

**AFI REDUCED VERTICAL
SEPARATION MINIMUM (RVSM)
SAFETY POLICY**

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AFI REDUCED VERTICAL SEPARATION MINIMUM (RVSM) SAFETY POLICY

1. INTRODUCTION

This document, the RVSM Safety Policy Document, sets out the Safety Policy, the Safety Objectives and describes the RVSM Safety Sub-Program tasks and actions necessary to ensure the safe implementation of RVSM in the AFI region.

The RVSM Safety Policy Document is intended to provide a framework to facilitate the safety regulation process of the AFI RVSM Program. As such, it is considered to be a formal deliverable of the RVSM Program.

The RVSM Safety Policy Document describes the deliverables of the RVSM Safety Sub-Program together with their role in the overall AFI RVSM Program and in the national safety assurance programs.

2. RVSM OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The principal concept behind RVSM is the reduction of the vertical separation minimum between adjacent aircraft from 2000 feet to 1000 feet between the Flight Levels FL290 and FL410 inclusive. This will provide six additional cruising levels to air traffic, increase the capacity of the Air Traffic Management system and facilitate the task of Air Traffic Services in maintaining a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic. It can be expected that the capacity and system benefits of RVSM will, by facilitating the Air Traffic Control function, also have the potential for possible safety benefits.

This vertical separation minimum shall be applied between RVSM approved aircraft within the airspace of the designated RVSM airspace. Therefore, all operators proposing to operate across the lateral limits of the RVSM airspace shall be required to indicate on Filed Flight Plans their RVSM status. Non-RVSM approved aircraft, other than state aircraft, shall not be permitted to operate within RVSM airspace.

There will be no RVSM Transition Airspace within the AFI Region.

The RVSM Program requires that specific training for aircrew and ATC staff shall be performed prior to the start of RVSM operations. The Program also requires ATC equipment and procedures to be modified according to specific Program requirements prior to the start of RVSM operations.

3. AFI RVSM PROGRAM SAFETY POLICY

The Safety Policy for RVSM implementation has been established to meet the requirements of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices and guidance material on managing collision risk consequent on the implementation of RVSM.

The following statements define the Safety Policy of the RVSM Program:

- (i) The AFI RVSM Program uses an explicit, pro-active approach to safety management in the development, implementation and continued operation of RVSM.
- (ii) The responsibility of management for the safety performance of the RVSM Program is recognised. The RVSM Program Manager is responsible for the overall management of the Program. The RVSM Safety Program Manager is responsible to the RVSM Program Manager for ensuring the compliance of the Program with AFI Safety Policy and appropriate international standards and requirements. The RVSM Safety Program Manager is also responsible for liaison with the Regulation Authorities.
- (iii) The implementation of RVSM shall be conducted in accordance with ICAO requirements and requires ninety percent RVSM approved aircraft operating within the Region;
- (iv) The safety of air navigation has been given the highest priority in the development of the RVSM operational concept and the Implementation Program;
- (v) The RVSM Program shall minimise the program's contribution to the serious or risk bearing incidents or aircraft accidents as far as is reasonably practicable.

4. RVSM IMPLEMENTATION SAFETY OBJECTIVES

- (i) The RVSM Program shall conduct a full Functional Hazard Analysis looking at the whole system including air and ground segments and the proposed operational concept. This analysis shall adopt a total aviation system perspective and a risk based approach to the classification of hazards. The analysis shall include, but not be restricted to, those risks already identified by ICAO for RVSM implementation;
- (ii) The RVSM Program shall, as its principal safety objective, minimise the program's contribution to the risk of an aircraft accident. The RVSM Program recognises the AFI Safety Objectives and Strategy, in particular the general objective to improve safety levels by ensuring that the number of ATM induced accidents and serious or risk bearing incidents do not increase and, where possible, decrease. Therefore, the implementation of RVSM shall not adversely affect the risk of en-route mid-air collision;
- (iii) The RVSM Program shall establish an explicit Safety Sub-Program to ensure that Program's contribution to the risk of an aircraft accident is minimised in accordance with the principal safety objective;

- (iv) In accordance with ICAO Guidance Material the management of vertical collision risk within RVSM airspace shall meet the Target Level of Safety of 5×10^{-9} fatal accidents per flight hour;
- (v) In accordance with ICAO Guidance Material, the risk of mid-air collision in the vertical dimension within RVSM airspace, due to technical height keeping performance, shall meet a Target Level of Safety of 2.5×10^{-9} fatal accidents per flight hour.
- (vi) Guidance shall be given to the States to explain the necessary activities to provide evidence about the safe implementation of RVSM on the national level and subsequently assure the preparedness of the States.

Safety Requirements that may arise as results from the detailed Functional Hazard Analysis that yet has to be carried out will complement these Safety Objectives.

5. RVSM IMPLEMENTATION SAFETY OBJECTIVES

As part of the RVSM Program, an RVSM Safety Sub-Program has been developed to provide evidence on the compliance of the Implementation Program with the RVSM Safety Policy and the RVSM Safety Objectives.

The work program of the RVSM Safety Program comprises the following elements:

- (i) Detailed Hazard Analysis, Preliminary System Safety Assessment and System Safety Assessment of the proposed RVSM operational concept;
- (ii) Assessment of operational error reports, both prior to and after implementation, to identify any additional risks and hazards associated with the proposed operational concept and to provide data for the assessment of the target levels of safety;
- (iii) Establishment of formal requirements for participating states to demonstrate that all necessary national activities and actions have been undertaken prior to implementation.
- (iv) Assessment of the risk of mid-air collision, using methods specified in ICAO guidance material;
- (v) A major assessment of aircraft height keeping performance to monitor compliance with height keeping requirements.

Each of these elements will produce deliverables, in the form of reports, which will be formally presented to the ARTF as the Program proceeds.

6. RVSM SAFETY DELIVERABLES

In this section, the major deliverables of the RVSM Safety Sub-Program are described. Although the deliverables are in the form of formal documents, interim reports will be provided for review prior to completion of the final version of a deliverable document.

6.1 RVSM Functional Hazard Analysis

A detailed Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) shall be carried out to provide assurance that all hazards and risks associated with RVSM have been identified and classified. The FHA shall cover (i) the situation that RVSM is operational one year after its introduction, (ii) the change-over on the day of RVSM introduction. The results of the FHA shall be documented in a detailed report and a hazard/risk matrix. It will be used as input to the Collision Risk Assessment and the National Safety Cases where appropriate. A summary of the results will constitute one chapter of the AFI RVSM Pre-Implementation Safety Case and the detailed report will appear as an Annex.

6.2 Collision Risk Assessment

A Collision Risk Assessment (CRA) shall be carried out in order to provide the evidence that the collision risk in RVSM airspace meets the Target Level of Safety required by ICAO. A summary of the results will form one chapter of the AFI RVSM Pre-Implementation Safety Case and the detailed report will appear as an Annex.

6.3 National Safety Plans

Guidance shall be given to the States to explain the necessary activities to provide evidence about the safe implementation of RVSM on the national level. Using the guidance material National Safety Plans should be produced by the States, submitted to the National Regulator as appropriate and shall be summarised by the RVSM Safety Sub-Program in to order to form one section of the AFI RVSM Pre-Implementation Safety Case.

6.4 AFI RVSM Pre-Implementation Safety Case

The AFI RVSM Pre-Implementation Safety Case shall provide the assurance that the objectives stated in the AFI RVSM Safety Policy Document are met. Evidence will be provided that (i) all identified hazards and risks are managed and mitigated, (ii) the collision risk meets the ICAO Target Level of Safety and (iii) States show they will safely implement RVSM through the development of national safety documentation.

6.5 AFI RVSM Post-Implementation Safety Case

The required contents of the Post-Implementation Safety Case will be developed as a result of the pre-implementation safety activities. However, the main objective will be to confirm assumptions and estimations being made in order to determine if in an operational RVSM environment the safety objectives can be met. It is expected that the document demonstrates *inter alia* that safety is continuously ensured, the aircraft approval process is effective, the target levels of safety are being met, operational errors do not increase and ATC procedures introduced for RVSM remain effective.