# AFI AVIATION WEEK – 8<sup>th</sup> EDITION AFI Aviation Symposium





### **Session 5:**

**Aviation Security and Cybersecurity policy developments** 

Presented by: Secretariat

Nairobi, Kenya: August 2023

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### **Presentation overview**

Annex 17 – Aviation Security
Amendment 18

Global Aviation Security Plan

41st Session of the Assembly

- Aviation Security

AVSECP/34 Major Outcomes

Cybersecurity activities








# Annex 17 – *Aviation Security*Amendment 18









### Amendment 18 Annex 17








## Summary of State notification








Differences are valid mostly until 1 January 2024



# When will guidance be available?

- 13th Edition of the ICAO Aviation Security
   Manual (Doc 8973 Restricted) is published in all
   ICAO languages.
- Some additional new/revised guidance was made available on June 2023.





## **AVSEC - Global Aviation Security Plan**







## Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP)

### Roadmap

### **Priority Outcome 1**

Enhancing risk awareness + response

### **Priority Outcome 2**

**Security Culture** 

### **Priority Outcome 3**

Improve technological resources and foster innovation


### **Priority Outcome 4**

Improve oversight + Quality assurance




### **Priority Outcome 5**

Increase cooperation + support



# Aspirational targets (data as of 31 March 2022)



2020

80% States over 65% effective implementation


**NOT MET** 



2023

90% States over 80% effective implementation

VERY UNLIKELY
TO BE MET



2030

100% States over 90% effective implementation





### Evaluation of the GASeP

### Some key findings include:

The 2021 evaluation by the Secretariat's Office of Internal Oversight points to key lessons learned from the experience of implementation in the past five years. The findings and recommendations of the evaluation are proposed to guide efforts in preparing for the first revision of the Plan.



Aspirational targets are important but need to be realistic



Evidence that progress is being made in implementing GASeP but there needs to be a coherent monitoring and reporting framework



Good aviation security technical assistance provided by ICAO to Member States but will be much better with budgetary allocation and human resources





### Updating the GASeP



Main review areas (as indicated by A41)

- Aspirational targets
- Roadmap
- Monitoring and reporting processes

Lessons learned from the last 5 years of implementation and the recent evaluation of GASeP will guide efforts in updating Plan


Next Edition of the GASeP

AVSEC Panel's
GASEP Task Force
will be reconvened to
review and
propose an
updated Roadmap

Participation from Member States, Regional Offices, regional and industry groups and other relevant stakeholders




## **TF-GASEP**



regions except SAM/NACC.

# Key conclusions Aviation Security

41st Assembly





### AVSECP/34 Major Outcomes



Assessment of threat and risk



Guidance material



Panel's technical advice to Member States



GASeP



AVSEC Panel's internal procedures



Work programme







# **Aviation Cybersecurity activities**








## ICAO's Work on Aviation Cybersecurity – International Legal Instruments

- The Beijing Convention (2010)
- The Beijing Protocol (2010)

Governments' Adoption of the Beijing
Instruments is an Important
DETERRENT of Cyber-Attacks
Against Civil Aviation



### PROTOCOL

SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT

THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS PROTOCOL

DEEPLY CONCERNED about the worldwide escalation of unlawful acts against civil aviation;

RECOGNIZING that new types of threats against civil aviation require new concerted efforts and policies of cooperation on the part of States; and

BELIEVING that in order to better address these threats, it is necessary to adopt provisions supplementary to those of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970, to suppress unlawful acts of seizure or exercise of seizure of proper to the convention of the convention of

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

### A rticle I

This Protocol supplements the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970 (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention").

### Autiala II

Article 1 of the Convention shall be replaced by the following:

### "Article


- Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally seizes
  or exercises control of an aircraft in service by force or threat thereof, or by coercion,
  or by any other form of intimidation, or by any technological means.
- 2. Any person also commits an offence if that person
- (a) makes a threat to commit the offence set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article;
   or
- (b) unlawfully and intentionally causes any person to receive such a threat

under circumstances which indicate that the threat is credible



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# ICAO's Work on Aviation Cybersecurity – SARPS



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# Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention – *Aviation Security* Standard 4.9.1

Each Contracting State shall ensure that operators or entities as defined in the national civil aviation security programme or other relevant national documentation identify their critical information and communications technology systems and data used for civil aviation purposes and, in accordance with a risk assessment, develop and implement, as appropriate, measures to protect them from unlawful interference

### **Recommended Practice 4.9.2**

Recommendation— Each Contracting State should ensure that the measures implemented protect, as appropriate, the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the identified critical systems and/or data. The measures should include, inter alia, security by design, supply chain security, network separation, and the protection and/or limitation of any remote access capabilities, as appropriate and in accordance with the risk assessment carried out by its relevant national authorities

## The Aviation Cybersecurity Strategy









### The Cybersecurity Action Plan



- First Edition published in November 2020
- Second Edition published in January 2022
- Available on ICAO Public Website
- Provides the Foundation for ICAO, States and stakeholders to work together
- Develops the 7 Pillars of the Aviation Cybersecurity Strategy into 32 Priority Actions, which are further broken down into 51 Tasks to be implemented by ICAO, States, and Stakeholders

# Key conclusions Aviation Cybersecurity

41st Assembly

# ICAO 41st Session Assembly Resolution A41–19: *Addressing Cybersecurity in Civil Aviation*

- •Highlights the need for global adoption of the Beijing Instruments
- Recognizes the need for aviation cybersecurity to be harmonized
- •Calls upon States to (not an exhaustive list):
  - ✓ implement ICAO Aviation Cybersecurity Strategy, and make use of the ICAO Cybersecurity Action Plan
  - encourage government/industry coordination with regard to aviation cybersecurity strategies, policies, and plans, as well as sharing of information to help identify critical vulnerabilities that need to be addressed
  - develop and participate in government/industry partnerships and mechanisms, nationally and internationally, for the systematic sharing of information on cyber threats, incidents, trends and mitigation efforts
  - ✓ design and implement a robust cybersecurity culture across the civil aviation sector



ICAO

ICAO Cybersecurity Panel – Second Meeting – June 2023





## ICAO Cybersecurity Panel – Second Meeting – Major Outcomes



**SARPs Gap Analysis** 



Aviation Global Cyber Threat & Risk Methodology and Picture



**Guidance Material** 















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