Aerodrome Safeguarding Workshop
Cairo, 4-6 Dec. 2017

Aeronautical studies and Safety Assessment

Nawal A. Abdel Hady
ICAO MID Regional Office, Aerodrome and Ground Aids (AGA) Expert
References

- ICAO Manual on Certification of Aerodromes Doc 9774
- ICAO Manual on Safety Management Doc 9859
- Regional Safety Advisory - MID-RSA/11(Safeguarding Guidelines & Tool Kit)
Contents

- Introduction
- Background
- Aeronautical studies
- Safety Assessment
Introduction

- Safe air operations require a permanent monitoring and assessment of possible infringements of applicable control surfaces defined in ICAO Annex 14 OLS, PANS-OPS, or State’ national regulations and implementation.
Introduction

- This process, called "safeguarding", shall facilitate the safe integration of new constructions around airports or air traffic control equipment. While regulations may be at a first sight restrictive, these also allow a great flexibility to enable urban development - provided a systematic assessment of the possible impacts of new constructions on aviation is conducted and demonstrate that the safety of air operations is not compromised.
Introduction

- Such assessment, also known as "aeronautical study" is one of the core competence of air sight aimed at making aviation safer.

- One of the objective of this workshop is to find ways and means for operational or technical solutions that meet the needs of airport operators, airspace users and project developers, and share experience and best practices in this field.
Background

Definitions:

**Aeronautical Study:**

✓ An aeronautical study is a study of an aeronautical problem to identify possible solutions and select a solution that is acceptable without degrading safety. (Doc 9774, Doc 9734 Part A).
Background

An Aeronautical Study is conducted to assess the impact of deviations from the aerodrome standards specified in Volume I to Annex 14 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, and the national regulations, to present alternative means of ensuring the safety of aircraft operations, to estimate the effectiveness of each alternative and to recommend procedures to compensate for the deviation.
Background

Aeronautical Study (Cont’d):

✓ Aeronautical studies may not be conducted in cases of deviations from the standards, if not specifically recommended in Annex 14, Volume I

✓ List of Annex 14, Volume I provisions where Aeronautical studies are specifically recommended are contained at

✓ Aeronautical study in Annex 14.pdf
Aeronautical Studies

Technical analysis will provide justification for a deviation on the grounds that an equivalent level of safety can be attained by other means. It is generally applicable in situations where the cost of correcting a problem that violates a standard is excessive but where the unsafe effects of the problem can be overcome by some procedural means which offers both practical and reasonable solutions.
Aeronautical Studies

Approval of Deviations

✓ In some instances, the only reasonable means of providing an equivalent level of safety is to adopt suitable procedures and to require, as a condition of certification, that cautionary advice be published in the appropriate AIS publications
Aeronautical Studies

Approval of Deviations (Cont’d)

✓ The determination to require caution will be primarily dependent on two considerations:

a) a pilot’s need to be made aware of potentially hazardous conditions; and

b) the responsibility of the CAA to publish deviations from standards that would otherwise be assumed under certificate status.
Aeronautical Studies

- Changes on an aerodrome can include changes to procedures, equipment, infrastructures, safety works, special operations, regulations, organization

- Each study is specific to a particular deviation or change; hence, caution should be exercised in considering applicability to other situations and locations. The outcome of the studies remains the ultimate responsibility of the State in accordance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation
Annex 19, standard in 4.1.8 states: “The SMS of an operator of a certified aerodrome in accordance with Annex 14, Volume I shall be made acceptable to the State responsible for aerodrome certification”.
Safety Assessment For Aerodromes

PANS-Aerodromes Doc 9981 – Chapter 3:
A certified aerodrome operator implements an SMS acceptable to the State that as a minimum:

✓ identifies safety hazards;
✓ ensures that remedial action necessary to maintain safety is implemented;
✓ provides for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the achieved safety; and
✓ aims to make continuous improvement to the overall safety of the aerodrome.
Background

Definitions:

**Safety Assessment**: An element of the risk management process of an SMS that is used to assess safety concerns arising from, inter alia, deviations from standards and applicable regulations, identified changes at an aerodrome or when any other safety concerns arise.
Background

A Safety Assessment is conducted when a safety concern, change or a deviation has an impact on several aerodrome stakeholders, consideration shall be given to the involvement of all stakeholders affected in the safety assessment process. In some cases, the stakeholders impacted by the change will need to conduct a separate safety assessment themselves in order to fulfil the requirements of their SMSs and coordinate with other relevant stakeholders. When a change has an impact on multiple stakeholders, a collaborative safety assessment should be conducted to ensure compatibility of the final solutions.
Note: Where alternative measures, operational procedures and operating restrictions have been developed arising from safety assessments, these should be reviewed periodically to assess their continued validity. The procedures do not substitute or circumvent the provisions contained in Annex 14, Vol I. It is expected that infrastructure on an existing aerodrome or a new aerodrome will fully comply with the requirements in the Annex.
A safety assessment considers the impact of the safety concern on all relevant factors determined to be safety-significant.
Items that may need to be considered when conducting an safety assessment:

- Aerodrome layout
- Types of aircraft intended to operate at the aerodrome
- Traffic density and distribution
- Aerodrome ground services
- Air ground communications
- Type and capabilities of surveillance systems
- Flight instrument procedures and related aerodrome equipment
Items that may need to be considered when conducting a safety assessment (cont’d):

- Complex operational procedures – (including A-CDM)
- Aerodrome technical installation - A-SMGC
- Obstacles or hazardous activities at or in the vicinity of the aerodrome
- Planned construction or maintenance;
- Any local or regional MET conditions
- Airspace complexity.
Methodologies and Procedures to be followed when undertaking safety assessments at Aerodromes
Safety Assessments for Aerodromes

- Safety assessment process
  - Safety assessment flow chart
  - Safety assessment methodologies for aerodromes

- Approval or acceptance of a safety assessment

- Promulgation of safety information

- Subsequent regulatory oversight
Safety Assessment Process

Composed of four basic steps:
- Definition of a safety concern and identification of the regulatory compliance;
- Hazard identification and analysis;
- Risk assessment and development of mitigation measures; and
- Development of an implementation plan for the mitigation measures and conclusion of the assessment.

A safety assessment process flow chart applicable for aerodrome operations is available in Attachment A to Chapter 3 of Doc 9981; a generic safety risk management process can be found in Doc 9859.
PANS Aerodromes - Attachment A to Chapter 3 – Safety assessment flow chart

Safety concern perceived

- Retain or reject
  - Retain
    - Define safety concern

Risk assessment (probability/severity)

- Is the risk acceptable?
  - Yes
    - Documentation
      - End
  - No
    - Can the risk be eliminated?
      - Yes
        - Eliminate
          - Documentation
          - End
      - No
        - Can the risk be mitigated?
          - Yes
            - Define mitigation
              - Implement mitigating measures
          - No
            - Cancel operation
              - Documentation
              - End

Hazard identified?

- Yes
  - Implement mitigating measures
- No
  - Documentation
  - End

Can the risk be eliminated?

- Yes
  - Eliminate
  - Documentation
  - End
- No
  - Cancel operation
  - Documentation
  - End

Can the risk be mitigated?

- Yes
  - Define mitigation
    - Implement mitigating measures
- No
  - Documentation
  - Regular review

Promulgation

Documentation

End
Definition of a safety concern and identification of the regulatory compliance

- Any perceived safety concerns are to be described in detail, including timescales, location, stakeholders involved or affected as well as their potential influence on specific processes, procedures, systems and operations.

- Analyze the safety concern to determine whether it is retained or rejected. If rejected, the justification for rejecting the safety concern is to be provided and documented.

- An initial evaluation of compliance with the appropriate provisions in the regulations applicable to the aerodrome is conducted and documented.

- Identify the areas of concern before proceeding with the remaining steps of the safety assessment, with all relevant stakeholders.

- Each assessment is specific to a particular safety concern at a given aerodrome.
Hazard identification

- Identify Hazards related to infrastructure, systems or operational procedures using methods such as brain-storming sessions, expert opinions, industry knowledge, experience and operational judgment. The identification of hazards is conducted by considering:

  a) accident causal factors and critical events based on a simple causal analysis of available accident and incident databases;

  b) events that may have occurred in similar circumstances or that are subsequent to the resolution of a similar safety concern; and

  c) potential new hazards that may emerge during or after implementation of the planned changes.
Hazard identification (cont’d)

- Identify all potential outcomes or consequences for each identified hazard; Define and detail the appropriate safety objective for each type of hazard. This can be done through:

  a) reference to recognized standards and/or codes of practices;
  b) reference to the safety performance of the existing system;
  c) reference to the acceptance of a similar system elsewhere; and
  d) application of explicit safety risk levels

- Safety objectives are specified in either quantitative terms (e.g. identification of a numerical probability) or qualitative terms (e.g. comparison with an existing situation). The selection of the safety objective is made according to the aerodrome operator’s policy with respect to safety improvement and is justified for the specific hazard.
Risk assessment Method

1. The risk assessment takes into account the probability of occurrence of a hazard and the severity of its consequences; the risk is evaluated by combining the two values for severity and probability of occurrence.

2. Each identified hazard must be classified by probability of occurrence and severity of impact. This process of risk classification will allow the aerodrome to determine the level of risk posed by a particular hazard. The classification of probability and severity refers to potential events.

2. The severity classification includes five classes ranging from “catastrophic” (class A) to “not significant” (class E). The examples in Table 3-B-1, adapted from Doc 9859 with aerodrome-specific examples, serve as a guide to better understand the definition.
Risk assessment method (cont’d)

4. The classification of the severity of an event should be based on a “credible case” but not on a “worst case” scenario. A credible case is expected to be possible under reasonable conditions (probable course of events). A worst case may be expected under extreme conditions and combinations of additional and improbable hazards. If worst cases are to be introduced implicitly, it is necessary to estimate appropriate low frequencies.

5. The classification of the severity of an event should be based on a “credible case” but not on a “worst case” scenario. A credible case is expected to be possible under reasonable conditions (probable course of events). A worst case may be expected under extreme conditions and combinations of additional and improbable hazards.
### Table I-3-Att B-1. Severity classification scheme with examples

(adapted from Doc 9859 with aerodrome-specific examples)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>– Equipment destroyed</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>collision between aircraft and/or other object during take-off or landing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Multiple deaths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous…</td>
<td>– A large reduction in safety margins, physical distress or a workload such that the operators cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>runway incursion, significant potential for an accident, extreme action to avoid collision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Serious injury</td>
<td></td>
<td>attempted take-off or landing on a closed or engaged runway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Major equipment damage</td>
<td></td>
<td>take-off/landing incidents, such as undershooting or overrunning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability class</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Frequent</td>
<td>Likely to occur many times (has occurred frequently)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Reasonably probable</td>
<td>Likely to occur sometimes (has occurred infrequently)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Remote</td>
<td>Unlikely to occur (has occurred rarely)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Extremely remote</td>
<td>Very unlikely to occur (not known to have occurred)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Extremely improbable</td>
<td>Almost inconceivable that the event will occur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table I-3-Att B-3. Risk assessment matrix with prioritization classes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk probability</th>
<th>Catastrophic (_A)</th>
<th>Hazardous (_B)</th>
<th>Risk severity (_C)</th>
<th>Minor (_D)</th>
<th>Negligible (_E)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequent</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5A</td>
<td>5B</td>
<td>5C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4A</td>
<td>4B</td>
<td>4C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3A</td>
<td>3B</td>
<td>3C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improbable</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>2C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely Improbable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>1C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Safety risk assessment and development of mitigation measures

- Estimate the level of risk of each identified potential consequence by conducting a risk assessment and determine the severity of a consequence and probability of the consequence occurring.

- Understanding the risks is the basis for the development of mitigation measures, operational procedures and operating restrictions that might be needed to ensure safe aerodrome operations.

- The method for risk evaluation is dependent on the nature of the hazards. The risk itself is evaluated by combining the two values for severity of its consequences and probability of occurrence.
Safety risk assessment and development of mitigation measures (cont’d)

• Once each hazard has been identified, analysed in terms of causes, and assessed for severity and probability of its occurrence, it must be ascertained that all associated risks are appropriately managed.

• All risk mitigation measures, whether currently being applied or still under development, must be evaluated for the effectiveness of their risk management capabilities.

• States should provide suitable guidance on risk assessment models for aerodrome operators.

• Methodologies for risk management can be found in Attachment B to Chapter 3.
Development of an implementation plan and conclusion of the assessment

The last phase of the safety assessment process is the development of a plan for the implementation of the identified mitigation measures.

The implementation plan includes time frames, responsibilities for mitigation measures, as well as control measures that may be defined and implemented to monitor the effectiveness of the mitigation measures.
APPROVAL OR ACCEPTANCE OF A SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The State establishes the type of safety assessments that are subject to approval or acceptance and determines the process used for that approval/acceptance.

Where required a safety assessment subject to approval or acceptance by the State shall be submitted by the aerodrome operator prior to implementation.

The State analyses the safety assessment and verifies that:

a) appropriate coordination has been performed between the concerned stakeholders;

b) the risks have been properly identified and assessed, based on documented arguments (e.g. physical or Human Factors studies, analysis of previous accidents and incidents);

c) the proposed mitigation measures adequately address the risk; and

d) the time frames for planned implementation are acceptable.
Upon completion of the analysis of the safety assessment, the State:

- either gives formal approval or acceptance of the safety assessment to the aerodrome operator; or
- if some risks have been underestimated or have not been identified, coordinates with the aerodrome operator to reach an agreement on safety acceptance;
- if no agreement can be reached, rejects the proposal for possible resubmission by the aerodrome operator; or
- may choose to impose conditional measures to ensure safety.

The State should ensure that the mitigation or conditional measures are properly implemented and that they fulfil their purpose.
PROMULGATION OF SAFETY INFORMATION

The aerodrome operator determines the most appropriate method for communicating safety information to the stakeholders and ensures that all safety-relevant conclusions of the safety assessment are adequately communicated (e.g. through AIP, ATIS (Automatic Terminal Information Service), etc.)
Responsibilities subsequent to the completion of the Safety Assessment

- **The aerodrome operator** is responsible for implementing and periodically monitoring the effectiveness of the identified mitigation measures.

- **The State** reviews the safety assessment provided by the aerodrome operator and its identified mitigation measures, operational procedures and operating restrictions, and is responsible for the subsequent regulatory oversight of their application.