

Supporting
European
Aviation



ICAO DOC 8071 Manual on Testing of Radio Navigation Aids Volume II: GNSS and current GNSS Operational Issues

ICAO Webinar on *Flight Inspection*

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NETWORK
MANAGER



Update of Volume 2 on GNSS


- With removal of flight validation, GNSS Volume is becoming thin
 - GNSS Signal in Space analysis is best done with data collection receivers (or network of receivers) on ground
 - Nature of “testing” evolving toward engineering data analysis
 - Main content in terms of size will be GBAS
 - Maintaining two volumes to minimize editorial efforts
 - Doc 8071 often used in contract specifications
- Sometimes boundary between flight inspection and flight validation can be argued
 - In particular with landing systems reference path as it is the reference for guidance signals
- Sometimes people forget that Doc 8071 is GROUND and flight test
 - Thorough ground preparation prevents wasting resources using flight hours (both in inspection and validation)
 - Improved guidance on flight path alignment verification

Volume 2 Revised Structure

1. General: GNSS-specifics only, no more duplication of chapter 1 in Vol I
2. ABAS for NPA becomes GNSS Core Constellations and ABAS
 - Link to new material in Doc 9849, GNSS Manual, on Performance Monitoring
3. SBAS: Testing relevant to SBAS service provider, TBD?
4. GBAS: Most significant update including GAST D
5. Flight Validation becomes **new GNSS RFI measurement chapter**
 - Building on attachment 3 to chapter 1

Moving from Vulnerability to Mitigation

GNSS RFI Mitigation Plan published in ICAO Doc 9849, GNSS Manual



Implementing Mitigation Barriers

(Protect)

Prevent Transmission of RFI

- Regulatory Control and Enforcement
- Outreach

(Toughen)

Prevent GNSS Service Outage

- GNSS Resilience
- On-board Integration

(Augment)

Limit Severity of Impact

- CNS/ATM Integration
- Terrestrial Systems
- Detection & Resolution


GNSS RFI Vulnerability

Supported by Threat Monitoring Networks
(Preventive & Reactive Role)

First Step: Visibility!

EUROCONTROL Voluntary ATM Incident Reporting (EVAIR)

GPS Outage Pilot Reports



- 250 Participating Aircraft Operators
 - Coverage: Europe, Middle East, Northern Africa
 - Detail reports subject to confidentiality (just culture reporting)
- RFI most probable cause in absence of rx, constellation or solar issues
- 2018/2019 trend continues: average of 10 GPS reports DAILY!
 - 2020 decrease due to reduced flights (COVID), RFI persists in many locations

EUROCONTROL Voluntary ATM Incident Reporting (EVAIR)


Reported failures:

- Failure of one or both GPS units
- Disagreement between GPS positions and Flight Management System
- Terrain warnings, sometimes with pull up requests
 - (In the majority of cases pull up warnings were disregarded by pilots or function switched off)
- Unable to fly GNSS procedure and request for radar vectoring
- Wind and ground speed wrong presentations
- Lost ADS-B, wind shear, terrain and surface functionalities
- Aircraft clock irregularities

- Many aircraft manufacturers are publishing more detailed guidance on GNSS RFI impact on avionics for their operators
- **Flight inspection system (FIS) operators should also assess the vulnerability of the FIS to GNSS RFI and resulting operational impact**

EUROCONTROL Voluntary ATM Incident Reporting (EVAIR)

→ 35 Flight Information Regions FIR affected
 → Several measurements clearly confirm narrowband RFI on L1 at significant distances (300+ km) and altitudes (10km)



ENR = En-Route
 APP = Approach
 LND = Landing
 TOF = Take Off
 TXY = Taxi
 STN = At Gate / Stand

→ Most affected regions:



- Middle East – Europe across the Black Sea / Caspian Sea
- Middle East – Europe via Mediterranean Sea (Cyprus Airspace, Malta)
- Middle East – Canada and USA via cross polar routes

→ Several events also in West European Terminal areas (airports)

→ Significant number of events in a specific area leads to further investigation: Cyprus example (Nicosia FIR)

DLR Airbus A320 Test Flight in Cyprus airspace

13 FEB 2020 Flight Track




- DLR: German Aerospace Research Center
- Flight conducted in an area about 250km (east-west) x 170km (north-south) between 10'000 – 30'000 ft altitude

- GNSS signal reception heavily affected for most part of the flight
- Multiple GPS-related alerts in cockpit (GPS 1 Fault, GPS 2 Fault, GPS Primary Lost)




GNSS RFI Impact on Maritime Sector




- Catherine Dunn, Fortune Magazine, “Mysterious GPS outages are wracking the shipping industry”, 22 January 2020

What can we do with detected GPS Outages?

3h slot – FL>290 – VIA LCCCUIR – reported by ADS-B stations (179 Flights)



Traffic



ADS-B gaps


21% of flights crossing Nicosia FIR are impacted
(Over 50% impacted flights if considering adjacent areas!)

ADS-B Data Analysis

1st Priority: Manage Operational Impact (Air Traffic can identify which aircraft need support)

2nd Priority: Identify Probable RFI Source: Geolocation to **Stop** RFI Source!?


GOOD POS



NO POS

Position Quality Indicator (NIC)

Clearly confirms multiple aircraft impact: given calm ionosphere, highly likely due to RFI



RFI Source Heatmap

Using Power Difference of Arrival (PDOA) approach: multiple RFI sources, possibly moving!

Recommendations of ICAO State Letter 2020/89


AN 7/5-20/89, 28 August 2020

- **Subject:** Strengthening of communications, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) systems resilience and mitigation of interference to global navigation satellite system (GNSS)
- **Action required:** Note the criticality of the issue and the importance of action by States to address it by **making use of the ICAO guidance** provided in Doc 9849, *Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Manual* and by taking any other measures as appropriate
- Doc 9849 Appendix F, 8.2 **Reactive measure checklist** (items a, b, c, g):
 - measurement capabilities exist for all potentially required monitoring tasks ;
 - where supported by a corresponding risk analysis, airports perform monitoring for RFI at critical points within or near airport perimeter ;
 - **capabilities to detect, locate and identify RFI sources are in place**
 - all involved personnel is trained to recognize and deal with RFI events as appropriate

Complementary Capabilities

- Advantage of Pilot reports and ADS-B analysis is evidence of operational impact
 - Disadvantage: No solid proof or RFI
 - Such proof is highly desirable for suitable radio regulatory action
- Ground vs. Airborne Measurement Capabilities
 - Ground receiver often will not “see” RFI impacting aircraft at altitude
 - But can record continuously
 - Aircraft can’t stay in the air forever
 - If successful at confirmation and geolocation, can reduce search space for efficient deployment of ground resources
- FI / FV Providers should do whatever possible to increase GNSS RFI detection capabilities
 - Many measurement quality GNSS receivers have RFI detection features
 - Suitable RF signal capture recommended with access to GPS antenna
 - Best is direction finding capability


Use of CRPA for In-flight RFI LOC? (2016 ION)



Proposed Principle of Operations


Installed system includes:

- CRPA
- Antenna & interface cabling
- DIGAR with GNSS Baseband Processing
- Laptop with DF Software



DIGAR

- Rockwell Collins DIGAR: Digital GNSS Anti-jam Receiver
- Algorithms able to detect wide range of RFI sources (Continuous Wave (CW), swept CW, Broadband, ...)
- AHRS and Direct Geolocation Processing NOT YET implemented / investigated



Jammer Direction Finder Display

Copyright 2015 Rockwell Collins. All rights reserved.

Conclusions


- Efficient Aviation Operations are enabled by GNSS (PBN, ADS-B)
 - For both capacity and reduced environmental impact
 - INS, DME/DME and ILS are the main alternative navigation capabilities today, VOR/DME is complementary (but VOR can be reduced)
 - Keep them going! (See Doc 8071 Volume I)
- Most significant GNSS Operational issue today is RFI
 - Hard to beat an airborne spectrum measurement, if available
 - Keep it on during ferry flight!
 - Consider recording on other aerial work aircraft
 - Example: Helicopter Emergency Medical Service HEMS
 - Even a very basic GNSS receiver can provide MUCH more detail than a pilot
 - Especially near conflict zones, an independent measurement can be very valuable
 - Future aviation GNSS receivers may detect and downlink RFI information
- Variety of projects ongoing to help establish best practice
 - Need continued exchange of experiences
 - ***Need to develop balanced & complementary capabilities***
 - Technology, Procedures, Human Factors

Thanks & Questions ???

- Data Processing and Analysis by Hamdi Nasser, Valeriu Vitan, EUROCONTROL
- EVAIR Manager: Dragica Stankovic, EUROCONTROL
- DLR Cyprus Flight: Dr. Okuary Osechas, Dr. Michael Felux, DLR
- ADS-B Data provided by Air Traffic Control of Cyprus and Malta
- Further data provided by French Flight Inspection Service, DSNA/DTI



Aircraft bottom mounted direction-finding array (multiple frequency bands), French Flight Inspection



“Waterfall” Spectrum Measurement at 1575,42 MHz by DLR near Cyprus

Further Reading and Links

- EUROCONTROL EVAIR: <https://www.eurocontrol.int/service/eurocontrol-voluntary-atm-incident-reporting>
- EUROCONTROL CNS Dashboard: <https://www.eurocontrol.int/communications-navigation-and-surveillance>
- GNSS Reversion Handbook on ePBN Portal: <https://pbnportal.eu/epbn/main/Using-PBN/GNSS-Reversion/GNSS-Reversion.html?queryStr=GNSS%20Reversion%20Handbook>
- GNSS Spoofing and Aviation: An Evolving Relationship: <https://insidegnss.com/gnss-spoofing-and-aviation-an-evolving-relationship/>
- Interference Localization using a Controlled Radiation Pattern Antenna, Berz et al, ION GNSS Portland USA September 2016
 - Also in FEB 2017 GPS World, “Tracking RFI: Interference Localization using a CRPA”