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WORKING PAPER

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Mexico City, Mexico, 1 – 5 December 2014

Agenda Item 4: CAR/SAM States learnt lessons to reduce the number of Large Height Deviation (LHD) occurrences

**PROPOSAL FOR BETTER PRACTICES FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE LHD OCCURRENCES
VALIDATION DURING TELECONFERENCES**

(Presented by Cuba)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	
The purpose of this Working Paper is to present to the Meeting the measures implemented by Cuba to facilitate the validation process during teleconferences.	
Action:	Paragraph 6
<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Safety
<i>References:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Thirteenth Meeting of the GREPECAS Scrutiny Working Group (GTE/13) Final Report, Lima, Peru• CARSAMMA Focal Points Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 11-13 August 2014

1. Introduction

1.1 The activities developed by the CAR/SAM Monitoring Agency (CARSAMMA) were analysed during GTE/13 Meeting, including those related to the review of analytical parameters for Large Height Deviation (LHD) validation, and LHD not yet validated were also examined. At the CARSAMMA Focal Points Meeting held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in August 2014, issues on data use and filling out of LHD forms were also addressed. In both meetings, there was agreement on the causes and factors that contribute to the absence of the required information and quality of LHD forms sent by some States, causing unexpected results during the analysis validation, which results in not enough validations and therefore the extension of the process to the following year.

1.2 In the CARSAMMA Focal Points Meeting, the ICAO SAM Regional Office requested from Cuba to present working papers at the GTE/14 including management results on these aspects, implemented mitigation measures, and the results obtained from reduction of LHD events occurrence and seriousness.

2. Analysis

2.1 It is noted during teleconferences that several LHD sent to CARSAMMA by States/Air Navigation Services Provider (ANSP) are not previously analysed and validated internally, in order to achieve the expected result. It is also noted that necessary information and data in form F4 case 21 is missing, causing unnecessary extension of the abovementioned analysis and validation forum.

2.2 Some States report LHD to the CARSAMMA but not to the involved FIR State aeronautical authority/dependencies, which prevents it from performing the event investigation through its information and evidence registers kept for a given period of time, and driving CARSAMMA to complete a process with missing data. This prevents the involved FIR from identifying potential failures and taking mitigation measures.

2.3 In addition, teleconference planning is not timely informed to PoCs, which affects their participation, either not participating at all or abandoning the teleconference before the end, because of previous commitments specific to their organisation. If an event is analysed during the absence of an involved Point of Contact (PoC), then the danger of validating it without proper information increases significantly, and those involved are not able to take measures to mitigate associated hazards.

2.4 CARSAMMA short notice provision of LHD reports database to be validated during teleconferences affects an appropriate previous preparation of the discussion and validation.

2.5 There is no guidelines procedure for teleconferences realization and obligations of each participant, so teleconferences can be conducted in a reasonable time frame and progress is made in presented LHD validation. Repeated absence of some States or ANSP is usual, which prevents proper validation of LHD reports that concern them.

3. Implemented measures

3.1 Taking into consideration the abovementioned analysis, Cuba adopted a related group of measures as follows:

- Havana Control Centre Supervisors are required, when receiving the notification from the controller of the sector where the LHD occurred, to contact its adjacent FIR counterpart for exchange, so both know about the occurrence and an analysis process with more data and evidence from both can be conducted.

- If, as a result of a previous analysis, responsibility of the aircraft operator is observed, information is immediately sent to the aeronautical authority so it notifies the operator and LHD investigation and generalization can be conducted with the airline pilots, using aircraft system data or registries.
- As a result, after the PoCs event, LHD responsible operators have been notified in different occasions.
- It was coordinated with IATA representative his inclusion as recipient of notifications made to operators, so than an alternate way of reaching the concerned person exists and achieve effectiveness in the proposed aim.
- ANSP decided to conduct an analysis and validation process before sending it to CARSAMMA, which is generally performed monthly in the Safety Subcommittee, in the presence of an aeronautical authority representative.
- Havana FIR PoCs completed a registry including contact information of the person in charge of information exchange in adjacent FIRs.
- ANSP developed a quality procedure, where steps to follow on the analysis, validation and submission to Aeronautical authority PoCs are clearly established, for its subsequent delivery to CARSAMMA, where some issues identified in Analysis 2.1-2.5 of the present WP are avoided.
- At the end of the month, PoCs send to their counterparts in adjacent FIRs, LHD messages where they were involved, and its related requests.
- Both PoCs faculties scope has been established so they don't interfere with each other functions. In the need of LHD exchange with CARSAMMA, both exchange and evaluate their points of view and give an unified criteria consideration.
- Event generalizations linked to Cuba operators are communicated and meetings results are notified in the region.

4. Obtained results

- Decrease in FIR occurrences, proper to Havana FIR, mainly from E2 type.
- Increase in the LHD coordination and information exchange between Havana FIR and adjacent FIRs, mainly with CENAMER.
- Informed LHD to CARSAMMA contained accurate data and information with supporting evidence and ability of presentation to clarify any related doubt to the monitoring agency, ANSP or FIR Aeronautical Authority, or involved operator.
- Occasionally notified operators responses are prompt, which facilitates the adoption of an action if needed, or collaboration with exchange of information or State regulatory document.

- That IATA collaborates in the process of notification and information search for a particular occurrence investigation.
- Initial exchanges with previously unknown adjacent FIRs PoCs that were not done before, basically with Jamaica and United States.
- Increase in the number of notifications from Havana Control Centre controllers and supervisors has been achieved, specifically those different from type E and those taking place in Havana FIR.
- An increased awareness of national operators is achieved, which contributes to a performance improvement.

5. Conclusions

5.1 Measures adoption and implementation for a more effective LHD analysis and validation process where Havana FIR is involved has decisively contributed in the achievement of advances in this area, where our region still presents issues that should be mitigated first by the ANSP, the Aeronautical States Authorities and finally by the aircraft operators, to accomplish its reduction and that TLS is in the appropriate values.

5.2 Together with these technical measures, actions of LHD training and information for involved personnel will be maintained, due to the conviction of the decisive role the human being plays to maintain safety rates, and how air safety depends on his knowledge, motivation and disposition.

6. Suggested actions

- a) Review the contents of this Working Paper;
- b) That the appropriate RMA establishes an annual plan of the teleconference number by month, and point out its realization at least two months in advance.
- c) That the appropriate RMA, considering this WP and the participation of the remaining States, develops an implementation process for the teleconferences, containing its fulfillment standards, planning, duration and points that make its organization, realization and expected results possible.
- d) That the appropriate RMA duly notifies NACC and SAM Offices about those States or ANSP not complying with the LHD submission deadlines and quality, and the repeated absence at teleconferences and GTE meetings.
- e) That LHD process validation is not conclusive if the RMA has no evidence of information exchange between the involved FIRs.