



**WORKING PAPER**

**ASSEMBLY — 38TH SESSION**

**EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE**

**Agenda Item 13: Aviation Security - Policy**

**PROPOSALS FOR WORK PRIORITIES IN AVIATION SECURITY**

(Presented by Lithuania on behalf of the European Union and its Member States<sup>1</sup>  
and the other Member States of the European Civil Aviation Conference<sup>2</sup>)

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This Working Paper presents proposals for work priorities in aviation security, based on the conclusions and recommendations of the ICAO High Level Conference on Aviation Security held in Montreal on 12-14 September 2012.

**Action:** The Assembly is invited to consider the recommendations for policy and work priorities described in this working paper in support of its review of Resolution A37-17: *Consolidated Statement on the Continuing ICAO Policies Related to the Safeguarding of International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference* and as a contribution to ICAO work programme for the 2014-16 triennium, as it pertains to aviation security.

<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	This working paper relates to Strategic Objective B — Security
<i>Financial implications:</i>	The proposed work priorities for ICAO should be covered under the regular budget of the organisation.
<i>References:</i>	Resolution A37-17: <i>Consolidated Statement on the Continuing ICAO Policies Related to the Safeguarding of International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference</i>

<sup>1</sup> Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

<sup>2</sup> Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Ukraine.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The High Level Conference on Aviation Security (hereafter 'the Conference') provided a unique opportunity for ICAO Member States and Observers to reflect on the progress made in the design and implementation of security policy. The Conference delivered conclusions and recommendations to guide ICAO's future activities and work programme in aviation security which should be supported.

## 2. POLICY PRIORITIES

### 2.1 *Risk based security*

2.1.1 The Conference '*encouraged ICAO Member States and industry stakeholders to adopt a risk-based approach to aviation security*' and '*welcomed the initiative taken by ICAO to establish a Risk Context Statement...*'. Although ICAO is not in a position, by its nature, to produce threat assessments for the air transport sector, its Global Risk Context Statement (RCS) provides valuable general information about risk. The efficiency of any security regime relies on its ability to address threats to and prevent vulnerabilities of civil aviation from being exploited to commit an act of unlawful interference; that involves managing the risk associated with such threats and vulnerabilities. Adopting a risk-based approach to security should span a number of fields to apply to: i) the design of security measures in ICAO Annex 17, ii) the decision-making in the allocation of finite resources at the operational level, iii) the determination of where, how and when ICAO security audits should be conducted, and iv) the definition of a timely and proportionate response to terrorist attacks and attempted attacks when they occur.

### 2.2 *Sustainability of aviation security measures*

2.2.1 The Conference '*requested ICAO and its Member States to consider developing a more outcomes-based approach when regulating aviation security...*' and '*highlighted the importance of defining security measures which are effective, efficient, operationally viable, economically sustainable, and take into account the impact on passengers*'. As such, it should be recognised that aviation security measures implemented in Member States may differ so long as they are compliant as a minimum with Annex 17 and achieve the necessary security outcome. Furthermore, the effectiveness and sustainability of these measures require that proper account be taken of their operational and economic consequences and the need to avoid undue impacts on passenger and cargo facilitation.

### 2.3 *Recognition of security measures*

2.3.1 The Conference '*strongly encouraged ICAO Member States to explore with each other mutual recognition arrangements, including one-stop security, which recognize the equivalence of their aviation security measures where these achieve the same outcomes, and which are based on an agreed comprehensive and continuous validation process and effective exchange of information regarding their respective aviation security systems.*' This principle, which is already recognised in Annex 17, should be based on objective and robust criteria, such as: i) regulatory convergence; ii) an agreed comprehensive and continuous validation process, including the possibility of on-site verification; and iii) an effective and continuous exchange of information between State authorities regarding their respective aviation security systems. Such recognition would avoid the unnecessary duplication of security measures, thus optimising the use of limited resources and removing obstacles to passenger travel and trade.

## 2.4 *Coordination between different entities*

2.4.1 Coordination between the different entities having responsibilities for one or more aspects of aviation security is essential to ensure that there is a comprehensive, integrated approach to security – beyond specific traditional areas of competencies – and that there is no gap in the transmission of security information that may be important for preventing an act of unlawful interference and no divergence of respective requirements that could create weaknesses or confusion in the overall system. Examples of this would be: i) the efforts to harmonise the approach to air cargo and mail security with the World Customs Organisation and the Universal Postal Union in order to promote synergies between their respective requirements, to avoid duplication, and to reduce costs for the industry; ii) the cooperation between all entities involved at national/airport levels in the protection of landside areas to enhance security of these areas of airports; and iii) the cooperation on cyber security and ATM security measures.

## 2.5 *Assistance activities*

2.5.1 The Conference '*encouraged Member States to share USAP audit results in an appropriate and secure manner in order to target capacity-building ...*' and '*encouraged ICAO Member States and relevant stakeholders such as regional organizations to enter into partnership agreements for the organization and delivery of capacity-building activities...*'. As such, more efficient targeting of assistance activities should be achieved and based on criteria such as: i) the level and nature of the risk to and from aviation; ii) the current vulnerabilities in a given country. A thorough analysis of ICAO USAP audit findings and other sources of information (e.g. regional compliance monitoring systems) should provide the necessary information about these vulnerabilities; and iii) the commitment of the recipient Member State to ensuring the implementation of the measures.

## 3. **WORK PRIORITIES**

3.1 As a contribution to defining ICAO's work programme for the 2014-16 triennium and to prioritising activities, the policy priorities described above should be fully integrated into ICAO's work by undertaking the following tasks:

3.2 ***Implementing risk based security:*** For Member States wishing to use it, the RCS offers a methodology for developing their own national risk assessment. Based on information provided by Member States, ICAO should update regularly its RCS. In addition, by adopting a risk based approach to aviation security, ICAO should:

- a) review existing risk assessments in the light of recent developments;
- b) develop further risk assessments on new and emerging threats. E.g. risks of cyber attacks to air navigation and ATM systems have materialised given the technological developments in aircraft and technological and operational procedures in the ATM, as discussed at the 12<sup>th</sup> Air Navigation Conference. Cooperation between the relevant ATM Panels and advisory groups and the AVSEC Panel on one hand, and between the industry and regulators on the other hand, is essential for defining technically and operationally relevant measures in these domains.
- c) further amend Annex 17, as well as the content of the ICAO Security Manual and training documentation. In particular, an analysis of the preventive security measures described in Annex 17 should be undertaken from a risk perspective, and thereafter proposals for amendment made.

- d) encourage Member States to react in a proportionate and coordinated in case of an act of unlawful interference against civil aviation in order to avoid any overreaction which would have a negative impact on the air transport sector and send wrong messages to the public.

3.3 ***Ensuring the sustainability of security measures:*** ICAO in its work on further developing the global aviation security framework should promote the proper analysis of the potential effects of new measures as a way of ensuring that they are proportionate and practicable, they take into account the expected increase of worldwide passenger traffic, and they will not cause unnecessary impacts on the aviation industry, on economic interest more generally or on the passenger experience. This analysis should include considering the impact on:

- a) operations and use of airport infrastructure, including on cost and (re-)assignment of resources;
- b) the acceptability of the measures both to staff members and the travelling public;
- c) costs to both government and industry;
- d) technological requirements and use of technology;
- e) other areas such as safety or the environment; and
- f) the passenger experience, including passengers' rights, dignity and protection of personal data.

3.4 ***Strengthening air cargo and mail security:*** In line with the Conference's conclusions to mitigate the risk to air cargo and mail, significant progress has been achieved through the recent adoption of enhanced Standards in Annex 17. However, this represents a first step forward and further work is required in order to ensure cargo and mail are subjected to either physical screening or secure supply chains (including approval of known consignors and regulated agents by or on behalf of the appropriate authority), and afterwards, that cargo and mail is protected from unlawful interference.

3.5 ***Addressing the threat from liquid explosives:*** In line with the Conference's conclusions, ICAO and its Member States should implement security controls to including addressing threats from liquid, aerosol and gel (LAG) explosives, and where possible, do this by technological means. With respect to mitigating threats to civil aviation from explosives, a comprehensive approach should include the detection of any kind of explosives by advanced screening technology.

3.6 ***Targeting assistance activities and measuring their performance:*** ICAO should actively assist Member States in their efforts to comply with Annex 17, including the new air cargo/mail security and customs standards, by providing guidance material and training. ICAO should take an active role in the targeting, prioritisation and coordination of such assistance, working with donor States/organisations and recipients, as well as with industry stakeholders in order to ensure their sustainability. In line with the Conference's conclusions, ICAO should continue developing and then implementing efficiency indicators, encapsulating both the criteria and methodologies for assessing the effectiveness and sustainability of assistance projects.

## 4. CONCLUSIONS

4.1 The Assembly is invited to consider the proposals for work priorities described in this paper in support of its review of Resolution A37-17: *Consolidated Statement on the Continuing ICAO Policies Related to the Safeguarding of International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference* and as a contribution to ICAO 2014-2016 work programme.