



EACCC PANDEMICS 19 Exercise

Annual EACCC crisis preparedness exercise

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EACCC






THE NETWORK MANAGER






CONNECTING THE NETWORK TO DELIVER IMPROVED PERFORMANCE





The Network Manager: 24/7 actor in coordinating & managing response to crises affecting aviation in Europe






Roles of Network Manager (NM) and European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC)



Role of State Focal Points



National Crisis Structures
Structures



Network Manager / EACCC







Network Manager & EACCC preparedness



- ICAO Crisis Management Framework EUR Doc 031
- EACCC risk register
- Training
 - Pan European Crisis Management Exercises
 - EACCC Workshops
 - State Focal Point Training sessions
 - Contingency and Crisis Management training at IANS (Luxembourg)

https://trainingzone.eurocontrol.int (GEN-CTG)





Contingency & Crisis Management Course (GEN-CTG)


- Target audience contingency and crisis responsibles from:
 - ANSPs
 - NSAs
 - Airports
 - Airline Operations
- Covering:
 - Regulatory requirements
 - Contingency planning (including risk assessments)
 - Crisis management and contingency operations



Preparing for the next crisis

European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC)





Exercise, exercise, exercise, ...



CYBER 13 – scenario & participants





NUCLEAR 14 – scenario & participants




Fatal incident at a Nuclear Power plant (NPP)

10 + 1h State authorities order evacuation of the vicinity of the NPP

TO + 2h NPP meltdown \rightarrow airspace above (30km radius closed)

T0 + 2h45 NM receives the dispersion model output \rightarrow forecast SFC-500m (RSMC)

Network Manager nominated by



SECURITY 15



Held on 2-3 February 2016 - security related scenario

Bombs going off at 2 European airports simultaneously

Unclear if these bombs were just targeting the airport

Aviation all over Europe under threat

How will the different states (directly affected and other) react to the threat?

- 18 States + EACCC
- Security and aviation experts from airports, airlines, EC & NM

POWER 17

Held on 1-2 February 2017 – blackout scenario

Full loss of power in 4 States

Test the response of aviation in major power failure events, including decision making and interfaces between crisis management, and operational organisations in aviation and power supply.

- 12 States + EACCC
- Expert Organisations: European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E)
- ANSPs, airports, airlines, EC & NM



EACCC18 – ATM coordination/cyber

- 13-14 March 2018 in Brussels
- Simulating a network crisis resulting from a pan-European cyber-attack affecting radar processing systems
- Focus on the EACCC coordination and communication of the European response in case of a pan-European cyber-attack targeting Air Traffic Management (ATM).





ICAO volcanic ash exercise: VOLCEX 18, 28 November 2018





PANDEMIC19





19-20 March 2018 EUROCONTROL HQ Brussels





EXERCISE SCENARIO







The PANDEMICS19 Exercise

- Objective
- Preparation
- Participants
- Scenario
- Discussions
- Conclusion



Objective

- The main objectives of EACCC exercises are:
 - Bringing stakeholder together
 - Check communications structures
 - Align views on acting during a crisis
- Out of scope are:
 - Testing preparedness of individual organisations
 - Finding solutions for specific scenarios



Preparation



- The preparation takes about a year
- Selection of a scenario
- Stakeholder identification
 - Directly affected, indirectly affected
- Scenario framework development
- Input from stakeholders
- Simulations of network impact (if necessary)
- Preparation sessions with stakeholders
- Exercise execution



Participants



- EACCC
 - Representing aviation stakeholders, military and EU
- EACCC state focal points
 - Representing state crisis organisations
- FU
 - DG SANTE
- National health authorities
- International health organisations
 - WHO
 - ECDC
 - ICAO CAPSCA
- Individual stakeholders



Scenario

- Outbreak of flu-like disease
- Immediate high media attention
- Cases spreading to neighbouring countries
- Measures are taken by appropriate authorities
- Sick passengers on board of airplanes
- Some countries restricting flights from affected region
- High international pressure
- Risk of cancellation of a high profile event



Day 1-4

- Early media coverage of a flu-like disease
- Sudden death of 5 previously healthy young persons in Stockholm
- The National IHR Focal Point (NFP) of Sweden notifies the WHO Regional IHR Contact Point in Copenhagen
- This event (unclear flu-like illness, death of 5 people, media interest) is posted to the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) as 'other information'





Media attention






Day 5

- First results of investigations are available indicating that no medical countermeasures are available.
- ECDC completed the Rapid Risk Assessment
- Swedish authorities declare national outbreak
- No travel and trade restrictions recommended by WHO
- NM Crisis Management Team starts to monitor the situation and prepares a fact sheet








Day 7

- Further cases are reported including onboard cases at Scandinavian airlines
- WHO convenes IHR Emergency Committee
 - No PHEIC is issued




Twitter











Day 8

- EACCC is activated
- EACCC request contributions from the State Focal Points for the fact sheet



Day 9

- WHO Emergency Committee declares a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)
- Guidelines and recommendations are issued
- Not all countries follow the guidelines and recommendations. Local (sometimes impractical) measures are taken
- Incidental travel bans are implemented
- Due to media attention travel demand decreases resulting in flight cancellations
- Some airline operators refuse to fly to affected countries












Media hype







Day 10

- A second Health Security Commission meeting is held. Other EC services are involved in the meeting
- In flight passenger casualty increases media attention leading to panic







Day 12

- More cases throughout Europe reported
- Pressure to cancel large conference in Sweden
- Second Emergency Committee meeting scheduled





LESSONS LEARNED



Early outbreak reporting

National level

First reporting will normally be done on the national level (in this case Sweden)

European level

- The EWRS can be used by a national health authority to inform other health authorities
- The reporting to the EU is compulsory when several criteria are met
- The dissemination of information from the EWRS is restricted by law to designated health authorities in the EU and EEA member states
- ECDC publishes a weekly summary of events on Fridays
 - This summary is publicly available

WHO

- The WHO has a dedicated unit that scans the media worldwide for signs of an outbreak
- WHO has a global network for notification of early events: the EIS notification

ICAO

At this point ICAO sees a major communications gap between the health and aviation communities



Outbreak development

- When the outbreak is confirmed and spreads, the collaboration between the HSC, ECDC and WHO is intensified.
 - ECDC convenes the Health Security Committee (HSC)
 - This can be requested by the outbreak country, but can also be triggered by media attention
 - It requires 24 hours notice
- IATA asked whether this would be the first communication to the aviation sector.
 - The reply was that on national level the aviation authorities are informed earlier
- It is not clear when bodies like EACCC are notified
 - ICAO proposes that the International Health Regulation focal points get in touch with the EACCC state focal points in case of an outbreak
- The EU member states have to coordinate the measures that they are going to take upfront with the EU (DG SANTE)
 - In case of urgency, this may be done afterwards



Involved stakeholders

- Large number of involved stakeholders
 - National and international level (WHO, ICAO, EC)
 - Different domains (health, aviation)
- Roles and responsibilities are not always clear
- Aviation focal points (EACCC) need to connect to health focal points (IHR and ICAO CAPSCA)



Practical issues

- Effectivity of screening:
 - Entry vs exit screening
- Passenger Locator Card
 - The PLC process is not clear
 - Consensus that PLCs are more effective than screening
- Quarantine airports
 - Who maintains the list?



EU

Information sharing

- ECDC flash reports
- EACCC factsheet
- WHO Emergency Committee recommendation
 - Public Health Emergency of International (or Regional) Concern
- WHO offers risk communication package for national authorities
- ICAO will open a dedicated CAPSCA website
- Notification of departure and destination airports in case of reported passengers
 - As required by Doc 4444
 - This may have practical limitations



Main conclusions

- Processes within domains are mostly clear
- Cross domain communication needs to be improved
 - This also includes the understanding of consequences
- Cross domain exercises should be done more often

