IMPLEMENTATION OF FREE ROUTE AIRSPACE - LOCAL

IN KANO FIR

FRA SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT



BACKGROUND



Consequent upon APIRG 22 Conclusion 22/36(a); "That, to foster the concept of tree routing in the AFI continental airspace in preparation for the ASBU B1 module, States consider incorporating Free Route Airspace concept into their national airspace concept and ATM Master Plan in line with the B1-FRTO ASBU module and AAO Sub-Group project plans, Nigeria considered and put machineries in motion for a seamless implementation of FRA concept in its airspace.

The consideration and subsequent decision to implement was strengthened by the successful participation of Nigeria at the Route Lab Workshop held in Accra, Ghana from 15th to 19th December 2019 which resulted in the implementation of more than eleven Flight Plannable Direct Routes in the Nigerian airspace.

Coupled with the recent investment in Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance as well as Air Traffic Management infrastructure embarked upon by Nigeria towards a seamless and harmonized implementation of Block 0 Modules of the ASBU, the stage seems set for a safe and efficient implementation of the FRA in the Nigerian airspace.



S С E

The scope of this safety risk assessment is limited to that associated with the implementation of the Free Routing Airspace (Local) in the Nigerian Airspace in accordance with the Concept of Operations (CONOP) submitted for the conceptualization, development, publication, charting and implementation of Free Route Airspace - Local.

It must be made clear from the very beginning that the hazards identified for assessment here have been assessed and their risk(s) sufficiently mitigated to have permitted safe operation despite their presence. They are identified here for specificity and probability of further mitigation for the specific purpose of FRA implementation. Some of them had lent themselves to further mitigations, while SMS is satisfied with the indices of others. Therefore, the document is purely for assessment of identified hazards consequent upon implementation of FRA in the Nigerian airspace. It contains recommendations based on data submitted by Directorate of Operations and the FRA Project Manager.

THE APPROACH





The identification of States/ANSPs that have the capacity to implement free routing based on ATM systems infrastructure and capability.


Develop the concept of operations and an implementation plan.

Trial period before full implementation

PURPOSE

The purpose of this exercise and this paper is to document the Safety Assessment of the Implementation of FRA within the Nigerian Airspace with the sole aim of showing stakeholders and reporting to the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) that the safety risks associated with the implementation of this project have been evaluated by relevant statutory body under the guidance of competent and qualified personnel. It is also to demonstrate that appropriate mitigation actions have been applied where necessary, and that an acceptable level of safety has been created and shall be maintained in the implementation of the FRA in the Nigerian Airspace.





KANO FIR



Lagos Sub-FIR Kano Sub-FIR

LAGOS EAST	LAGOS WEST	KANO EAST	KANO WEST
ACC Frequency Pry – 127.3Mhz Sec – 122.8 MHz APP Free	ACC Frequency Pry - 120.9 MHz Sec - 128.8 MHz q u e n c y	ACC Frequency Pry - 124.1 MHz APP Frequ	ACC Frequency Pry - 124.1 MHz ency
Pry - 124 <u>TWR Fre</u> Pry - 118	q u e n c y	Pry - 125. <u>TWR Frequ</u> Pry - 118.	<u>lency</u>
3 R - C W P / 3 R - A C W P	1 S - W P / 4 P - C W P 3	R - C W P / 3 R - A C W P / 1	S - W P / 4 P - C W P

LIMITATIONS

<u>CPDLC</u>

- Poor ergonomics in the equipment layout,
- Low Pilot and aircraft capabilities and patronage especially in Lagos
- Sub-optimal ATCO competencies in operating the system.

POWER SUPPLY AND CNS SYSTEMS

- Public mains power supply facilitated by FAAN on behalf of the Local Distribution Company.
- Power generators, UPS Batteries and Solar Panels installed and maintained by NAMA.
- Procedures, Regulations and Instructions are contained in the LOAs,
 LATCI and ATM Manuals that require amendments
- Automation of flight planners, printers, etc. awaiting TRACON upgrade.
- Inadequate TRACON workstation floor space with no available VCCS





TRAFFIC FLOW PATTERN





PREDICTABILITY WITHIN THE FIR

- * 0600 1800 UTC High density east-bound traffic for departure, and west-bound traffic for arrival, comprising mainly domestic operations interspersed with some overflights.
- * 1800 0600 UTC High density westbound overflight traffic controlled in Kano sub-FIR), and mixed-direction overflights traffic controlled by Lagos.





CHARACTERISTICS OF FRA

Free Route Airspace (FRA) is defined as an airspace within which users may freely plan a route from a defined entry point to a defined exit point (may require an intermediate significant point) subject to airspace availability.

Characterized by;

- ✓ Preferred trajectory
- ✓ Free flight plan routing
- ✓ Direct Route Operations (DRO)





CHARACTERISTICS OF FRA

Airspace Classification

•Class A

•Application of Flight Level Orientation Scheme (FLOS)

Airspace Organisation

•Civil/Military Cooperation

•Publication and maintenance of ATS Route Network eg. 5NLC

•No airspace sectorization restructure required

Trajectory Adherence


•Enhanced Monitoring Aids (MONA) to support ATC service





GROUND BASED AND AIRBORNE SAFETY NETS





STCA SHORT TERM COLLISION ALERT

ground-based safety net intended to assist the controller in preventing collision between aircraft by generating, in timely а manner, an alert of a potential actual or infringement of separation minima

APW AREA PROXIMITY WARNING

ground-based safety net intended to warn the controller about unauthorized penetration of an airspace volume by generating, in a timely manner, an alert of a potential or actual infringement of the required spacing to that airspace volume, which require attention/action.

CD/R CONFLICT DETECTION AND RESOLUTION

tools that provide automated assistance to the Planning Controllers (PC), as well as Tactical Controllers (TC).

MONA MONITORING AIDS

helps controllers to reduce the workload associated with traffic monitoring tasks by providing warnings if aircraft deviate from a clearance or plan and reminders of instructions to be issued and providing conformance monitoring triggering trajectory recalculation essential for the CDT


FRA SIGNIFICANT POINTS

- E ENTRY POINT
- X EXIT POINT
- I INTERMEDIATE POINT
- EX ENTRY/EXIT POINT
- AD ARRIVAL CONNECTION POINT
- EXAD ENTRY/EXIT/ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE
- AI ARRIVAL CONNECTION/INTERMEDIATE CONNECTION

BI-DIRECTIONAL

UNI- DIRECTIONAL





NASPACE

GERIAN

MANAG

NAMA

AGENC

GENERAL PROCEDURES (FRA - LOCAL)



APPLICABILITY

Nigeria (Kano FIR) is implementing FRA between Latitudes 3° and 14° north to be mainly used by overflying Traffic.

AIRSPACE CLASSIFICATION

Nigeria (Kano FIR) FRA is classified as class A Airspace

LATERAL LIMITS

The Nigeria (Kano FIR) FRA characteristics are described in Appendix 3 of the Nigeria AIP.

VERTICAL LIMITS

FL 245 / UNL

TIME OF AVAILABILITY

H24

SEPARATION MINIMA

No change in enroute separation minima required

SEPARATION MINIMA



No change in En-Route separation minima (i.e. Vertical and horizontal separation minima based on ATS surveillance) is needed in relation to Free Route operations. Separation minima between aircraft are expected to continue to be based on guidance, regulations, and factors used in today's environment (ICAO Doc 4444 Procedures for Air Traffic Management). Differences from DOC 4444 standards (if any) are to be published in AIP

FRA ATM CONTINGENCY





Free Route Airspace shall be available for flight planning and operations within the Kano FIR, except under the following conditions;


- In the event of total failure of surveillance system (Radar and ADS-C / CPDLC).
- In the event of total or partial failure of communication system within the designated Free Route Airspace or portion thereof.
- In the event of severe weather conditions that may not permit flight over direct route as planned.
- During ATM contingency that may affect the safety and efficiency of flight operations on such Direct Routes.

FLIGHT PLANNABLE DIRECT ROUTES IN FRA - LOCAL IN KANO FIR USING PHX SOFTWARE


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37 PUBLISHED FREE ROUTE AIRSPACE - LOCAL





SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

TYPE OF OPERATIONS:

Air Traffic Management (ATM)

GENERIC HAZARD:

FRA Implementation

ATM (Airspace Reorganisation)

SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF HAZARD:

- Loss of situational awareness by ATCO.
- Aircraft crossing the length and breadth of the Nigerian airspace on an unusual trajectory.
- Inter-FIR route traffic conflict because of aircraft maneuvers to avoid widespread weather.
- RCF/poor readability involving one aircraft in one sub-FIR while entering into another sector.
- Uneven ATCO competencies operating in the different Sub FIR.
- Convergence of traffic from the two different sectors at an exit point adjacent to neighboring FIR
- Failure/lack of coordination between Lagos and Kano ACC
- Inadequate trained manpower
- High ATCO Workload / Reduction of Separation (AIRPROX)



SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT EXISTING DEFENCES:

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION HARZARD RELATED CONSEQUENCES:

- Collision avoidance maneuver
- Level Burst and inability to maintain level
- Substantial damage to aircraft hull
- Injuries to passengers
- Mid-Air collision
- Death of crew and passengers
- Damage to State, ANSP and Airlines reputations
- Bankruptcy due payment of huge reparation

- Development of Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
- Conduct of preliminary FRA Gap Analysis Annex 2
- Issuance of AIP Supplement (AIRAC AIP SUP AS08/2021 Publication date 21st Oct.
 2021, with Effective implementation date of 2nd December 2021, three months prior to initial FRA Local implementation
- Conduct of physical and virtual training/sensitization workshop/seminar on implementation
- Update of radar maps and charts
- Enhanced ATC Coordination procedures
- Availability of reliable and rapid inter-unit coordination systems.
- Identification and tagging of flash points of traffic conflict, especially at route intersections.
- Continual monitoring and reporting shortcomings of implementation lapses.
- Availability of high integrity radio communication system.
- Availability of high integrity surveillance coverage of the entire sectors and safety nets.
- Adequate contingency procedures for transiting from Surveillance to Procedural Control
- Availability of adequate manpower for seamless implementation of FRA Local.



SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS



The FRA implementation is still work in progress for Nigeria

Undergoing continuous monitoring

Ongoing observations and reviews

Need for a new SRA





Technology Regulations


19 KANO FIR EQUIPMENT QUESTIONAIRE FOR FRA – LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION

īπ.			
R	ISK CONTROL/MITIGATION	RESPONSE	ADDITIONAL DEFENCES
9	UESTION		REQUIRED
A	re the CNS systems that will	Yes, but has recorded	Power supply has been
s	upport the required prompt and	intermittent hitches recently that	identified as the source of
n	eliable coordination available?	are handled by the	failure. Work is almost
		reconditioning.	completed for rectifying it.
I	s the manpower requirement	Yes, meets minimum	Plan for more trained ATCOs
s	ufficient to service the intended	requirement, but need	posting presented and
0	peration?	improvement.	approved.
D	the CNS systems required for	Yes, had been made better	Surveillance reliability and
e	ffective coordination function as	through upgrade.	integrity are also increased
n	equired?		through upgrade.
A	re the CNS systems defenses	Yes	Minimize system failure rate,
p	ractical for use under working		and reduce average down time
C	onditions?		through upgrade
A	re staff involved aware of the safety	Yes, through training and unit	Iterate the briefing and review
ri	isks of the consequences of the	briefing.	training requirements
h	azards, and the defenses in place?		whenever necessary.
			Communicate safety risk
			assessment to operation staff
A	re additional safety risks	Yes. Make available electronic	Review ATC procedures to
п	nitigation/control measures	flight progress strip for ATCOS	make for reduction of
n	equired?		controllers' workload.
A	re procedures on ground to	Yes, under supervision	Entrench increased supervision
а	ccommodate trainee ATCOS in FRA		of trainees to forestall unsafe
_	Local operations		acts and breakdown of
			separations
A	re procedures on ground to brief	No	Institute procedures for
0	perational staff on the progress		communication of progress
n	ecorded in the FRA implementation		made in the implementation of
			FRA – Local including sharing
			statistical data.

Kano FRA Equipment Questionnaire (FRA-Local)



Risk Control/Mitigation Question



Additional Defenses Required

FRA GAP ANALYSIS CHECK LIST ANNEX 2



THEME

- QUERY REMARKS
- Airspace Structure
- Communication Capabilities
- Survellance Capabilities
- Ground-based safety nets
- Conflict detection and Resolution Tools
- Systems
 Supported by
 Coordination
- Flight Planning Process
- Navigation Infrastructre
- Contingency
- Training



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Theme	Query	Remarks
Airspace Structure	Which practices are currently in place within your FIR? Image: Size of the stress of the st	All Air Routes within Kano FIR are published in the Nigeria AIP
Communication	Which Air/Ground communication capabilities do	
capabilities	you have? Please specify the communication capabilities you have	
	 ☑ VHF Transaction time in sec: Availability in %: 100 Continuity in %: 100 Integrity in %: 97 	
	 CPDLC Transaction time in sec: Availability in %: 80 Continuity in %: 80 Integrity in %: 95 	
	 ☑ HF Transaction time in sec: Availability in %: 100 Continuity in %: 100 Integrity in %: 100 	
	Others	

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SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT OF FREE ROUTE AIRSPACE – LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION IN NIGERIA



Type of Operations	Generic Hazards	Specific components of the Hazard	Hazard Related Consequences	Exiting Defenses to Control Risk(s) and Risk Index	Further Actions to Reduce Risk(s) and Resulting Index
Operations (Air Traffic Management)	FRA	 Extreme and marginal weather condition. Partial or complete RAADAR failure 	1.Level burst/ inability to maintain level due turbulence, 2.Death and/or injury of Passengers and crew, haul loss or damage to aircraft	 Conduct of preliminary FRA Gap analysis – Annex 2 Issuance of appropriate AIP Supplements Updating of LOAs, LOPs and LATCIs 	 Conduct of more robust FRA Gap analysis - Annex Obtain 5NLC for an un- named intermediate waypoint "OGDIX".

SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT OF FREE ROUTE AIRSPACE – LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION IN NIGERIA (Cont'd)



Type of Operations	Generic Hazards	Specific components of the Hazard	Hazard Related Consequences	Exiting Defenses to Control Risk(s) and Risk Index	Further Actions to Reduce Risk(s) and Resulting Index
Operations (Air Traffic Management)	FRA	3.RCF/Poor readability of radio frequency, 4.Loss of situation awareness, 5.Inadequately trained manpower in FRA Local procedures.	 3. Damage to State, ANSP or Airlines' reputations. 4. Bankruptcy due high payment of reparations. 	 Nigeria Airspace Route Chart/Navigation Chart 5. Radar map Update of Intermediate Waypoints. 6.Training/sensiti zation workshop for ATCOS and AIS personnel 	 3. Conduct of additional Training/sensitiz ation workshop for ATCOS and AIS personnel 4. Installation of High-Integrity air-ground radio equipment. 5. RADAR upgrade.

SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT OF FREE ROUTE AIRSPACE – LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION IN NIGERIA (Cont'd)



Type of Operations	Generic Hazards	Specific components of the Hazard	Hazard Related Consequences	Exiting Defenses to Control Risk(s) and Risk Index	Further Actions to Reduce Risk(s) and Resulting Index
Operations (Air Traffic Management)	FRA			 8. Enhanced co- ordination procedures 9. Safety nets on radar 10. High integrity radio communication 11. Operational posting of ATCOS for adequate manpower 	
				Risk Index: 2D	Resultant Risk Index: 1D

HAZARD ASSESSMENT



S/N	Hazard ID	Hazard Description	Resultant Risk Index
1.	ATM/OPS 01	Radio Communication Failure	2D
2.	ATM/OPS 02	Surveillance Equipment Failure (Full or Partial)	2E
3.	ATM/OPS 03	Failure/lack of coordination between Lagos and Kano	3D
4.	ATM/OPS 04	Failure of VSAT and Satellite Systems	2E
5.	ATM/OPS 07	Inadequate ATCO Training for FRA	1B
6.	ATM/OPS 06	Power Failure	18

Severity	Catastrophic	Hazardous	Major	Minor	Negligible
	А	в	с	D	E
Probability					
Frequent					
5	5A	5B	5C	5D	5E
Occasional					
4	4A	4B	4C	4D	4E
Remote					
3	ЗA	3B	3C	3D	ЗE
Improbable					
2	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E
Extremely					
Improbable					
1	1A	18	1C	þр	1E
Fig.1: Risk Asse	ssment Analysis	s Matrix	Source: NAM/	SMS Manual	

ICAO RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX





Fig. 2: Legend to the Risk Analysis Matrix



SAFETY RISK PROBABILITY

Likelihood	Meaning	Value
FREQUENT	Likely to occur many times (has occurred frequently)	5
OCCASIONAL	Likely to occur sometimes (has occurred infrequently)	4
REMOTE	Unlikely, but possible to occur (has occurred rarely)	3
IMPROBABLE	Very unlikely to occur (not known to have occurred)	2
EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE	Almost inconceivable that the Event will occur	1

Table 2: ICAO Safety Risk Probability Table

SAFETY RISK SEVERITY



Severity	Meaning					
CATASTROPHIC	- Equipment Destroyed	Α				
	- Multiple Deaths					
HAZARDOUS	 A large reduction in safety margins, physical distress or a workload such that the operators cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely. Serious injury Major Equipment Damage 	В				
MAJOR	 A significant Reduction in safety margins, a reduction in the ability of the operators to cope with adverse operating conditions because of an increase in workload or because of conditions impairing their efficiency Serious incident Injury to persons 	C				
MINOR	 Nuisance Operating limitations Use of emergency procedures Minor incidents 	D				
NEGLIGIBLE	- Few consequences	E				

Table 3: ICAO Risk Severity Table

Source: NAMA SMS Manual



ATC Environment of SAFETY RISK SEVERITY

.t.

Catastrophic –	Hazardous –	Major –	Minor –	Negligible –
Α	В	С	D	Е
Collision with other aircraft, obstacles, or terrain.	Reduction in separation as defined by a high severity operational error, or a total loss of ATC.	Reduction in separation as defined by a low/moderate severity operational error, or significant reduction in ATC capability.	Slight reduction in ATC capability, or significant increase in ATC workload.	Slight increase in ATC workload.

Table 4: Example of risk severity using ATC environment Source: NAMA SMS Manual

(Radio Communication Failure)

Ty

NIGERIAN A	IRSPACE MANAGEMENT AGEN	NCY (NAMA)		
Hazard ID: ATM/OPS 01	Project: Free Route	Date: 09/02/23		
	Airspace			
Hazard Description:				
Radio Communication Failure				
Risk Probability: Improbable	Severity: Minor	Risk Index: 2D		
Hazard Related	Existing Defenses:			
Consequences:	ATCO training			
Loss of separation	CPDLC			
Increased ATCO workload	Secondary radio frequency			
	Route Design			
	Contingency Procedures			
Further Mitigation (If require	d):			
Radar upgrade				
ATCO Training				
ATCO refresher				
Mode S (On-going)				
Integration of PSR, SSR and AD	S-C (on-going)			
Resultant Risk Probability:	Resultant Severity:	Resultant Risk Index: 2E		
Improbable	Negligible			
Mitigation By:	Director of Operations and D	irector of Engineering		

e of tration	Generic Hazard	Specific component of Hazard	Hazard Related Consequence	Existing Defences	Risk Index	Further Actions	Resultant Index
			Loss of	ATCO trained		Installation of	
			separation			high integrity	
			Increased ATCO	CPDLC		radio	
		Radio	workload				
		Communication failure		Provision of	2D	More ATCO	2E
		(ATM/OPS 01)		redundancies		training	
		(Anni Orson)		SLOP			
				Airways			
				design			
				-			
				Contingency			
				procedure			
			Loss of	Back up radar		Radar	
			separation	back up radar		upgrade	
			Increased ATCO	Contingency		Mode 5	
			workload	Procedures	2D		2E
		Surveillance	Fall-back to			Integration of	
		Equipment	procedural	Trained		PSR, SSR and	
		Failure (full or	control	ATCOS		ADS-C	
		Partial)	Loss of situation	61 A A			
		(ATM/OPS02)	awareness	SLOP			
			Congestion and increased fuel	ADS-C			
			burn	2000			
			Height deviation				
			and level burst				
ATM	Free Route		undetected				
	Airspace		Increased ATCOS	Enhanced		Safety Nets	
			workload	Coordination		-	
		Failure/lack of		Procedures		ATCOS	
		coordination	Loss of separation			Refresher	2E
		between Lagos	Delayed Aircraft	CPDLC	2D	ATCO	
		and Kano (ATM/OPS03)	Movement	Installation of		Supervisors	
		(Perint/OF303)	in or contained	Telephones		Training	
			Loss of situation	relephones			
			awareness				
			Long-range RT	Contingency			2E
			failure	Procedures	2D	VSAT	
		Failure of VSAT	Loss of	47000		Redundancies	
		and satellite	separation	ATCOS		Color course	
		systems (ATM/OPS04)	Loss of	Training		Solar power	
		(PG M/OPS04)	connectivity of radar system	SLOP		IDU7000	
			Increased ATCOS				
			workload				
		Inadequate	ATCO workload	ATCO Training		More ATCO	
		ATCO Training	AIRPROX			Training	
		for FRA	Air Traffic	Contingency	2C		2D
		(ATM/OPS07)	Congestion	Procedure		Update of	
				FRA Manager		radar map	
				FRA Manager workshop		FRA Charts	
			Radar failure	Public power		Replacement	



(Surveillance Equipment Failure - Partial or Total)

NIGERIAN A	IRSPACE MANAGEMENT AGEN	NCY (NAMA)
Hazard ID: ATM/OPS 02	Project: Free Route	Date: 09/02/23
	Airspace	
Hazard Description:		
Surveillance equipment Failur	e (full or partial)	-
Risk Probability: Improbable	Severity: Minor	Risk Index: 2D
Hazard Related	Existing Defenses:	
Consequences:	Back-up radar	
Loss of separation	ATCO training	
Increased ATCO workload	ADS-C	
Congestion and increased	SLOP	
fuel burn	Route Design	
Loss of situation awareness	Contingency Procedures	
Revert to procedural control		
Further Mitigation (If require	d):	
Installation of high integrity ra	dio	
Additional ATCO training		
Resultant Risk Probability:	Resultant Severity:	Resultant Risk Index: 2E
Improbable	Negligible	
Mitigation By:	Director of Operations and Di	irector of Engineering
Date Completed:	June, 2022	

Type of Operation	Generic Hazard	Specific component of Hazard	Hazard Related Consequence	Existing Defences	Risk Index	Further Actions	Resultant Index	
				Loss of separation Increased ATCO	ATCO trained CPDLC		Installation of high integrity radio	
		Radio Communication failure (ATM/OPS 01)	workload	Provision of redundancies	2D	More ATCO training	2E	
		<i>v</i> ,		SLOP				
				Airways design				
				Contingency procedure				
			Loss of separation	Back up radar		Radar upgrade		
			Increased ATCO workload	Contingency Procedures	2D	Mode S	2E	
		Surveillance Equipment Failure (full or Partial) (ATM/OPSO2) Free Route	Fall-back to procedural control	Trained ATCOS		Integration of PSR, SSR and ADS-C		
			Loss of situation awareness Congestion and	SLOP				
			increased fuel burn	ADS-C				
ATM			Height deviation and level burst undetected					
	Airspace		Increased ATCOS workload	Enhanced Coordination Procedures		Safety Nets		
		Failure/lack of coordination between Lagos	Loss of separation	CPDLC	2D	Refresher	2E	
		and Kano (ATM/OPS03)	and Kano Delayed Aircraft	Installation of Telephones	20	ATCO Supervisors Training		
			Loss of situation awareness					
	a	Failure of VSAT	Long-range RT failure Loss of	Contingency Procedures	2D	VSAT Redundancies	2E	
		and satellite systems	separation Loss of	ATCO5 Training		Solar power		
		(ATM/OPS04)	connectivity of radar system Increased ATCOS	SLOP		IDU7000		
		Inadequate	workload ATCO workload	ATCO Training		More ATCO		
		ATCO Training for FRA (ATM/OPS07)	AIRPROX Air Traffic Congestion	Contingency Procedure	2C	Training Update of	2D	
				FRA Manager workshop		radar map FRA Charts		
			Radar failure	Public power		Replacement		







(Failure/Lack of Coordination between Lagos and

		Vana)				
NIGERIAN A	IRSPACE MANAGEMENT AGEN	ICY (NAMA)				
Hazard ID: ATM/OPS 03	Project: Free Route Date: 09/02/23					
	Airspace					
Hazard Description:						
Failure or lack of coordination	between Lagos and Kano ACC					
Risk Probability: Improbable	Severity: Minor	Risk Index: 2D				
Hazard Related	Existing Defenses:					
Consequences:	uences: Enhanced coordination procedures					
Loss of separation	ATCO training					
Increased ATCO workload	CPDLC					
Congestion and increased	Installation of telephones					
fuel burn	Contingency Procedures					
Loss of situation awareness						
Delayed aircraft movement						
Further Mitigation (If required	d):					
Safety Nets						
ATCO Refresher						
ATCO Supervisor training						
Resultant Risk Probability:	Resultant Severity:	Resultant Risk Index: 2E				
Improbable	Negligible					
Mitigation By:	Director of Operations					
Date Completed:	May, 2022					

ype of peration	Generic Hazard	Specific component of Hazard	Hazard Related Consequence	Existing Defences	Risk Index	Further Actions	Resultant Index
			Loss of	ATCO trained		Installation of	
			separation			high integrity	
			Increased ATCO	CPDLC		radio	
		Radio	workload				
		Communication failure		Provision of	2D	More ATCO	2E
		(ATM/OPS 01)		redundancies		training	
		(AIM/OPS01)		SLOP			
				Airways			
				design			
				deaign			
				Contingency			
				procedure			
				,			
			Loss of	Back up radar		Radar	
			separation			upgrade	
			Increased ATCO	Contingency		Mode S	
			workload	Procedures	2D		2E
		Surveillance	Fall-back to			Integration of	
		Equipment	procedural	Trained		PSR, SSR and	
		Failure (full or	control	ATCOS		ADS-C	
		Partial)	Loss of situation	61 O D			
		(ATM/OPS02)	awareness	SLOP			
			Congestion and	ADS-C			
			increased fuel burn	ADS-C			
			Height deviation	-			
			and level burst				
ATM	Free Route		undetected				
	Airspace		Increased ATCOS	Enhanced		Safety Nets	
	-		workload	Coordination		Juncty Heta	
		Failure/lack of		Procedures		ATCOS	
		coordination	Loss of			Refresher	2E
		between Lagos	separation	CPDLC	2D		
		and Kano	Delayed Aircraft			ATCO	
		(ATM/OPS03)	Movement	Installation of		Supervisors	
				Telephones		Training	
			Loss of situation				
			awareness				
			Long-range RT	Contingency			2E
		failure	Procedures	2D	VSAT		
	Failure of VSAT	Loss of	ATCOS		Redundancies		
		and satellite	separation			Color power	
		systems (ATA (OPCOA)	Loss of	Training		Solar power	
	1	(ATM/OPS04)	connectivity of radar system	SLOP		IDU7000	
	1		Increased ATCOS	~~~~			
	1		workload				
	1	Inadequate	ATCO workload	ATCO Training		More ATCO	
	1	ATCO Training	AIRPROX			Training	
	1	for FRA	Air Traffic	Contingency	2C		2D
	1	(ATM/OPS07)	Congestion	Procedure		Update of	
	1	, , ,	congestion			radar map	
	1			FRA Manager			
	1			workshop		FRA Charts	
	1		Radar failure	Public nower		Replacement	



(VSAT and Satelite System Failure)

NIGERIAN A	IRSPACE MANAGEMENT AGEN	ICY (NAMA)
Hazard ID: ATM/OPS 04	Project: Free Route	Date: 09/02/23
	Airspace	
Hazard Description:		
Failure of VSAT and Satellite S	ystem	
Risk Probability: Improbable	Severity: Minor	Risk Index: 2D
Hazard Related	Existing Defenses:	
Consequences:	Contingencies	
Loss of separation	ATCO Training	
Loss of radar connectivity	SLOP	
Increased ATCO workload		
Further Mitigation (If required	d):	
Upgrade to IDU7000		
VSAT Redundancies		
Solar power system (Additiona	al on-going)	_
Resultant Risk Probability:	Resultant Severity:	Resultant Risk Index: 2E
Improbable	Negligible	
Mitigation By:	Director of Operations	
Date Completed:	May, 2022	

ype of Operation	Generic Hazard	Specific component of Hazard	Hazard Related Consequence	Existing Defences	Risk Index	Further Actions	Resultant Index
			Loss of	ATCO trained		Installation of	
			separation			high integrity	
			Increased ATCO	CPDLC		radio	
		Radio	workload				
		Communication		Provision of	2D	More ATCO	2E
		failure		redundancies		training	
		(ATM/OPS 01)					
				SLOP			
				Airways			
				design			
				Contingency			
				procedure			
				procedure			
			Loss of	Back up radar		Radar	
			separation			upgrade	
			Increased ATCO	Contingency		Mode S	
			workload	Procedures	2D		2E
		Surveillance	Fall-back to	1		Integration of	
		Equipment	procedural	Trained		PSR, SSR and	
		Failure (full or	control	ATCOS		ADS-C	
		Partial)	Loss of situation	1			
		(ATM/OPS02)	awareness	SLOP			
			Congestion and]			
			increased fuel	ADS-C			
			burn				
			Height deviation				
ATM	Free Route		and level burst				
AIM	Airspace		undetected				
	Airspace		Increased ATCOS	Enhanced		Safety Nets	
			workload	Coordination			
		Failure/lack of	Loss of	Procedures		ATCOS	
		coordination	separation	CPDLC	2D	Refresher	2E
		between Lagos	Delayed Aircraft	CPDLC	20	ATCO	
		and Kano (ATM/OPS03)	Movement	Installation of		Supervisors	
		(PEIN(OPSUS)		Telephones		Training	
			Loss of situation	relephones		nathing	
			awareness				
			Long-range RT	Contingency			2E
			failure	Procedures	2D	VSAT	
		Failure of VSAT	Loss of			Redundancies	
		and satellite	separation	ATCOS			
		systems	Loss of	Training		Solar power	
		(ATM/OPS04)	connectivity of				
			radar system	SLOP		IDU7000	
			Increased ATCOS	1			
			workload				
		Inadequate	ATCO workload	ATCO Training		More ATCO	
		ATCO Training	AIRPROX	1		Training	
		for FRA	Air Traffic	Contingency	2C	-	2D
		(ATM/OPS07)	Congestion	Procedure		Update of	
						radar map	
				FRA Manager			
				workshop		FRA Charts	
	1	1	Radar failure	Public nower		Replacement	

HAZARD REGISTER for FRA SRA (Inadequate ATCO Training for FRA)

NIGERIAN A	IRSPACE MANAGEMENT AGE	NCY (NAMA)
Hazard ID: ATM/OPS 07	Project: Free Route	Date: 09/02/23
	Airspace	
Hazard Description:	-	
Inadequate ATCO Training for	FRA	
Risk Probability: Improbable	Severity: Major	Risk Index: 2C
Hazard Related	Existing Defenses:	
Consequences:	Contingency Procedure	
ATCO workload	ATCO Training	
AIRPROX	FRA Manager Workshop	
Congestion		
Further Mitigation (If required	d):	
More ATCO Training		
Update of radar map		
FRA Charts		
5NLC for waypoint		
Resultant Risk Probability:	Resultant Severity: Minor	Resultant Risk Index: 2D
Improbable		
Mitigation By:	Director of Operations	
Date Completed:	May, 2022	

ype of Operation	Generic Hazard	Specific component of	Hazard Related Consequence	Existing Defences	Risk Index	Further Actions	Resultant Index
peradion	Theorem	Hazard	consequence	05360568		Acuons	Index
			Loss of	ATCO trained		Installation of	
			separation			high integrity	
			Increased ATCO	CPDLC		radio	
		Radio	workload				
		Communication		Provision of	2D	More ATCO	2E
		failure		redundancies		training	
		(ATM/OPS 01)					
				SLOP			
				Airways			
				design			
				design			
				Contingency			
				procedure			
				procedure			
			Loss of	Back up radar		Radar	
			separation			upgrade	
			Increased ATCO	Contingency		Mode 5	
			workload	Procedures	2D		2E
		Surveillance	Fall-back to			Integration of	
		Equipment	procedural	Trained		PSR, SSR and	
		Failure (full or Partial)	control	ATCOS		ADS-C	
			Loss of situation				
		(ATM/OPS02)	awareness	SLOP			
			Congestion and				
			increased fuel	ADS-C			
			burn				
			Height deviation				
ATM	Free Route		and level burst undetected				
	Airspace		Increased ATCOS	Enhanced		Safety Nets	
			workload	Coordination		sarety nets	
		Failure/lack of	workioad	Procedures		ATCOS	
		coordination	Loss of	riocedures		Refresher	2E
		between Lagos	separation	CPDLC	2D	-series rei	-
		and Kano	Delayed Aircraft			ATCO	
		(ATM/OPS03)	Movement	Installation of		Supervisors	
				Telephones		Training	
			Loss of situation	1			
			awareness				
			Long-range RT	Contingency			2E
			failure	Procedures	2D	VSAT	
		Failure of VSAT	Loss of			Redundancies	
		and satellite	separation	ATCOS			
		systems	Loss of	Training		Solar power	
		(ATM/OPS04)	connectivity of	ci on		10112000	
			radar system	SLOP		IDU7000	
			Increased ATCOS				
		1	workload	ATTENT TO LOC			
		Inadequate	ATCO workload	ATCO Training		More ATCO	
		ATCO Training	AIRPROX	Continuor	26	Training	20
	for FRA	Air Traffic	Contingency	2C	Update of	2D	
		(ATM/OPS07)	Congestion	Procedure		radar map	
				FRA Manager		radar map	
				workshop		FRA Charts	
			Radar failure	Public power		Replacement	



(Power Failure - Partial or Total)

NIGERIAN A	IRSPACE MANAGEMENT AGEN	ICY (NAMA)			
Hazard ID: ATM/OPS 06	Project: Free Route	Date: 09/02;23			
	Airspace				
Hazard Description:					
Power Failure (Partial or total)					
Risk Probability: Improbable	Severity: Major	Risk Index: 3D			
Hazard Related Existing Defenses:					
Consequences:	Contingency Procedures				
Radar Failure	Public power supply				
Radio outage	Generator				
AIPROX	Batteries				
Loss of separation	Solar power system				
Further Mitigation (If required	d):				
Replacement of old generators	S				
Installation of additional solar	power system				
Additional redundancies					
Resultant Risk Probability:	Resultant Severity: Minor	Resultant Risk Index: 2D			
Improbable					
Mitigation By:	Director of Operations				
Date Completed:	May, 2022				

ype of Operation	Generic Hazard	Specific component of Hazard	Hazard Related Consequence	Existing Defences	Risk Index	Further Actions	Resultant Index
		Hazard	Loss of separation	ATCO trained		Installation of high integrity	
		Radio	Increased ATCO workload	CPDLC		radio	
		Communication		Provision of	2D	More ATCO	2E
		failure (ATM/OPS 01)		redundancies		training	
		(AUN/OFS01)		SLOP			
				Airways			
				design			
				Contingency			
				procedure			
			Loss of separation	Back up radar		Radar upgrade	
			Increased ATCO	Contingency		Mode S	
			workload	Procedures	2D		2E
		Surveillance	Fall-back to	Technol		Integration of	
		Equipment Failure (full or	procedural	Trained ATCOS		PSR, SSR and ADS-C	
		Partial)	Loss of situation	AICOS		ADS-C	
		(ATM/OPS02)	awareness	SLOP			
			Congestion and	1			
			increased fuel	ADS-C			
		•	burn Height deviation	1			
			and level burst				
ATM	Free Route		undetected				
	Airspace	Failure/lack of	Increased ATCOS workload	Enhanced		Safety Nets	
			workload	Coordination Procedures		ATCOS	
		coordination	Loss of			Refresher	2E
		between Lagos and Kano (ATM/OPS03)	separation	CPDLC	2D		
			Delayed Aircraft Movement	Installation of		ATCO Supervisors	
				Telephones		Training	
			Loss of situation	1			
			awareness	Castinguese			25
			Long-range RT failure	Contingency Procedures	2D	VSAT	2E
		Failure of VSAT	Loss of	rioceoures	20	Redundancies	
		and satellite	separation	ATCOS			
		systems	Loss of	Training		Solar power	
		(ATM/OPS04)	connectivity of radar system	SLOP		IDU7000	
			Increased ATCOS				
			workload				
		Inadequate	ATCO workload	ATCO Training		More ATCO	
		ATCO Training for FRA	AIRPROX	Contingency	2C	Training	2D
		(ATM/OPS07)	Air Traffic Congestion	Procedure	20	Update of	20
		+,	congestion			radar map	
				FRA Manager			
	1		Radar failure	workshop Public power		FRA Charts Replacement	



FURTHER ACTIONS

Obtaining 5NLC from ICAO WACAF for an un-'Intermediate' waypoint (OGDIX) named causing loss of situation awareness and update on radar map.

RISK INDEX

- ✓ Conduct of more robust FRA Gap Analysis Annex 2 – more parameters were analyzed
- \checkmark Conduct of additional training/sensitization workshop for ATCOS and AIS personnel
- Installation of high-Integrity digital radio equipment for long range Air-ground communication
- Commencement of TRACON Recondition \checkmark project pending upgrade

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Hazard Identification and Risk Management (HIRM) Log can be found in Appendix 1 to this SRA

RESULTANT **RISK INDEX**

1D



FRA INCREMENTS BASED ON ENHANCED SAFETY RISK INDEX - 1D



Implementation of FRA – Local first phase increment –

FIRST PHASE INCREMENT AS10/2022 effective date 19th May 2022 with attendant ATM procedures and notified all stakeholders appropriately

Implementation of FRA – Local first phase increment –

FIRST PHASE INCREMENT AS10/2022 effective date 19th May 2022 with attendant ATM procedures and notified all stakeholders appropriately



CONCLUSION



After very careful considerations of the six (6) hazards associated with the implementation of FRA – Local in the Nigerian airspace, it was assessed that all were within acceptable zones of safety risk, with the current conclusions being;

RISK INDEX – 2D

66

RESULTANT RISK INDEX: 1D

This therefore implies that risk(s) posed by the identified hazards have been sufficiently mitigated to pose no safety risk to the implementation of FRA – Local operations in the Kano FIR.

It is therefore the considered opinion of NAMA SMS that the free route airspace – Local is safe for implementation in the Nigerian airspace (Kano FIR) based on the data provided by the Directorate of Operations and the FRA Project Manager.

THANK YOU

Bolakale S. Ahmed

Ag. GM SMS/QA

bsahmed@nama.gov.ng

Samson O. Akpore

FRA Project Manager

sakpore@nama.gov.ng