



WORKING PAPER

ASSEMBLY — 39TH SESSION

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Agenda Item 16: Aviation Security - Policy

LANDSIDE SECURITY POLICIES

(Presented by the Airports Council International (ACI))

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The security of public areas of airports, not within a security restricted area, has become an increasingly high priority following several terrorist attacks. ACI World has collected the views of its membership with regard to the practical implementation of landside security measures and concerns with the potential response to such events. In particular, it highlights the increase in risk posed by some well-intentioned but ultimately self-defeating measures introduced at some airports.

Action: The Assembly is invited to:

- a) note this report on best practices and policies relating to landside security;
- b) request States to continue to work with airports to clearly define responsibility, accountability and scope of measures;
- c) request ICAO to develop further guidance material that clearly identifies a recommended scope for landside security along with appropriate measures, and highlight that guidance to States through State letters or other mechanisms;
- d) request ICAO to review the *Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security* in light of the points presented in this paper; and
- e) direct the Council to include appropriate policies for landside security in the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) proposed by A39-WP/15.

<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	This working paper relates to Strategic Objective C – <i>Security and Facilitation</i> .
<i>Financial implications:</i>	
<i>References:</i>	Annex 17 – <i>Security</i> <i>Aviation Security Manual</i> (Doc 8973, Restricted) A39-WP/16, <i>Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security</i> A39-WP/15, <i>Establishment of a Global Aviation Security Plan</i> <i>ICAO Global Risk Context Statement</i>

¹ Submitted by ACI in English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The terrorist attacks in the landside area of Brussels Airport on 22 March 2016 and at Atatürk Airport in Istanbul on 28 June 2016 have again brought the protection of airport terminals, in particular, sharply into focus for all aviation stakeholders. The changing mode of terrorism towards suicide attacks, and the presence of radicalized individuals throughout the world, has increased the likelihood of attack. The focus on landside areas is in no small part a direct result of measures to improve security processes as passengers move into secured areas on their way to the aircraft.

1.2 Landside spaces (airport spaces accessible to the general public) are subject to general security regulations enacted by national authorities. These national authorities should, therefore, review and coordinate with airports to identify the appropriate measures that match their specific threat scenario.

1.3 There are several developments ongoing in terms of regulation with regard to landside security, both nationally and globally:

- a) the ICAO Council has agreed to two new Standards for inclusion in Amendment 15 of Annex 17– *Security* with regard to landside security, aimed at ensuring that States put appropriate measures in place. These replace existing (similar) Recommended Practices. ACI World appreciates the risk-based nature of these new standards, and recognizes the need to address this issue within Annex 17 Standards.
- b) in A39-WP/16, an addition is proposed to the *Consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security* such that “*the Assembly Encourages Member States, pursuant to their domestic laws, regulations and aviation security programmes, and in accordance with applicable SARPs and the capacity of each State, to promote the implementation of aviation security measures in a practical manner to:*
 - j) address the risk of attacks in landside areas, including terminal buildings, by working with all stakeholders to sustain a culture of constant vigilance, deterrence, prevention, response and resilience in a coordinated manner in the face of evolving threats, taking into account the need to maintain a practical balance between the needs of effective and sustainable security measures and passenger facilitation.*”; and
- c) in A39-WP/14, the *ICAO Comprehensive Aviation Security Strategy (ICASS)* also identifies landside security as a high-priority risk area for the coming years.

1.4 Airports agree that they have a duty of care for their passengers and take responsibility for securing their property, staff and customers. To help ensure the security of the travelling public, airports continually evaluate and enhance security measures based on available information from local, national, and international experts and authorities and based on documented incidents.

1.5 Airports already exercise best practices by taking every threat seriously and applying a rigorous, comprehensive, multi-layered, risk-based approach that provides effective aviation security while delivering open, accessible and expedient air transport services.

1.6 There is a shared responsibility between airports and the local law enforcement authorities at airports to protect the public spaces of an airport according to the local threat assessment, and defining and agreeing on accountability and responsibility is critical in ensuring that there is a robust system in place.

2. AIRPORT CONCERNS

2.1 However, at a regulatory level and in some States, responsibilities may be undefined and differ. One of the biggest vulnerabilities, therefore, relates to the lack of agreed accountability.

2.2 There is also a risk of introduction of Standards regarding landside security in that they may prompt some States to implement inappropriate measures, such as screening, at the entrance to terminal buildings. This may pose a new risk in that this simply moves the vulnerability while creating considerable inconvenience to passengers; many States agree.

2.3 There is also a risk that the Standard may be interpreted too broadly to include areas that do not have mass gatherings of people, such as hotels and carparks, which are owned by an airport and thus could be considered “landside”. We believe that this may spread security resources far too thinly and be counterproductive in addressing the greatest vulnerabilities.

3. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS AND MEASURES

3.1 ACI World and its member airports have identified a number of key actions that we believe are critical for securing the landside:

- a) ensuring that there is a mechanism to share threat information between local law enforcement, intelligence agencies and security cleared airport staff. This should include appropriate mechanisms for regular updates and emergency communications and facilitating relevant airport staff to have sufficient State sanctioned security clearance;
- b) setting in place a process for collaboration between airports and national regulators to agree on a definition of “landside.” This might include areas of mass gathering inside or close to the terminal, where there is a regular concentration of people. A clear definition will be critical to defining the scope of measures and ensuring that the focus of measures is on genuinely high-risk areas, and not all property owned by the airport;
- c) similarly, working between airports, national regulators and local authorities, as appropriate, to conduct a vulnerability assessment of the airport to determine if any adjustment to current security measures is warranted;
- d) implementing a risk-based approach – airports should discuss the most appropriate measures for their particular situation and identify the benefits and disadvantages of each with local authorities;
- e) agreeing on (among airports, national regulators and local authorities) a range of flexible options for measures to enhance security as the threat situation dictates, including the use of high visibility deterrence such as explosive-detection equipment and dog teams, high visibility law enforcement patrols and behaviour detection;
- f) agreeing on a clear set of criteria to reduce security measures when the threat situation allows;
- g) identifying means to reduce queues and crowds and avoiding additional touchpoints or bottlenecks in the passenger process; and,
- h) ensuring a strong security culture including vigilance and reporting of suspicious behaviour for all persons working in the airport environment, whether employed by the State, airport or sub-contracted companies.

4. CONCLUSION

4.1 Landside areas of airports, as public open spaces, are clearly a favoured target for terrorist attacks due to the mixed international nature of the people within them, and the opportunity for operational disruption and significant financial impact.

4.2 ACI supports the actions being taken by ICAO in this regard, and the policy proposed in the *Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security*.

4.3 However, we see a critical need for:

- a) clarity between States and airports on roles, responsibilities and scope;
- b) better sharing of information and intelligence between agencies and with airport operators;
- c) provision of sufficient resources by States to provide visible and effective patrolling of airport landside areas; and,
- d) clarity of messaging to States to ensure that landside security is not interpreted as “additional screening.”

4.4 We would therefore ask for additional points to be included in the *Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security*, harmonization with the proposed *Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP)* and very clear guidance material to be developed on these matters.

— END —