



**INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION**  
**Fourth Meeting of the AFI Region Directors General of Civil Aviation (DGCA/4)**  
**(Matsapha, Manzini, Swaziland, 8 to 9 November 2010)**

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**Agenda Item 3. Aviation Security**

**3.1 Security Risk Indicators and Significant Security Concerns**

1. ICAO teams conducting audits under the Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) may encounter situations that pose an immediate security risk to international civil aviation and which may constitute significant security concerns (SSECs). In accordance with the established time frame for USAP activities, remedial action might not be taken by the audited State for approximately four months following the conclusion of the audit when the State's corrective action plan (CAP) is due to be submitted to ICAO. At the recommendation of the Aviation Security Panel, a Secretariat Study Group was established to review the definition of, and develop a mechanism to address, SSECs in a timely manner.

2. The ICAO Council, during its 189th Session (C-DEC 189/3), approved the definition of an SSEC and the related mechanism for the resolution of an SSEC. Subsequently, to reflect the new mechanism, the Council approved consequential amendments to the model Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between ICAO and Member States regarding aviation security audits.

3. An SSEC occurs when the appropriate authority responsible for aviation security in the State permits aviation activities to continue, despite lack of effective implementation of the minimum security requirements established by the State and by the provisions set forth in Annex 17 — *Security* related to critical aviation security controls including, but not limited to: the screening and the protection from unauthorized interference of passengers, cabin and hold baggage; the security of cargo and catering; access control to restricted and security-restricted areas of airports; and the security of departing aircraft resulting in an immediate security risk to international civil aviation.

4. Preliminary SSECs identified during a USAP audit will be described to the State in the debriefing at the conclusion of the audit. Within 15 calendar days of the conclusion of the audit, ICAO will notify the State in writing of the existence and details of any SSECs validated and confirmed through the mechanism and requiring immediate corrective action by the State. Following the receipt by the State of the written notification from ICAO of the existence of any SSECs, the State then undertakes to implement and notify ICAO of its immediate corrective action to resolve any SSECs within a time frame prescribed by ICAO, but not later than 15 calendar days. Failure by the State to implement and notify ICAO of satisfactory corrective action within the prescribed time frame will result in information pertaining to any SSECs being made available through the USAP secure website to all Member States until resolved. In extreme situations, the Secretary General may intervene, as appropriate, and urge the State to take immediate action to resolve the deficiency, as well as offer assistance from ICAO.

5. The mechanism to deal with SSECs is not retroactive. However, States which have received the previous version of the MoU and are still to be audited in 2010, will be invited to agree to the amendments to the MoU through an exchange of letters. States to be audited starting in 2011 will receive the latest amended version of the MoU.

6. A flowchart describing the different phases for the identification, validation and notification of SSECs is found in the Attachment.

**Enclosure:** Mechanism for the Identification, Validation and Notification of a Significant Security Concern (SSEC)

ATTACHMENT to DGCA/4 IP/6

**Mechanism for the Identification, Validation and Notification of a Significant Security Concern (SSeC)**

