INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

REPORT OF THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE ANNUAL SAFETY REPORT GROUP

(ASRG/5)

(Virtual Meeting, 5 October 2023)

The views expressed in this Report should be taken as those of the Regional Aviation Safety Group and not of the Organization. This Report will, however, be submitted to the ICAO Council and any formal action taken will be published in due course as a Supplement to the Report.

Approved by the Meeting
and published by authority of the Secretary General

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PART I – HISTORY OF THE MEETING

1. PLACE AND DURATION

1.1 The Fifth Meeting of the Annual Safety Report Group (ASRG/5) was held virtually, on 5 October 2023, using MS Teams.

2. OPENING

2.1 The meeting was opened by Mrs. Leena Ahmed Alkooheji, Chief, Airport & Air Navigation Audit, Bahrain who welcomed the participants and thanked them for joining this Teleconference and for their continuous support.

2.2 Mrs Leena encouraged the participants to support the ASRG in developing the MID-ASR by sharing safety information.

2.3 Mrs. highlighted that the main objective of the ASRG is to gather and analyze the safety information, identify the risk category focus/key areas and emerging issues; and identify root causes and contributing factors, in order to support the SEIG in the development of mitigation measures.

2.4 She thanked all the participants for their attendance and wished the meeting every success in its deliberations.

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3. ATTENDANCE

3.1 The meeting was attended by a total of Twenty-seven (27) participants from eight (8) States (Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE) and Four (4) Organizations (AACO, Airbus, Boeing and IATA). The list of participants is at **Attachment A**.

4. OFFICERS AND SECRETARIAT

4.1 The meeting was chaired by Mrs. Leena Ahmed Alkooheji, Chief, Airport & Air Navigation Audit, Bahrain, and Mr. Erdal Yesilbas, SSP Coordinator, Qatar.

4.2 Mr. Mohamed Chakib, RO/SAF-IMP was the Secretary of the meeting.

5. LANGUAGE

5.1 Discussions were conducted in English and documentation was issued in English.

6. AGENDA

6.1 The following Agenda was adopted:

Agenda Item 1: Adoption of the Provisional Agenda

Agenda Item 2: Regional Performance Framework for Safety

Agenda Item 3: Future Work Programme

Agenda Item 4: Any other Business

7. CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS – DEFINITION

7.1 The RASG-MID records its actions in the form of Conclusions and Decisions with the following significance:

a) **Conclusions** deal with matters that, according to the Group's terms of reference, merit directly the attention of States and its stakeholders/partners, or on which further action will be initiated by the Secretary in accordance with established procedures; and

b) **Decisions** relate solely to matters dealing with the internal working arrangements of the Group and its subsidiary bodies.

8. LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS

DRAFT CONCLUSION 5/1: SHARING OF SAFETY DATA ANALYSIS

PART II: REPORT ON AGENDA ITEMS

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 1: ADOPTION OF THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA

1.1 The subject was addressed in WP/1 presented by the Secretariat.

1.2 The meeting reviewed and adopted the Agenda as at paragraph 6 of the History of the Meeting

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REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 2: REGIONAL SAFETY PERFORMANCE

Outcome of the RASG-MID/10

2.1 The subject was addressed in PPT1 presented by the secretariat. The meeting noted with the appreciation the outcome of the RASG-MID/10.

PIRG/RASG and RASG-MID/10 Conclusions and Decisions

2.2 The subject was addressed in WP/2 by the secretariat. The meeting noted the status on the outcome of the RASG-MID/10 and PIRG/RASG meeting related to the ASRG and the follow-up actions taken by concerned parties as at ***Appendices 2A and 2B*** respectively.

MID Region Safety Priorities

2.3 The subject was addressed in WP/3 and PPT/2 presented by the secretariat. The meeting reviewed the Draft version of the 12th MID-ASR. Based on the analysis of the reactive and proactive safety information for the period 2018-2022 provided by ICAO, IATA and the MID Region States for the period 2018 – 2022. The safety priorities defined for the MID Region are:

Regional Operational Safety Risks

1. Loss of Control Inflight - (LOC-I);
2. Runway Excursion (RE) and Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC) during landing;
3. Mid Air Collision- (MAC);
4. Controlled Flight into Terrain- (CFIT); and
5. Runway Incursion- (RI)

2.4 In addition to this, safety issues have been identified and mapped to their respective accident outcomes.

Organizational issues

States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

2.5 USOAP-CMA audits had identified that State's inability to effectively oversee aviation operations remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is approx. 74, 07 %, which is above the world average 68.81% % (as of 20 July 2023). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60.

2.6 All eight areas have an EI above 60%. However, the areas of AIG and ANS still need more improvement. With respect to the Critical Elements (CEs), CE4 (Qualified technical personnel) is below 60% (58.8%) EI, whereas CE8 (resolution of safety issues) is also below EI 60% (54. 32%) EI. 4 areas and 4 critical elements are above the target of 75% EI.

2.7 Moreover, the effective implementation in certification, surveillance, and resolution of Safety concerns need to be improved.

Safety Management

2.8 States should build upon fundamental safety oversight systems to fully implement SSPs according to Annex 19; States shall require that applicable service providers under their authority implement an SMS. The average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is 76, 18%.

2.9 Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as one of the top Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). In connection with this, the RSC/7 endorsed the MID Region Safety Management Implementation Roadmap and the establishment of the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT) to support MID States with the implementation of the SSP in an effective and efficient way. The SMIT handbook endorsed by the RASG-MID/9.

2.10 In addition, the development of National Aviation Safety plan (NASP) is one of the MID region safety priorities and four (4) States had developed and published their NASPs in ICAO website.

2.11 In line with the Safety Strategic Objective of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the 2023-2025 edition of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. It also provides a framework in which regional and national aviation safety plans (RASPs and NASPs) are developed and implemented.

2.12 The States NASP should be developed in alignment with the GASP and the MID-RASP. However, priority should be given to national safety issues. Moreover, the NASP should be also aligned and coordinated with the MID-RASP (as appropriate).

Human Factors and Human Personnel

2.13 As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. CRM has been identified as most important human factors issue in the domain of commercial air transport and safety actions would be identified and developed.

Competence of Personnel

2.14 Availability of well-trained and competent aviation personnel is paramount to the safety and resilience of the aviation industry. Some of States in MID Region has a mature and detailed regulatory framework in place to ensure proper training, licensing, adequacy of training devices and oversight. Nevertheless, several factors are challenging this mature framework: new technologies and increasing automation are changing the safety needs for aviation personnel and new training devices are emerging. New aircraft types and technological advancements in virtual reality/artificial intelligence are revolutionizing pilot training altogether.

Manage Risk Interdependencies

2.15 The COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that safety, security, health safety and other risks can no longer be managed in isolation. The aviation community has realized that continuing to develop tools and specific guidance for each situation and for each domain affected by transversal risks may delay not only the implementation of mitigation measures, but also the development of an enabling framework to support integrated, collaborative risk management.

Cybersecurity Risks

2.16 The global civil aviation ecosystem is accelerating towards more digitalization. This implies that any exchange of information within any digital workflow of the aviation community needs to be resilient to information security threats which have consequences on the safety of flight or the availability of airspace and beyond. Aware of the complexity of the aviation system and of the need to manage the cybersecurity risk the MID Region needs to consider and address information security risks in a comprehensive and standardized manner across all aviation domains. In addition, it is essential that the aviation industry and civil aviation authorities share knowledge and learn from experience to ensure systems are secure from individuals/organizations with malicious intent.

Security Risks with an impact on Aviation Safety

The implementation of aviation security measures can have a direct impact on safety aspects of aerodrome or aircraft operations. Airport security, aircraft security or in-flight security are the areas where the interdependencies are highly visible and where any security requirements should also consider potential impacts on aviation safety. States should consider where interdependencies between civil aviation safety and security exist.

2.17 Therefore, an integrated approach to the management of safety and security risks across the spectrum of aviation activities would bring benefits such as a complete overview of risks, a better sharing of security information and the closure of gaps in the security system while focusing on increasing the overall level of safety. Consequently, this would allow ensuring synergies where security measures can have an impact on safety and vice versa; thereby avoiding incompatible actions and strengthening the overall safety and security of civil aviation.

Risks arising from conflict zones

2.18 Some fatal accidents on conflicted areas raised the question why the aero plane was flying over an area where there was an ongoing armed conflict. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region. Thus, military or unlawful interference conflicts may occur in any State at any time and pose risks to civil aviation. This is why it’s important for states, aircraft operators, and other airspace users such as air navigation service providers (ANSPs), to work together to share the most up-to-date conflict zone risk-based information possible to assure the safety of civil flights.

Aviation Health Safety (AHS) Risks

2.19 The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the harmonization of health policies affecting aviation, and in particular in the CAT domain, has become an important topic to help overcome the pandemic. The objective is to minimize the impact of health safety threats in CAT. Health safety threats should be included in the management of risk interdependencies.

2.20 COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic we will be faced with. It is crucial to continue supporting the MID Region aviation industry competitiveness by offering the safest aircraft interior environment to reduce the risk of disease transmission between continents and States, restore public trust and facilitate future responses to events of similar nature.

GNSS Interference Risks

2.21 Satellite navigation signals are used both for aircraft navigation and for aggressive aircraft/ drone in the region. Satellite navigation signals are weak and can easily be compromised by a range of growing threats, including intentional or unintentional signal interference, jamming, spoofing, and/or the manipulation of position and timing information. The effects of such threats vary greatly. Satellite signal jamming can have a serious effect on the accuracy of navigation systems and, in some cases, results in unusual system behavior.

2.22 In a continuous monitoring of the regional safety risk of GNSS/GPS Interference, an updated analysis on reported occurrences is presented to provide figure from January until December 2022 of GNSS/GPS Interference in MENA and adjacent countries. The analysis utilized two datasets: Incident Data Exchange (IDX), and Flight Data Exchange (FDX), the analysis covers the time period of January 2022 to December 2022.

2.23 The analysis revealed 524 GNSS/GPS jamming or suspected interference reports from 12 operators in the MENA region and adjacent states gathered through the Incident Data Exchange (IDX) from January 2022 to December 2022.

2.24 The analysis utilized data from the Flight Data Exchange (FDX) showed a total of 162,654 'GPS signal loss' events from 54 operators in the MENA region and adjacent states from January 2022 to December 2022. This is 68.5 % of all GPS Signal Loss Events in FDX database in 2022. The Total Event Count around the world was 237,489.

Interference with Radio Altimeter

2.25 There is a major risk that 5G telecommunications systems in the 3.7–3.98 GHz band will cause harmful interference to radar altimeters on all types of civil aircraft- including commercial transport airplanes; business, regional, and general aviation airplanes; and both transport and general aviation helicopters. If there is no proper mitigation, this risk has the potential for broad impacts to aviation operations in the United States as well as in other regions where the 5G network is being implemented next to the 4.2-4.4 GHz frequency band.

Emerging Issues

2.26 Emerging issues are risks that might impact Safety in the future, these may include a possible new technology, a potential public policy, a new concept, business model or idea that, while perhaps an outlier today, could mature and develop into a critical mainstream issue in the future or become a major trend in its own right.

- UAS and manned VTOL-capable aircraft;
- Artificial intelligence (AI) in Aviation; and
- Digitalization in the aviation field.

2.27 The meeting noted that RASG-MID/10 endorsed the Safety Data Analysis Collection Related to Civil Helicopter Operations through conclusion 10/14 so that states to share their safety data analysis related to civil helicopters operation.

2.28 The meeting was apprised with appreciation of the development of the 12th MID-ASR Edition and agreed that the MID Office, in coordination with the ASRG Chairpersons, finalize the 12th MID-ASR to be presented to the RASG-MID/11 for endorsement.

Sharing of Safety Information and Development of the 13th MID Annual Safety Report

2.29 The subject was addressed in WP/3 and PPT/1 presented by the Secretariat. The meeting reiterated the importance of sharing the occurrences and their respective safety analysis by the States in order to produce an improved annual safety reports in the future. Accordingly, the meeting agreed to the following Draft Conclusion:

DRAFT CONCLUSION 5/1: SHARING OF SAFETY DATA ANALYSIS

In respect of the next MID ASR edition, States are encouraged to provide necessary safety information and safety analysis to the ICAO MID Office, by May 2024 related to each occurrence category in ***Appendix 2C*** *for the past 5 years (2019– 2023) and using the templates in* ***Appendix 2D and Appendix 2E****. The Draft of the 13th edition of the MID ASR will be presented to the ASRG/6 meeting for review.*

2.30 The meeting highlighted the main Challenge facing the ASRG for the development of the ASRs, in particular:

- Limited sharing of safety information including safety analysis by the States.

GNSS/GPS Spoofing

The subject was addressed in PPT/3 presented by IATA. The meeting noted with concern the issue of GNSS/GPS spoofing and its safety impact on flight operations. The meeting also thanked IATA for sharing the updated information on GNSS/GPS spoofing.

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 3: FUTURE WORK PROGRAMME

3.1 The subject was addressed in WP/5 presented by the Secretariat.

3.2 The meeting agreed that the ASRG/6 meeting be tentatively scheduled to be held virtually on October 2024 and the exact dates will be coordinated with Chairperson.

FOLLOW-UP ACTION PLAN ON RASG-MID/10 CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
C. 10/1	**11TH ASR** That, the Eleventh MID Annual Safety Report is endorsed and be posted on the ICAO MID Website.	Sharing the final 11th MID-ASR for the period 2017-2021 with identified MID Region safety priorities	MID-ASR 11th Edition published on the ICAO website	RASG-MID/10	July 2023	**Completed**
C. 10/2	**SHARING OF SAFETY DATA ANALYSIS** That, in order to present an improved version of the 12th MID-ASR to the MID-ASRG/5 meeting, States be urged to provide the ICAO MID Office by 30 May 2023 with the number of accidents, serious incidents and incidents, safety data analysis/information, and their associated safety recommendations in **Appendix 5.1A** for the past 5 years (2018 – 2022) and using the template in **Appendix 5.1B**.	Collection of safety data for a Harmonized database	Safety Data Analysis for development of ASR	States	May 2023	**Completed**
C.10/3	**RSA ON EGPWS/TAWS** That, the guidance material (RSA-16) on measures to improve the effectiveness of Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS)/Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) at **Appendix 5.2B** is endorsed.	Continuous reduction of the Operational Safety Risk (CFIT)	RSA-16 on measures to improve the effectiveness of EGPWS/ TAWS circulate to all States	IATA ICAO	August 2023	**Completed** *SL issued File Ref.: ME4 -23/156; dated 3 August 2023*
C. 10/4	**RSA ON DG INSPECTORS OVERSIGHT** That, the guidance material (RSA-18) to support States inspectors to conduct oversight to ensure safe transport of dangerous goods by air at **Appendix 5.2C** is endorsed	Share best practices on transport of dangerous goods by air	RSA-18 to support States inspectors to conduct oversight to ensure safe transport of dangerous goods by air circulate to all States	Bahrain and Oman ICAO	August 2023	**Completed** *SL issued File Ref.: ME4 -23/157; dated 3 August 2023*

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
C. 10/5	**RSA ON OCCURRENCE REPORTING** That, the guidance material (RSA-17) to support States' on developing an occurrence reporting system for the CAA and on establishing an effective operation of the mandatory and voluntary reporting systems at **Appendix 5.2D** is endorsed.	Share best practices on occurrence reporting	RSA-17 to support States' on developing an occurrence reporting system circulated to all States			**Completed** *SL issued File Ref.: ME4 -23/15; dated 3 August 2023*
C. 10/6	**RSA ON SMS ASSESSMENT** That, the guidance material (RSA-19) to support States' on developing and conducting an SMS Assessment on their Service providers at **Appendix 5.2E** is endorsed.	Share best practices on conducting SMS assessment tool	RSA-19 to support States' on developing and conducting an SMS Assessment on their Service providers circulated to all States	UAE ICAO	August 2023	**Completed** *SL issued File Ref.: ME4 -23/159; dated 3 August 2023*
C. 10/7	**MID-RASP 2023-2025 EDITION** That, a) the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition including the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and the MID region Safety Performance Measurement and Monitoring (SPMM) at Appendix 5.2F is endorsed; and b) urge States, international organization, and industry to support the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition activities including SEIs and their respective safety actions.	Sharing the final MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition	MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition published on the ICAO website	RASG-MID/10	August 2023	**Completed**

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
D. 10/8	**ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ACTION GROUP** That, the Action Group composed of the following States & international organizations and their nominated experts, is established to develop the guidance material to assist MID Region States in the issuance of exemptions related to temporary deviations from standards impacting Articles 38 and 40 of the Chicago Convention. - Iran: Mr. Mahmoodreza Rohani - Qatar: Dr. Ramy Saad - Sudan: Mr. Bahaeldin AbdAlrahim Yassin - UAE: Mr. Ahmed Salim Abdalla AlSaabri - IATA: Mr. Jehad Faqir - ACAO: Mr. Hicham Bennani.	Share best practices on the issuance of exemptions	RSA the issuance of exemptions related to temporary deviations	Qatar supported by Iran, Sudan, UAE, ACAO, IATA	Oct. 2023	**On-going**
D. 10/9	**ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ACTION GROUP** That, the Action Group composed of the following States and their nominated experts, is established to develop the guidance material to support States for the conduct of remote surveillance. - Iran: Mr. Jaber Goodarzi - Jordan: Eng. Rawan Al-Naimat - Qatar: Dr. Ramy Saad - Saudi Arabia: TBD - Sudan: Mr. Bahaeldin AbdAlrahim Yassin - UAE: Mr. Eisa Saeed Al Mesmari - ACAO: Mr. Hicham Bennani	Share best practices on the conduct of remote surveillance	RSA to support States for the conduct of remote surveillance	Qatar supported by Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE, and ACAO.	Oct. 2023	**On-going**

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
C. 10/10	**DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN (NASP) IN MID STATES** That, States a) urged to develop and implement the NASP in line with the GASP and MID-RASP, if not yet done so; b) encouraged to continue to use existing ICAO guidance material and tools to implement their NASPs; c) encouraged to share the latest version of their NASPs with ICAO HQ and ICAO Regional MID office for posting on the GASP public website; d) encouraged to request assistance from the ICAO MID Regional Office related to the development of their NASPs including the conduct of assistance missions and/or customized NASP Workshop for each State; and e) encouraged to share their experiences related to the development of their NASPs during the SEIG meetings and/or Regional NASP Workshop to be organized by the ICAO MID Regional Office in 2024.	Compliance with Assembly Resolution A40-1	State Letter	ICAO	Aug. 2023	**On-going** *SL issued File Ref.: ME4 & FS1/2-23/155; dated 3August 2023* *NASP workshops conducted* *Virtual meetings with States on NASP development have been conducted*

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
C. 10/11	**DEVELOPMENT OF SSP IN MID STATES** That, States be: a) encouraged to effectively implement their State Safety Programme in a timely manner, and to strengthen the implementation of safety management systems in their aviation industry; b) encouraged to request assistance from the ICAO MID Regional Office related to the development and implementation of their SSPs including the conduct of assistance missions and/or customized SSP implementation Workshop for each State; c) encouraged to support the SMIT activities; d) share their experiences on the development of their SSPs during the SEIG meetings; e) encouraged to share their latest version of SSP manuals with ICAO MID Office; and f) States are urged to provide the ICAO MID Office by **30 June 2023** with the SSP information using the template **in Appendix 5.2G** to support MID office in identifying and prioritising the needs of States on SSP development and implementation.	Support States with the development and Implementation of SSP	State Letter	ICAO	Feb. 2023	**On-going** *SSP workshops conducted* *SSP training course conducted* *Survey conducted*
C. 10/12	**ADHERENCE TO ICAO ANNEX 13** That, the State conducting an investigation must submit a Preliminary report to ICAO within thirty days of the date of the accident and release the final report within twelve months in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 requirement.	Sharing of the Final Investigation Report	RASG-MID/10	States		**On-going** *Discussed during the AIGP/8 meeting and highlighted during MENA ARCM/4 meeting*

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
D. 10/13	**DISSOLUTION OF THE CIVIL HELICOPTER OPERATIONS WORKING GROUP** That, a) the CHOPWG is dissolved; b) the RASG-MID Organizational Structure be updated as at Appendix 5.5A; and c) the RASG-MID Procedural Handbook be revised and presented to RASG-MID/11 Meeting for endorsement.	Low participation	RASG-MID/10	ICAO States	May 2023	**Completed**
C. 10/14	**SAFETY DATA ANALYSIS COLLECTION RELATED TO CIVIL HELICOPTER OPERATIONS** That States are urged to share their Safety Data Analysis to be included in MID Region Annual Safety Report.	Collection of Safety Data Analysis related to Civil Helicopter Operations for a Harmonized database	Safety Data Analysis for development of ASR	States	May 2024	**On-going** To be highlighted during the upcoming ASRG/5 meeting and be analysis be included in the upcoming 13th MID ASR.

FOLLOW-UP ACTION PLAN ON PIRG/RASG MID CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
C. 1	**EVOLUTION OF AVIATION SAFETY PLANNING** That, hat States, nominate a focal point and provide information on the Secure Portal on Operational Safety Risks and Emerging Issues to support work of RASG and provide inputs for future editions of GASP	Sharing of the operational safety risks and emerging issues	Support the update of the future editions of GASP	ICAO States	August 2023	**Completed** SL issued
C. 2	**SHARING OF THE NASP** That States, be reminded to share the latest version of their NASPs with ICAO HQ and ICAO MID Office for posting on the GASP public website.	Compliance with Assembly Resolution A40-1	State Letter	States	August 2023	**Completed** SL issued
C. 3	**MENA ARCM** *That States be encouraged to sign the MENA AIG Regional Cooperation Mechanism (MENA ARCM) MoU, if not yet done.*	Enhancement of cooperation among MENA States in the provision of AIG area	Sign the MoU to support States in AIG area	States	July 2023	**On-going** Highlighted during MENA ARCM/4 meeting and discussed during the AIGP/8 meeting
C. 4	**MENA RSOO** That, a) States are encouraged to Join the MENA RSOO by signing the revised Memorandum of Agreement; and	Enhancement of States' Oversight Capabilities, increase USOAP EI and support development and implementation of SSP	Sign the MoA to legally establish MENA RSOO and lunch its operation	States	2024	**On-going** The Second Steering Committee meeting (DGs Level) held on 10 May 2022 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, alongside the First Future Aviation Forum. It was highlighted that some MENA States have officially joined the MENA RSOO by presenting their signed copies of the Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) to ACAO.

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
	b) States and Stakeholders are urged to support the establishment and operations of the MENA RSOO to enhance aviation safety at National and Regional levels.					
C. 5	**CONTINUOUS COLLABORATION APPROACH TO MANAGING AND ENHANCING SAFETY IN MID REGION** That, a) States and Stakeholders are urged to support the implementation of the Continuous Collaboration Approach to Managing and Enhancing Safety in MID Region; b) Continuous Collaboration Approach to Managing and Enhancing Safety in MID Region to be included as a strategic approach within the RASG-MID and MIDANPIRG frameworks; and c) Coordinating the prioritization of Member States needs with ICAO MID Regional Office.	Managing and Enhancing Safety in MID Region Challenges include: 1) Unstable Security/Political Situation 2) Financial Constraint (financial resources) 3) Insufficient qualified and experienced technical staff 4) Development of NASP and SSP implementation 5) Lack of sharing of safety information	Fostering effective risk management capabilities in the MID Region, State and industry level to cope with the systemic and operational safety risks and wide-ranging effects of the crisis and constitute an important enabler for building back a more resilient aviation system	States and all Stakeholders and partners	On-going	**Actioned** DGCA-MID/6 meeting (Abu Dhabi, 1 – 3 November 2022) endorsed the Approach and commended the ICAO MID Regional Office for developing this Collaborative Approach for afety Enhancement and Management in the MID Region. MIDANPIRG/20 & RASG-MID/10 supported the Approach and included it in its framework under MID RASP.

- END -

LIST OF OCCURRENCE CATEGORIES TAXONOMY

Scope: State of Occurrence

The data to be collected be based on scheduled commercial operations involving aircraft having a Maximum Take-off Weight (MTOW) above 5700 kg.

Occurrence Category	ADREP/CICTT taxonomy	Remarks
Runway Excursion (RE)	Veer off or overrun off the runway surface.	
Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC)	Any landing or take-off involving abnormal runway or landing surface contact.	
Loss of Control-Inflight (LOC-I)	Loss of Control while, or deviation from intended flight path, in flight.	
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)	Inflight collision or near collision with terrain, water, or obstacles without indication of loss of control.	
MID Air Collision (MAC)/ NMACs	Airprox/TCAS Alerts, Loss of separation as well as NMAC or collisions between aircraft inflight.	
Fire/Smoke (F-NI)	Fire or smoke in or on the aircraft, in flight, or on the ground, which is not the result of impact.	
Runway Incursion (RI)	Any occurrence at aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for landing and takeoff of aircraft.	
System Component Failure –Non-Power Plant (SCF-NP)	Failure or malfunction of an aircraft system or component other than the power plant.	
Turbulence Encounter (TURB)	In-flight turbulence encounter.	
Birdstrike (BIRD)	Occurrences involving collisions/near collisions with bird(s).	
Navigation Errors (NAV)	Occurrences involving the incorrect navigation of aircraft on the ground or in the air	

System Component Failure- Power Plant (SCF-PP)	Failure or malfunction of an aircraft system or components related to the power plant.	
Security related (SEC)	Criminal/Security acts which result in accidents or incidents (per Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation).	
Wind shear	Flight into wind shear or thunderstorm	

NB: States may share any other occurrence category or national safety concern.

APPENDIX 2D

TEMPLATE FOR THE COLLECTION OF

ACCIDENT, SERIOUS INCIDENT AND INCIDENT DATA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS

Name of State: ……..

1- Occurrences: *The data to be collected be based on scheduled commercial operations involving Aeroplane having a Maximum Take-off Weight (MTOW) above 5700 kg.*

#	Occurrence Category	2019			2020			2021			2022			2023		
		# Accidents	# Serious incidents	# Incidents	# Accidents	# Serious incidents	# Incidents	# Accidents	# Serious incidents	# Incidents	# Accidents	# Serious incidents	# Incidents	# Accidents	# Serious incidents	# Incidents
1	Runway Excursion (RE)															
2	Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC)															
3	Loss of Control-Inflight (LOC-I)															
4	Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)															
5	Mid Air collision (MAC)/ NMAC															
6	Fire/Smoke (F-NI)															
7	Runway Incursion-(RI)															
8	System Component Failure-Non-Power Plant (SCF-NP)															
9	Turbulence Encounter (TURB)															

10	BIRD															
11	Navigation Errors (NAV)															
12	System Component Failure-Power Plant (SCF-PP)															
13	Security related (SEC)															
14	Wind shear															

States should provide the number of accident, serious incidents, and incidents related to each category mentioned in the template above for the past five years (2019-2023)

Scope: State of Occurrence

2- Brief- Safety data Analysis (Root-cause analysis, Trends, Low probability high consequence (LPHC) events if any, etc.)

3- Identified Top Five safety risks and their respective contributory factors

4- Safety mitigations/Recommendations

APPENDIX 2E

TEMPLATE FOR THE COLLECTION OF

ACCIDENT, SERIOUS INCIDENT AND INCIDENT DATA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS

Name of State: ……..

1- Occurrences: *The data to be collected involving civil helicopters operations*

#	Occurrence Category	2019			2020			2021			2022			2023		
		# Accidents	# Serious incidents	# Incidents	# Accidents	# Serious incidents	# Incidents	# Accidents	# Serious incidents	# Incidents	# Accidents	# Serious incidents	# Incidents	# Accidents	# Serious incidents	# Incidents
1	Runway Excursion (RE)															
2	Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC)															
3	Loss of Control-Inflight (LOC-I)															
4	Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)															
5	Mid Air collision (MAC)/ NMAC															
6	Fire/Smoke (F-NI)															
7	Runway Incursion-(RI)															
8	System Component Failure-Non-Power Plant (SCF-NP)															
9	Turbulence Encounter (TURB)															
10	BIRD															

11	Navigation Errors (NAV)															
12	System Component Failure-Power Plant (SCF-PP)															
13	Security related (SEC)															
14	Wind shear															

States should provide the number of accident, serious incidents, and incidents related to each category mentioned in the template above for the past five years (2019-2023)

Scope: State of Occurrence

2- Brief- Safety data Analysis (Root-cause analysis, Trends, Low probability high consequence (LPHC) events if any, etc.)

3- Identified Top Five safety risks and their respective contributory factors:

4- Safety mitigations/Recommendations

ICAO MID

Attachment A

Fifth Meeting of the Annual Safety Report Group (ASRG/5)
Virtual Meeting,

(5 October 2023 from 07h00 to 09h00 UTC Time)

State/ Org	Contact	Title	Email
Bahrain	Mrs. Leena Ahmed Alkooheji	Chief, Airport & Air Navigation Audit	l.alkooheji@mtt.gov.bh
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