



**Opening Address by the Secretary General of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
to the Special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on
Terrorist Threats to Civil Aviation
United Nations Headquarters**

(New York, 7 July 2017)

Excellencies,

Ladies and gentlemen,

1. I am pleased to be here today on behalf of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), in order to participate in discussions related to terrorist threats to international civil aviation.
2. In order to protect the global air transport network, it is important to understand the nature and level of the threat. And it is important to define gaps in our ability to mitigate risks associated with this threat.
3. In today's sessions, we have been tasked with identifying ways to strengthen and promote the implementation of international aviation security standards, and to expand international cooperation.
4. Last September, Security Council Resolution 2309 (2016) *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts: Aviation security* was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This is the first resolution of the Security Council that broadly addresses international civil aviation security. It articulates the importance of numerous critical facets of aviation security, from the implementation of effective countermeasures to the sharing of technical knowledge and the provision of capacity building assistance.
5. Under ICAO guidance and leadership, extensive progress has been made in enhancing aviation security:

- The Global Risk Context Statement has been updated, based on current analyses of threat and risk;
 - The emphasis on landside security, explosives detection, and cyber security has been increased through the amendment of Annex 17 – *Security*;
 - Aviation security priorities have been aligned and adjusted based on Security Council Resolution 2309 (2016);
 - The Risk-Management Workshop, which will help States create their own Risk Assessments, has been developed and evaluated;
 - Guidance materials have been revised to reflect best practices; and
 - The cargo security regime has been enhanced.
6. The Universal Security Audit Programme is expanding its review of the operational application of ICAO Standards and Recommend Practices (SARPs) at representative airports during the audits. This is following direction provided by the 39th Session of the ICAO Assembly. It ensures that not only are the national programmes robust, but that local measures are appropriately implemented.
7. In support of our *No Country Left Behind* initiative, capacity development projects continue to take place in locations that have demonstrated need.
8. And, on 16 June 2017, the ICAO Council adopted a new international Standard, in Annex 9 — *Facilitation* to the Chicago Convention. The Standard obliges all its Member States to establish an Advance Passenger Information (API) system.
9. Comparing API with national databases will enable border agents to identify those travellers requiring more detailed examination upon arrival while allowing the efficient and expedited clearance of low-risk persons. This is an important step in preventing the movement of terrorists through more effective border controls and information sharing.
10. Perhaps the most notable advancement pertains to the finalized draft of the Global Aviation Security Plan, or GASeP. This strategic plan will enable us to execute the intent and direction articulated in Security Council Resolution 2309 (2016). The Plan identifies five priority outcomes with associated actions, measures, and indicators. Global, State, industry, and ICAO responsibilities are delineated in the Plan’s Roadmap, which enables us to quantitatively measure and analyse progress in implementing Resolution 2309.

11. I draw attention to one of the most pressing topics for the aviation security community, and an important example for today's discussions. The recent ban on Portable Electronic Devices, or PEDs, in the cabins of certain designated flights led to lengthy debates regarding the need for a better understanding of the threat and potential safety issues. This event proved to be a pointed example in which information sharing was ineffective.
12. Subsequent measures, released on June 28th, were distributed to a limited number of recipients. The implications of these changes are potentially far reaching and even more substantial than the original requirements. On a positive note, some of the original airports have been able to implement enhanced measures and will no longer ban PEDs.
13. During the 28th Aviation Security Panel meeting in May 2017, ICAO established a multi-disciplinary working group to analyse the safety considerations associated with carrying PEDs in the aircraft cargo hold.
14. Additionally, we created a specialized task force to evaluate the threat and risk pertaining to Improvised Electronic Devices concealed in passengers' personal items. This task force will include PEDs in its review and will identify possible mitigation measures.
15. The task force will also focus on enhancing information sharing and collaboration between States and Industry in order to better address the impacts of such mitigation measures. The next meeting of the task force will be convened later this month.
16. Security Council Resolution 2309 (2016) calls upon States to implement effective, risk-based measures that reflect the ever-evolving threat picture. Accomplishing this requires that States' Aviation Security authorities have sufficient access to current threat information.
17. Although information sharing between States has been discussed extensively in a variety of forums, emerging issues such as the PEDs threat demonstrate that much work remains to be done.
18. And while it is true that States need to share information with each other more extensively, an equally pressing concern pertains to the lack of intelligence information sharing internal to the State. Aviation Security authorities must be provided adequate information by the State's own law enforcement and intelligence organizations in order to create a meaningful and effective threat assessment.

19. Another persistent challenge encountered by the Aviation Security community – both in government and industry – is the lack of will. Political leaders, those who oversee budgets, and boards of directors must all acknowledge and accept that the integrated nature of global aviation puts everyone at some level of risk.
20. Let me state it more directly: Terrorism is not “someone else’s problem.” At the appropriate levels, States and industry must commit the necessary resources and provide effective governance.
21. Strengthened national will has a cascading effect on all aspects of Security Council Resolution 2309 (2016) implementation. Sufficient funding and widened authorities lead to the procurement, installation, and application of the most effective training, technology, and procedures.
22. Candid self-assessment of security gaps leads to tailored requests for assistance that are much more likely to resolve the root causes. The global nature of aviation leads to connections among States, and subsequent offers of technology, training, and mentoring for other States in need.
23. As we enter into this afternoon’s sessions, I wish to highlight for you the analytical cycle we use for evaluating aviation security risk, to keep it at the forefront of our deliberations.
24. First, we must articulate the threat. Then, we consider the consequence. Next, we analyze the vulnerabilities. And finally, we identify capacity building opportunities.
25. In closing, I wish to thank the Counter-Terrorism Committee for their invaluable support in the implementation of UNSCR 2309 towards countering global aviation terrorism.