Evidence of Identity: Breeder Documents and Beyond

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Why Care?

- “A false passport in the hands of a terrorist is as dangerous as a bomb” ... US 9/11 Commission.
- From the Migration Policy Institute: The proliferation of counterfeit breeder documents continues to be a “major cause for concern”.
- Arrests in Pakistan of a father and son.
- One of the accused Dubai assassins was in possession of a genuine German ePassport.
We Must Care

- Many nations of the world have invested time, money and great expectations in enhanced travel document programs.
- By all accounts, the current generation of ICAO-compliant travel documents is the best and most secure the world has ever known.
- However, there is a threat that affects virtually all issuing authorities: the kinds of documents, civil registry systems and other media and ways that are used to verify and/or validate an applicant’s identity.
- Judgments are based in large part on the representations of the applicant.
- At several recent ICAO Symposia, speaker after speaker called for improvements and concerted effort on addressing and improving this situation.
Breeder Documents

- Breeder documents are the fundamental physical evidence accepted by national authorities to establish a *prima facie* claim to an identity.

- The international travel document community is calling for a global focus on this problem to improve the foundations on which the world’s travel documents rely.

- After this presentation, my intent is that “breeder documents” will mean much more to identity management, indeed the “beyond” of the title of this presentation.
Identity Documents

**Travel Documents**
- International treaty
- Globally interoperable
- Well organized multilaterally
- Existing systems and guidance
- Security features
- Founded on premise of machine readability

**Breeder Documents**
- No international foundations
- Unlimited number
- No systems, no guidance, no generalized handbooks and above all, no interoperability
- No systems of security or other guardian features
- No Standards
The Threat

- Although look-alike fraud is still quite common, it is expected that the use of biometrics will help to impede this type of crime.
- We live in an increasingly global context that more and more relies on high-quality identity documentation, which must include all underlying civil and administrative systems and processes.
- Although we have taken extensive and successful steps to improve the quality of identity documents, there remains to be addressed the foundations upon which these documents ultimately reside.
- These kinds of improvements have resulted in an increasingly prevalent global shift from document fraud to identity fraud, bringing even greater pressures on document issuing programs.
More Than Ever Before

- The threat of an individual presenting a genuine passport that was issued on the basis of false evidence of identity documentation is very real.
- Presentation of these false documents and false claims of entitlement will be rewarded with a travel, residence or identity document.
- This document has far more credibility than ever before.
- Today’s documents contain advanced security features of great capability and when present, generally attest to the veracity of the documents themselves, and, hence, the bearer.
- There is a much quicker and widespread presumption on the part of inspection authorities to “accept” the legitimacy of the documents and thereby, the bearer.
Databases and National Civil Registries

- Birth certificates, cards of national identity and driving licenses, often, though not always have the information in these and other breeder documents in a national database.
- Increasingly governments have been focusing on these sources of information in addition to the documents themselves or in some cases in lieu of some documents.
- There are sometimes limitations of a legal or privacy nature that impedes the use and utility of these databases.
- Some countries are beginning to link these civil registry data sources, for example birth and death records, to serve as automatic checks and verifications.
Establishing Identity

The claim to an identity is tested by the national authority checking:

1. what does the applicant “know” about the identity that is claimed;
2. who “is” the applicant;
3. what does the applicant “have” to support the claimed identity.
Social Footprint

- Testing what the client “knows” about the identity they are claiming.
- Corroborating checks may extend to confirmation that the claimed identity is actually being used in the community.
- The concept of a “living identity” social footprint puts all the factors into perspective.
- Identifying and articulating better practice in this area is a task identified in ICAO’s long term concept of Vision.
Introduction of Biometrics

- Checking who the applicant “is” will usually involve the collection and comparison with prior records of unique biometric information such as photos.
- Digital facial and/or fingerprint and/or iris images now allow automation of biometric comparisons at issuance and at border clearance.
- And in this regard, it MUST be noted that the documents must be inspected and the electronic security tools used.
The Message

- One of the primary messages of this presentation is in the testing of what applicants “have” to support their claim to a particular identity.
- The civil registration and identity documents which accompany an application (that which the applicants “have”) are generally referred to as breeder documents.
- However, NOW we want to broaden the concept beyond documents, and broaden the message from this presentation.
 Components of an Operational Model

- The three components for establishing identity involve:

  1. **Evidence** that the claimed identity is valid, i.e. that the person was in fact born and, if so, that the owner of that identity is still alive.

  2. **Evidence** that the presenter links to the claimed identity – i.e. that the person claiming the identity is who they say they are and that they are the only claimant of the identity.

  3. **Evidence** that the presenter uses the claimed identity – i.e. that the claimant is operating under this identity within the community.

- This is the model for the **Evidence** of Identity.
Current Work

- A Work Paper regarding the evidence of identity was presented to the ICAO TAG and approved for development.
- A work group has been established and a comprehensive Table of Contents has been developed to guide the work toward a TR.
- Work group volunteers have submitted draft inputs for aggregation into the initial draft.
- Among a number of specific areas covered, examples:
  - Social Footprint
  - Birth Certificates
  - Civil Registries
Framing Some Best Practices
*A Start*

- Adherence to specific guidelines.
- Accept only original documents or copies certified.
- Accept only documents that are currently valid; request evidence of 'use in the community' documents that are less than one year old.
- Require at least one form of trusted photographic identification.
- Require documented evidence of any name change.
- Where the authenticity of a particular document is in any way questionable, verify the authenticity of that document with the source issuing authority.
Summary

- One size does not fit all
- Use risk assessment and management
  - Direct-passport fraud
  - Indirect-financial transactions, elections and other uses of false identity documents
- Verify identity-related data against source data and with a trusted referee
  - Birth and death
  - Tax and property deeds
  - Privacy considerations must be in the conscious forefront
- Human resources: Greatest strength and greatest weakness
  - Training
    - As a minimum, new frontline staff should be trained to recognize the types of documents that they will most frequently be presented with.
    - Constant updating is a must-do challenge.
- Remember that biometrics are a TOOL
  - Personal appearance
  - Living identity
- Stay tuned to the ICAO initiative
Thank you for your attention…

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