- A: Status of the CAA Director
- B: Status of the Members of the management board
- C: Relationship between the CAA and Parliament and Government
- D: Financial and organisational autonomy
- E: Regulatory competencies




As may be seen at first sight, the results show a clear weakness in points A and B, related to the appointment of personnel. Variable B, related to the status of the members of management board, has not been clearly understood in the Region, since it is an institutional figure that has not been implemented in the CAAs of the Region. Consequently, this element must be reviewed and considered for further discussion.

In this sense, variable A shows a weakness related to the position of the Director, involving high turnover and consequently, unreliable management.

The results of some significant cases of the region are shown below.


STATE N°2



The CAA of State N°2, with an index of **0.69**, is the “Gilardi Index” leader in the SAM Region. The results reveal a significant financial independence as the strength of the institution, supplemented by a distinct exclusivity of regulatory functions over the industry. However, they also reveal contrasting results regarding appointment of personnel, and independence of the Director and the Management Board, which are key elements for institutional performance.


This case, which exceeds the mean level for the Region, has an average of **0.64**, showing a unique balance among the variables assessed. The institutional design of the regulator includes a system of appointments and functions leaning towards independence, which is outstanding in the Region.

STATE N°6




The index of this CAA is **0.32** and is the lowest in the SAM Region. It lacks a Members of the management board, and has low autonomy in the appointment of its Director and in its relationship with the government. An element that stands out in the general results of the institution is its financial independence, although it is not a determining factor for a generalised optimisation of its levels of independence.

STATE N°29




4.2. RESULTS IN THE NACC REGION



THE MEAN
INDEPENDENCE
INDEX IN THE
NACC REGION:

0.53

- A: Status of the CAA Director
- B: Status of the Members of the management board
- C: Relationship between the CAA and Parliament and Government.
- D: Financial and organisational autonomy
- E: Regulatory competence




In the case of the results for the NACC Region, the trend of low scores for variables A and B continues. Consequently, the rationale applied for the SAM Region has some validity in this Region, except that variable A has better results.

On the other hand, it should be noted that this Region shows a significant increase in the last two variables, related to Financial and Organisational Autonomy and Competence Exclusivity (the latter showing the highest score in the two Regions).

The results of some striking cases in the region are shown below.


STATE N° 5



With an index of **0.66**, State N°5 has an institutionalised CAA with respect to functional exclusivity, with appointments dependent on the Government and Parliament, but compensating this with long terms of office. Consequently, the overall level of independence is above the mean for the region.


With an index of **0.45**, State N° 18 lacks a Members of the management board, something atypical in this Region but typical of systems with centralist bureaucracies. This CAA has a strong relationship with Parliament and Government and certain economic independence. Even so, there is no absolute exclusivity of its regulatory functions over the industry.

STATE N° 20




State N°16 has an index of **0.33**, an average to be noted because of its low independence in the 5 variables, especially in the regulatory exclusivity, as well as in the financial and organisational independence of the CAA.

STATE N° 27



5. Analysis of Results



STATE	A	B	C	D	E	INDP.
AVERAGE	0.40	0.39	0.58	0.60	0.60	0.51
SAM	0.33	0.39	0.59	0.61	0.51	0.49
NACC	0.46	0.34	0.58	0.59	0.68	0.54

The first table is a practical comparison of each of the variables in each region. In general, both regions have a good performance in variables “C”, “D” and “E”; and are weak in variables “A” and “B”.

As already explained, variables “A” and “B” show a strong trend towards low independence in the appointment of the Director. Variable “A” specifically has the lowest score of all categories, which we believe is due to the centralist bureaucratic systems that exist in the Region. This is enough reason for its subsequent consideration as an organisational figure. On the other hand, variable “B”⁷ has lent itself to different

⁷ This variable refers to the institutional figure of a “Members of the management board”, which is missing in several of the cases studied.

interpretations, since several States do not use this figure, which is typical of autonomous entities. This assumption is to be taken into account when analysing the results.

Regarding variables “C” and “D”, both regions are above average, leading to the assumption that CAAs have been able to define a suitable structure in their government systems.

Finally, variable “E”, on exclusivity of regulatory functions, shows a high average score in both regions, as expected, given the specificity of the industry.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The analysis leads to some conclusions to be presented below and which shall be compared in broader studies that include more representative data and, above all, that contemplate the inputs obtained from the participants in this first report. A special metrics in the field of civil aviation has been modelled, scientifically based on studies conducted worldwide within the context of State regulators, as an area of general study. On the other hand, it has been clearly established that the results obtained must be interpreted taking into account that responses were provided at the discretion of the regulatory bodies, representing their perception of the topics proposed in the questionnaire.

Accordingly, the following conclusions are proposed:

- a) Regarding the first variable concerning the independence of the Director, it is clear that, in the SAM Region, there is a marked trend towards low autonomy in the appointment of the Director. The average score for independence of appointment is 0.33.
- b) Similarly, the second variable related to autonomy in the appointment of the Members of the management board, which shows a total average of **0.37**, is a variable in which answers were missing from about 24% of the States, the reason being the inexistence of this institutional figure in the CAAs. This element must be considered in future research studies.

It should be noted that the question on the Members of the management board was left blank in some cases. Further studies should be made on the impact of the absence of a Members of the management board on the final result, for instance in the case of aeronautical authorities that fall within the structure of a ministry instead of being a decentralised body.

7. Next Steps

As already stated, this project is an initial exercise aimed at the implementation of globally recognised and visible metrics to measure the institutional strength of a CAA. A normal refreshment cycle for the metrics could be every three (3) years at the ICAO Assembly.

It is expected that, with the dissemination of these initial results, it will be possible to obtain good feedback and identify opportunities for improvement. There will be a natural tendency to make changes to the parameters to be measured. However, the recommendation is to proceed with caution and use models with ample scientific support.

Highly visible metrics could become an important driver for the introduction of organisational changes in favour of a safe and orderly development of air transport.

The academic sector could play an important role in securing support for the publication every three years of the report on the institutional strength of CAAs.

ANNEX N°1

REGIONAL METRICS ON INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING: SURVEY

VARIABLE	QUESTIONS	OPTIONS	Answer	SCORE					
1	1	Term of office	More than 8 years	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00				
			6 to 8 years	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.80				
			5 years	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.60				
			4 years	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.40				
			Fixed period of 4 years, at the discretion of the appointer [2]	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.20				
			No fixed term	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00				
	2	2	Who appoints the members of the Members of the management board/Administrative Council [3]?	Members of the administrative council	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00			
				A full combination of executive and legislative powers	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.75			
				The Legislative (Congress)	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.50			
				The Executive	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.25			
				One or two ministers	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00			
	3	3	Dismissal	Dismissal impossible	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00			
				Only for reasons unrelated to politics	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.67			
				No specific provisions on dismissal	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.33			
				At the discretion of the appointer	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00			
	4	4	Can the Director of the CAA hold other positions in government?	No	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00			
				Only with the permission of the Executive	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.50			
				No specific provisions	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00			
	5	5	Is the appointment renewable?	No	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00			
				Yes, only once	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.50			
				Yes, more than once	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00			
6	6	Is independence a formal requirement for the appointment?	Si	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00				
			No	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00				
2	7	Term of office	More than 8 years	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00				
			6 to 8 years	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.80				
			5 years	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.60				
			4 years	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.40				
			Fixed period of 4 years, at the discretion of the appointer	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.20				
			No fixed term	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00				
	8	8	Who appoints the members of the Members of the management board/Administrative Council?	The Director of the CAA	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00			
				A combination of the executive and the legislative powers	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.75			
				The Legislative (Congress)	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.50			
				The Executive	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.25			
				One or two ministers	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00			
				9	9	Dismissal	Dismissal impossible	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00
							Only for reasons unrelated to politics	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.67
							No specific provisions on dismissal	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.33

3	Relationship with Government and Parliament	10	Can administrative members hold other positions in government?	At the discretion of the appointer(s)	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00		
			No	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00			
			Only with the permission of the Executive	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.50			
			No specific provisions	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00			
		11	Are appointments renewable?	No	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00		
				Yes, only once	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.50		
				Yes, more than once	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00		
		12	Is independence a formal requirement for the appointment?	Si	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00		
				No	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00		
		3	Relationship with Government and Parliament	13	Is the independence of the Authority formally declared?	Si	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00
						No	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00
				14	What are the formal obligations of the Authority <i>vis-à-vis</i> the government?	No obligations	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00
Submission of an annual report for information only	<input type="checkbox"/>					0.50		
Submission of an annual report for approval	<input type="checkbox"/>					0.00		
15	What are the formal obligations of the Authority <i>vis-à-vis</i> Parliament?			No obligations	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00		
				Submission of an annual report for information only	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.67		
				Submission of an annual report for approval	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.33		
				The Authority is fully accountable	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00		
16	Who, aside from the Judiciary, can revoke the decisions of the Authority in areas where it has exclusive competence?			No entity	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00		
		A specialised entity	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.67				
		The Government, with qualifications	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.33				
		The Government, unconditionally	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00				
4	Financial and Organisational Autonomy	17	What is the source of the Authority's budget?	External funding	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00		
				The Government and external funding	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.50		
				The Government	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00		
		18	How is the budget controlled?	Through the Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00		
				Through the accounting office or a judicial body	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.67		
				Through the government and the Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.33		
				Through the government	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00		
		19	Who decides on the internal organisation of the Authority?	The Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00		
				The Government and the Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.50		
				The Government	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00		
		20	Who is in charge of the personnel policy of the Authority?	The Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00		
				The Government and the Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.50		
The Government	<input type="checkbox"/>			0.00				
5	Regulatory competencies	21	Who is competent to regulate the sector?	Only the Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	1.00		
				The Authority and other independent institutions	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.75		
				The Authority and Parliament	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.50		
				The Authority and the Government	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.25		
				The Authority has only consultative competencies	<input type="checkbox"/>	0.00		