



Agenda Item 3:

Safety Oversight

3.2 Regional Safety Oversight Developments

(Presented by the Secretariat)

SUMMARY	
This working paper presents follow-up to the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) audits, as well as audit results analysis corresponding to the limited number of States audited in the CAR Region, and proposes actions for the audits to be carried out in the CAR region during the second half of 2008.	
References:	
• ICAO – C180 WP12885	
Strategic Objectives:	<i>This working paper is related to Strategic Objective A and Key Activity A3.</i>

1. Introduction

1.1 As of 30 April 2008, 90 audits have been conducted. The audits have been instrumental in establishing the degree of implementation of the eight critical elements of the safety oversight system, determining the status of State compliance with ICAO Standard and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and highlighting areas of concern.

1.2 Audit results continue to reveal findings in the areas of personnel licensing, aircraft operation, and airworthiness of aircraft; however, the majority of audit findings under the current cycle relate to the new audit areas, i.e., aerodromes, air navigation services, and aircraft accident and incident investigation.

1.3 This working paper is structured into two parts. Part one aligns the implementation of the USOAP with ICAO Strategic Objective A and the associated expected outputs as contained in the Organization's Strategic Action Plan. Part two of the report contains audit results and matters requiring the attention of the Directors of the Civil Aviation Authorities.

1.4 The analysis represents only the eight audits conducted in the Central American and Caribbean Regions; nevertheless, the similarities are evident, and we expect similar results as the audits expand to all States and operational safety deficiencies become representative of the area audited due to geopolitical, cultural and availability of resources in the Region. **Appendix A** to this paper contains a graph representing the global average and the relationship between the global average and the results from the Central American and Caribbean Regions, considering the residual deficiencies from the areas of personnel licensing, aircraft operations and airworthiness from previous audits. The global average of

deficiencies has risen to a disconcerting 58.4% which denotes a significant increase in safety deficiencies and a lack of implementation of ICAO SARPs. The CAR Region, with results available from the Safety Oversight Audit (SOA), shows approximately 40% lack of implementation of the eight critical elements.

1.5 The North American, Central American and Caribbean Regional Office conducted a workshop on the preparation, execution and reporting of Comprehensive System Audits (CSA) in July 2007, for the NACC Region in preparation for the 2007, 2008 and 2009 audit schedule.

2. PART ONE: PROGRESS WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ICAO STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE A

2.1 The USOAP is directly related to ICAO Strategic Objective A – *Enhance Global Civil Aviation Safety* and, in particular, to Key Activity A3 – *Conduct Aviation Safety Oversight Audits to Identify Deficiencies and Encourage their Resolution by States*. In turn, this key activity, leads to a series of expected outputs. The progress of the programme with regard to Key Activity A3 and its expected outputs is as follows:

2.1.1 *Complete the audits of all Contracting States in a six-year cycle*

2.1.1.1 Eighteen Contracting States were audited during the reporting period bringing the number of States audited under the CSA as of 30 April 2008, to 90 States.

2.1.1.2 All Contracting States scheduled for a safety oversight audit in 2008 and 2009 have been notified of the proposed dates for the conduct of the audit and provided with the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for their signature.

2.1.1.3 States continue to submit and update their State Aviation Activity Questionnaires (SAAQs) and Compliance Checklists (CCs) in preparation for upcoming audits. Usage of the Safety Oversight Audit (SOA) dedicated website to manage the submission of SAAQs and CCs continues to increase.

2.1.1.4 For States in the Region scheduled for the USOAP CSA the second half of 2008 and 2009, submission of SAAQs on the ICAO Flight Safety Information Exchange (FSIX) SOA secure website, continues to be minimal. Compliance Checklists are still in a initial state of completion, and must be completed as soon as possible in preparation for the scheduled audits.

2.1.1.5 Pursuant to Assembly Resolution A35-6, final audit reports are made available in their entirety to Contracting States on the ICAO SOA secure website together with relevant information from the Audit Findings and Differences Database (AFDD). As of 31 December 2006, 14 such reports, including the one pertaining to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), have been posted on the SOA secure website. **Appendix B** to this working paper contains information on the status of audit reports yet to be published. The latest Safety Oversight Audit (SOA) schedule of activities for 2007 and 2008 has been forwarded to States and can be accessed on the ICAO-Net through the password already provided to the Directors of Civil Aviation.

2.1.2 *Monitor the level of implementation of State corrective action plans in coordination with the Regional Offices and through correspondence with States*

2.1.2.1 In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding signed with ICAO, States agree to prepare and submit a corrective action plan to ICAO that addresses the findings and recommendations contained in the interim safety oversight audit report, including specific actions and deadlines.

3. **PART TWO: PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE AUDITS AND MATTERS REQUIRING THE ATTENTION OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES**

3.1 **Audit results and areas of concern**

3.1.1 The results of the 90 safety oversight audits conducted under the CSA as of 30 April 2008, covering the safety-related provisions in all safety-related Annexes, have been analysed using the AFDD. As shown in the chart in Appendix A, the average lack of effective implementation of the critical elements of a safety oversight system (Doc 9734 — *Safety Oversight Manual, Part A – The Establishment and Management of a State's Safety Oversight System, refers*) at the global level was 58.4 percent. Some of the main areas of concern for each of the critical elements are highlighted below.

3.1.2 **Critical element 1 – Primary aviation legislation (CE-1).** In the area of primary aviation legislation, it has been identified that some States face difficulties in determining how to introduce ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) into their legal framework, be it through the promulgation of national regulations, the adoption of foreign regulations or the direct adoption of a particular Annex in its entirety. The audits indicate that some States do not have a clear understanding of the implications of these three approaches. Difficulties have also been identified with State establishment of a system to introduce Annex amendments into their legislation and notify differences to ICAO. Finally, provisions for State national requirements to effectively empower their inspectors were not always provided.

3.1.3 **Critical element 2 – Specific operating regulations (CE-2).** With respect to this critical element, the majority of concerns were found in the new areas being audited. Specifically, 44 percent of the protocol questions asked pertaining to the development of regulations to address provisions of Annex 13 — *Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (AIG)*, were found unsatisfactory. With respect to air navigation services (ANS) protocol, 31 percent of the questions asked were unsatisfactory, identifying inadequacies with establishing requirements for air traffic management and PANS-OPS, operating procedures for ANS service provision, ANS service providers, training of technical staff and establishing an ATM Safety Management System. Finally, 29 percent of the protocol questions asked pertaining to the development of regulations to address Aerodromes and Ground Aids (AGA) were found unsatisfactory.

3.1.4 **Critical element 3 – State civil aviation system and safety oversight functions (CE 3).** Findings in this critical element were, for the most part, identified in all areas audited. States continue to face difficulties in attracting and retaining qualified personnel, resulting in a staffing shortage. The establishment of an organizational structure with adequate financial resources remains a challenge for many States.

3.1.5 **Critical element 4 – Technical personnel qualification and training (CE-4).** Another area refers to the difficulties faced by States in establishing qualifications and experience levels for technical staff, and the development and implementation of training programmes to maintain competency.

3.1.6 **Critical element 5 – Technical guidance, tools and the provision of safety-critical information (CE-5).** The majority of the audit findings regarding this critical element related to the lack of licensing, certification and approval procedures developed by the States to guide their regulatory and technical staff as well as industry. Some States conducting their own aircraft accident investigations lacked investigation procedures; in the aerodromes field, guidance material for regulatory staff and industry was also lacking.

3.1.7 **Critical element 6 – Licensing, certification, authorization and/or approval obligations (CE-6).** Most of the audit findings regarding this critical element were identified in the new audit areas: ANS, AGA and AIG. With respect to ANS, many States had neither developed a policy and procedures to determine the capacity of their ATS system nor established separation minima in accordance with ICAO requirements and the need for SMS approval. In the area of aerodromes, findings revealed problems with the certification process and aerodrome manual content, followed by operational services such as apron management, airport emergency plans and wildlife control.

3.1.8 **Critical element 7 – Surveillance obligations (CE-7).** Audit findings related to this critical element were equally distributed in all areas audited. States continue to have shortcomings in their aircraft operations surveillance programmes, as well as in the surveillance of their air navigation service providers and licensed aerodromes.

3.1.9 **Critical element 8 – Resolution of safety concerns (CE-8).** The resolution of safety concerns remains problematic. Some States are still not adequately ensuring that findings identified through routine inspections and surveillance activities are resolved. With respect to accident and serious incident investigations, many findings were identified against the processing of accident or serious incident reports and the lack of reporting systems.

3.1.10 It should be noted that the audit results under the CSA continue to reveal audit findings in the areas of personnel licensing, aircraft operations and airworthiness of aircraft. As an example, the audits have indicated that as a result of the high demand for pilots, a number of States are facing increasing difficulties in recruiting qualified flight operations inspectors. This situation has generated audit findings related to the certification of air transport operators and the surveillance of aircraft operations. However, it is worthy to note that the majority of the audit findings (under the CSA) relate to the new audit areas (aerodromes, air navigation services and aircraft accident and incident investigation).

3.2 **Procedure for transparency and disclosure**

3.2.1 Subsequent to the approval by the Council of the procedure for transparency and disclosure (C-DEC 175/13 and 14), follow-up letters were sent to those States that had not replied to the ICAO request to submit a corrective action plan following a safety oversight audit, or to provide ICAO with information regarding the status of safety oversight in their States. To date, most States have responded. The information provided thus far was used in determining the urgency to schedule audits and the scope of the audit missions.


4. **Suggested action**

The Meeting is invited to:


- a) take note of the information provided in this working paper;
- b) take into account the findings related to the application of the eight critical elements of the CSA, paragraph 3.1.2 to 3.1.9, and to take the corresponding actions to solve these deficiencies; and
- c) examine that the preliminary audit results from the 90 audits conducted under the CSA, which have revealed world-wide lack of effective implementation (58.4%) of the safety oversight system critical elements, with most of the audit findings related to the new audit areas.

APPENDIX A

Critical Elements of a Safety Oversight System
(Applied to all Safety related Annexes)
Lack of Effective Implementation (%)



APPENDIX B



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