



## **FACILITATION (FAL) DIVISION — TWELFTH SESSION**

**Cairo, Egypt, 22 March to 2 April 2004**

### **Agenda Item 5: Modernizing airport facilities and service delivery systems**

#### **OPERATION OF THE AIRBUS A380**

(Presented by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF))

##### **SUMMARY**

In FAL/12-WP/31, the Division was invited to exchange views on the subject of the Airbus A380 and the challenges posed by its deployment when developing and amending the relevant Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). In consideration of this request, the ITF recommends that the Division consider several issues related to emergency evacuation, airport services, and cabin crew requirements.

Action by the Division is in paragraph 3.1.

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

1.1 In a relatively short period of time, the new Airbus A380 is about to start operation. The A380 is a completely new type of aircraft that will have a full-length upper deck with multiple exit pairs and a wide staircase to the main deck.

1.2 In Paragraph 2 of FAL/12-WP/31, the Secretariat lists a number of security and facilitation issues that must be considered prior to operation of the Airbus A380. Among these issues are impacts on check-in areas, increased passenger risk, and various in-flight issues.

1.3 In addition to these concerns, ITF would like to submit the following emergency services issues for consideration (per Paragraph 3, "Action by the Division", which invited an exchange of views on the subject of new large aircraft security and facilitation challenges).

### **2. EMERGENCY SERVICES**

2.1 It is apparently the intention of various regulatory authorities to certify the Airbus A380 for evacuation of passengers and crew without conducting a full-scale evacuation demonstration. Instead, it appears that authorities will rely on data from partial tests of a simulated upper-deck-only evacuation, or from evacuation tests of the B747, with its much shorter upper deck with only one pair of exits. The ITF believes this is insufficient.

2.2 For this novel aircraft design, there is no combination of analysis and tests that will provide data with respect to the emergency evacuation capability of the aircraft equivalent to that which would be obtained by actual demonstration.

2.3 The ITF believes that is far better to learn lessons before introduction of the airplane into operational service. If a full-scale evacuation demonstration is not required to certify the A380, it does not mean that we will never witness a full-scale evacuation demonstration for this aircraft. Rather, it means that fare-paying passengers will replace volunteer test subjects in a life-threatening emergency, not a safely controlled experimental design. This unnecessarily exposes the travelling public and crewmembers to a potentially disastrous outcome.

2.4 We are equally concerned that the lack of such full scale evacuation tests on the aircraft leaves airport authorities with insufficient information regarding their own emergency services requirements, e.g., numbers of emergency personnel, fire response units and procedures, and training.

2.5 A further concern is in relation to duty periods in excess of 14 hours currently being discussed. For safety and security reasons, cabin crew must maintain vigilant passenger observation and situational awareness while on duty, and be prepared to deal with emergencies as well as violence in the cabin.

2.6 The ITF believes that the issues of cabin crew requirements, training, crew levels and duty cycles must be considered if they are to operate safely in these ultra long-range operations.

### 3. ACTION BY THE DIVISION

3.1 The Division is invited to exchange views and information on these subjects and recommend that the emergency services challenges posed by deployment of the Airbus A380 be taken into account when developing/amending the relevant SARPs.

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