

# Alliances, Mergers, and Airline Consolidation

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
- Airline consolidation has reached a **new pinnacle**.
- The main partners in the 3 global alliances now enjoy **antitrust immunity**.
- The DL/NW and UA/CO mergers have **raised concentration** in the US industry (along with Southwest/AirTran).

- Good or bad for consumers?
- Consider alliances, then mergers.

## *Alliances*

- It's now recognized that alliances are good for passengers traveling across two networks (“interline passengers”).
- Less known about impacts for passengers on hub-to-hub overlap routes.

XY pax get lower fare with alliance (double marginalization gone).



HK pax could see less competition and higher fares (e.g., JFK/LHR with AA/BA).

- With an immunized alliance, reduction in interline fares was as large as 27% in the late 1990s (relative to nonaligned, IATA fares).
- Over the 2000-08 period, reduction is smaller, at 11%.
- Possible reason is that IATA fares have become more competitive (closer to online fares).

- So interline passengers still **benefit a lot** from alliances.
- Hub-to-hub passengers may see **less competition**, but they also benefit from **offsetting cost synergies** from alliance JV's.
- These cost synergies are a possible reason for **not imposing** competition-enhancing **carve-outs** on hub-to-hub routes.

# Mergers

- Mergers can be **anticompetitive**.
- But they also generate **cost synergies** and offer passengers larger networks with **more destinations**.
- **How serious** are any anticompetitive effects?

- Since fares don't respond much to legacy competition, lost competition from a legacy merger doesn't hurt much.
- Recent work shows that fares on a nonstop route rise by at most 5% when a legacy competitor is lost (LCC effect is much larger!)
- Fares on a connecting route rise by at most 3% when a legacy competitor is lost.



- Using these numbers, predicted **aggregate fare increase from UA/CO** merger is less than **\$40 million** per year.
- Loss is **almost surely offset** by merger benefits (cost synergies, network benefits).
- Actual (rather than predicted) **fare effects of DL/NW** merger are also small.

- Controlling for other changes, recent study shows **no measurable fare effect of merger on NW/DL nonstop overlap routes** (small number of routes may preclude good estimate).
- **NW/DL connecting routes show 5% fare increase from merger**, controlling for other changes.

- Bottom line same as in UA/CO case: **merger benefits probably dominate.**

## *Conclusions*

- **Consolidation** from mergers and greater integration of alliances **generates various benefits.**
- Downside of consolidation appears **not sufficiently large to offset them.**