Copenhagen Airports A/S

Kjeld Binger

Vice President of Copenhagen Airports A/S
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Copenhagen Airport
Hotel- and Real Estate Company A/S
Member of the Supervisory Board of Copenhagen Airport
Development International A/S
Member of the Board of Directors of ASUR

ICAO Airport Privatization Seminar/Forum - Guatamala, 13-16 December 1999

Mexico Case Study

Interests in Airports

Public sector

Optimizing socioeconomic utility by providing sufficient infrastructure

- Airports as a growth driver
- Airports as a community trademark
- Airports as a public service

Stake holder value

Versus

Exploiting market opportunities by taking business decisions

- Cost efficiency
- Market driven capacity planning
- Developing commercial activities

Share holder value

Private sector operator


Why involve a private sector operator?

- the public sector point of view -

- Disengage airport development from public fiscal policies and political regimes
- Obtain greater operational efficiency
- Attract new sources of investments funds
- Attract new technology
- Develop airport related commercial activities

How is the interests of both the public sector and a private airport operator met in a privatization?






Private airport operator

The ownership structure is the key to balance of the interests of the public sector and a private sector operator in a privatization process

Ownership structure




BOT - valuation

The value of the concession for the concessionaire is the Net Present value of the free cash flow available as dividends.

Does a limited time horizon of n years matter in the valuation of free cash flow?

Free cash flow - nominal prices




BOT - valuation

Artificial case - no termination

NPV of the terminal value at a long term horizon typical equals 2-4% of the total NPV - no significant impact on valuation

Free cash flow - Net Present Value



But other termination issues matter

BOT - termination issues


If the concession contract shall be of value at the end of the concession period dividends must be paid out throughout the whole concession period

=>

Issues of matter at the end of the concession period

- Capital investments versus dividend pay out
- The take-over valuation of capital investments
- The level of maintenance

Degree of conflict about the use of cash if no agreement on the take-over valuation of capital investments has been arranged



The use of BOT for an airport system

Public sector interest

- Possibility to privatize less profitable airports or airports with deficit
- Development of infrastructure at less developed areas
- Cross-subsidization between airports
- Effective use of resources in the airport system

Public sector risks

- Abuse of monopoly status in the airport system region
- Limited competition between the airports
- Uncontrolled diversification in the pursuit for profit
- Conflicts with airlines and other users in the pursuit for profit

What to privatize in an airport system

Operational objectives

- Obtain full synergy between all operational areas
- Full operational flexibility
- Controlling conflict of interest in capacity planning

Areas of question

- Control of airspace
- Security
- Customs and passport control
- Fuel supply

Mexico Case

- •During 1997, the Mexican government started a privatization process for 35 profitable airports
- •ASA will continue operating 27 minor airports around the country
- •The privatization process has two stages:

A public tender for the purchase of 15% of the company by a Strategic Partner

The sale of shares in the domestic and international equity markets


•With the sale to the Strategic Partner, the airport companies exit the government sector without any governmental budget controls

The Privatization Objectives

The strategy was chosen in order to support the following objectives:

- To maintain, modernize and expand airport infrastructure
- To increase safety and efficiency
- To improve airport and commercial services in a <u>competitive</u> and non-discriminatory manner
- To support the development of the air transport and airport industry
- To secure at all times the *continuous* operation of *all* airports

The Privatization Strategy



Our nine concessions have the following characteristics:

Right to exploit, manage, operate, maintain and commercialize the airports for a 50 year period as of November 1, 1998

Option to extend period for another 50 years

A concession can be cancelled if ASUR does not comply with terms of the concession

The Concessionaire's main obligations include:


- •Rendering airport services, which include landing, aircraft parking, airport security, fire brigade and basic services to airlines and passengers
- Minimum investment requirements (contained in bid)
- Comply and exceed international quality service standards
- •Prepare and submit Master Development Plan by September 30, 1999
- •Based on anticipated air traffic and service standards, concessionaires must develop required airport infrastructure
- •Contains new capex requirements for next five years

Mexico Case: Southeast Airport Group

- The use of BOT for an airport system -



Ownership Organization



The Participation Agreement

- Participation Contract (15 years)
- Stock Purchase Agreement
- Stock Option Agreement
- Shareholders Agreement
- Trust Agreement
- Technical Assistance and Technology Transfer Agreement

Covering risk

Public sector risk

- Management contract
- Regulation

Operator risk

- Dual till
- Return on aeronautical activities
- Management contract

Mexico Case: Southeast Airport Group - Summary -

- BOT: Build-Operate-Transfer
- Airport group of 9 airports
- 50 year concession period
- Regulation
 - ∇ 5 year review of master plan
 - aeronautical income regulated based on the master plan
- Dual till
- 15 years management contract transfer of technology
- Performance fee

