1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Based on intelligence, improvised explosive devices concealed in computer laser printer ink cartridges were detected on 29 October 2010 in the course of screening cargo shipments at Nottingham East Midlands Airport, United Kingdom, and Dubai Airport, United Arab Emirates. The design of these devices made it extremely difficult to detect the explosive devices with the usual cargo screening methods.

2. AIR CARGO SECURITY MEASURES

2.1 In the light of these events, the Russian Federation subscribes to the international aviation community’s idea of a comprehensive approach to the common goal of enhancing security in the carriage of air cargo, introducing the principle of ‘high-risk cargo’ and mandatory screening of all categories of cargo, particularly cargo from unknown consignors, based on a security risk assessment, as well as using diverse additional screening methods for special cargo categories that may represent an increased danger to civil aviation.

2.2 According to the Air Code (federal law), the mandatory 100 per cent pre-flight screening of air cargo consignments is prescribed in the Russian Federation, which makes it possible to provide the very highest level of cargo transport security.

2.3 Technical and special cargo inspection resources are used during screening: stationary X-ray equipment, stationary explosives detection units, explosive vapour detectors, and other technical and special equipment, as well as the specially trained sniffer dogs that are used.

2.4 Furthermore, before cargo is loaded on an aircraft, it is held in secure conditions for a period of at least two hours over the estimated flight time of the aircraft to its destination.
2.5 Air cargo security is stipulated to be an obligatory section in airport security programmes. These programmes are furnished to carriers by the airport when concluding an airline ground handling services agreement at the airport. The technologies for pre-flight screening of cargo, mail, and stores specific to the airport conditions are worked out by the airport administration.

2.6 In the carriage of cargo, the regulated agent system and application of security risk assessment methods can be considered only as additional security measures that must not exclude the conduct of 100 per cent screening of cargo consignments.

2.7 In order for State authorities and security services to perform prompt air cargo control, software and information systems are being deployed that provide these authorities and services with advance information prior to the arrival at the relevant airport of an aircraft carrying cargo, and allow them to decide beforehand what resources need be mustered, to choose the ways and means to implement the full set of security measures, and to promptly perform border, customs and other types of control.

2.8 A system for automated, remote control and oversight of the security of air cargo, including dangerous goods, employing state-of-the-art satellite navigation technologies, is in development in the Russian Federation. The implementation of this system will lead to strengthened air cargo security, enhanced efficacy of oversight functions, reduced damage to the transportation infrastructure, and increased environmental and public safety.

2.9 Work by Russian experts is also underway on implementing the airlines’ standard for electronic air freight processing and tracking (EF), which makes it possible to cut the costs and time of the air freight service cycle, to track a cargo movement in real time, taking into consideration the one-stop security inspection concept, and to integrate into the global air freight system.

3. **INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN AIR CARGO SECURITY**

3.1 In order to strengthen air cargo security the cooperation of States is needed on all levels, including the governmental, and in international aviation security fora. The Russian Federation is disposed to such cooperation with experts from other countries and welcomes sharing experience and relevant information.

3.2 While considering air cargo security, the civil aviation risk-based approach must be used, i.e., segregating ‘high-risk’ air cargo and applying additional security measures to it.

3.3 As we know, cargo received from an unknown or unregulated shipper, which has suspicious anomalies in the nature of the consignment, or in respect of which threats or intelligence about threats were received, can be high-risk cargo.

3.4 With respect to all cargo consignments, additional security measures safeguarding air cargo throughout its entire supply chain should be developed and introduced, including accepting air cargo only from known and regulated shippers.

3.5 The Russian Federation endorses the proposal to make changes to Annex 17 by including a regular amendment on strengthened and harmonized air cargo security measures.
4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 The High-level Conference on Aviation Security is invited to conclude that: Air cargo security is one of the key conditions for air transport security and the normal operation of the entire international air transport system.

4.2 The High-level Conference on Aviation Security is invited to recommend:

a) agreement that high-risk air cargo necessitates the application of appropriate security measures;

b) support of the initiative of the Russian Federation in developing an automated, remote air cargo security oversight system;

c) calling upon States to safeguard air cargo by applying a secure supply chain system in which air cargo is accepted by known and regulated shippers only or otherwise subjected to appropriate security controls, including screening;

d) agreement with amendments to Annex 17 — Security, germane to strengthened and harmonized air cargo security measures; and

e) encouragement of international cooperation on air cargo security including activities to implement the standard for electronic air freight processing and tracking (EF) and, when implementing this, consider the further application of the one-stop security inspection concept.

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