



SECOND HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE ON AVIATION SECURITY (HLCAS/2)

Montréal, 29 to 30 November 2018

Agenda Item 2: Future approaches to managing aviation security risks

SECURITY REPORTING AND CULTURE

(Presented by Ireland)

SUMMARY

Contracting States are required to establish confidential reporting systems for analysing security information. Promoting an effective security culture includes promoting reports on security occurrences. Moreover, it prompts the need to analyse trends and to identify areas where preventative measures can be taken, their effectiveness measured and an improved outcome delivered for the safety and security of the travelling public.

Action by the High Level Conference is in paragraph 5.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Under SARP 3.4.7 of ICAO Annex 17, each contracting State shall supplement its national civil aviation security quality control programme by establishing a confidential reporting system for analysing security information provided by sources such as passengers, crew and ground personnel.

1.2 Since the entry into force of Amendment 16 of Annex 17 in November 2018, each Contracting State shall have a supplementary reporting system on acts of unlawful interference and preparatory acts. This amendment takes SARP 2.1.4 into account where each Contracting State should ensure appropriate protection of aviation security information.


2. REGULATORY MEASURES FOR AVIATION SECURITY REPORTING

2.1 Implementing SARPs 3.4.7, 5.1.6 and 2.1.4 comprises several elements: a means of reporting, analysis of the reports, identification of trends, security intelligence based on the aggregated and anonymised reports and a management process for handling confidential reports.

2.2 A key knowledge competence included in security awareness training is that personnel within the aviation regime know who to report to. Promotional slogans such as “See something, Say something” are commonplace. Less evident is how the reports are analysed and communicated back to industry as the intelligence should be used to ensure that identified gaps are addressed and that actions taken are positively impacting negative trends.

2.3 In Ireland, there is a disparity between the reporting levels of different aviation industry sectors – the most prolific reports are from air carriers, with airport operators next. There are similar differences within sectors between those with mature reporting systems and safeguards and those companies that may require reports but have no safeguards in place for the reporters.

2.4 While establishing or refining their reporting system is a Standard, it is important to ensure that the safeguards for reporting are in place. States should ensure that the reporting system is protected and used to effect the necessary changes to strengthen the national and international aviation security regime. The following chart demonstrates how the reporting culture has evolved in one Irish organization in the last ten years:




3. PRACTICAL EXAMPLES

3.1 Pepper spray in cabin baggage is one of the most likely prohibited articles to be detected at a cabin baggage checkpoint in Ireland. In Ireland, it is illegal to carry pepper spray unless authorized to do so and that is limited to the national police. The airports were reporting that these items had been detected and the reports indicated that there was a trend: pepper spray. Once the trend was identified, the airport operators started to examine where the pepper spray was coming from. In all cases to date, the source was inbound – these were passengers travelling to Ireland from States where it is legal to carry such items. Using this evidence, communication with passengers can be targeted to ensure that passengers are aware that this material cannot travel in cabin baggage.


3.2 Another example is in regard to unruly/disruptive passengers on board an aircraft. Such passengers create distraction and disruption which can compromise the safety of the flight. Current reporting trends in Ireland show that the highest category of reports is disruptive behaviour by passengers on board aircraft. Having examined this trend, it was not initially possible to discern whether there was any aviation security element to these reports. Anecdotal evidence suggested that there was an increasingly negative trend toward Level 3 type reports and isolated cases of Level 4 activity, that while not statistically significant, were concerning.

3.3 By requiring that reports are now categorized according to the Levels recommended by ICAO, Ireland can now discern which reports are security related and which reports relate to unruly behaviour. The result would suggest that a significant minority of reports are security related and this means that State resources can be more targeted toward those cases that are classified at the highest level. Additionally, together with the industry, passenger behaviour campaigns have been undertaken to focus resources into training and awareness of the issue. The intelligence shows the routes and times of the day where the campaigns need to be most prevalent. Ultimately, this has allowed the State and industry adopt a risk-based approach.



3.4 In another case, the reports identified routes and types of fraudulent documentation used to access flights. For all States and air carriers, detecting persons travelling with illegal documentation is a costly challenge. By using the reports, the State can target the routes, share information with the State of origin and prevent further cases.

3.5 To use a recent example, in one quarter and for only one air carrier to Ireland, the following shows the number of cases where inbound passengers, previously subject to immigration controls elsewhere, presented in Ireland with false documentation.



3.6 While not shown on the slide, Ireland is aware of the routes where there is a higher prevalence of this practice than on other routes. The security issue arises when the now Potentially Disruptive Passenger must be returned to their origin or where deemed admissible. If the root cause was addressed at the origin before travel the likelihood of security issues arising would be greatly diminished. Are there opportunities to work together to ensure that we can reduce the incidence?

4. **REPORTING CULTURE**

4.1 An effective reporting system is entirely dependent on reports and reports depend on the reporting culture in the organization and in the State. While the Standard clearly requires the State to establish a reporting system, the establishment of a culture requires active promotion to normalize and encourage reporting. An open and positive reporting culture has key benefits in the context of threat mitigation. For example, an insider threat could be identified where an open and positive reporting culture exists.

4.2 Realizing an open and positive reporting culture requires just culture and safeguards that protect legitimate reporters, ensuring that there are no sanctions for those persons that have acted commensurate with their training, skills and competencies territories.

4.3 The relatively low level of aviation security reporting in some sectors relative to aviation safety suggests that more promotion by States is needed to give feedback on the aviation security systems performance both at national level and if effective at national level, it will greatly enhance the aviation security intelligence at international level.

5. **ACTION BY THE HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE**

5.1 The High-level Conference on Aviation Security is invited to:

- a) reaffirm the need to establish efficient aviation security reporting systems, including confidential reporting provisions, to facilitate effective analysis of information as specified in Standards 3.4.7 and 5.1.6 of ICAO Annex 17;
- b) urge States and industry to promote a reporting culture to improve the number and levels of reporting; and
- c) urge States and industry to share information and affect meaningful outcomes in areas where there are established and negative trends.

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