

# LOC 1 Progress Report

Presented August, 2015

7<sup>th</sup> APRAST Meeting

Bangkok, Thailand

# Background

- \* As discussed and agreed to at the 3<sup>rd</sup> APRAST meeting, I had floated an idea for a SOP Focus Group to be formed.
- \* This Group will be charged with determining a common approach to the issue of SOPs instead of LOC-I, CFIT and RS coming out with 3 Model ACs on SOPs respectively.
- \* Better alignment and less confusion for implementation by States with 1 AC.
- \* However, at the APRAST 5 meeting, RS WG deemed that Runway Safety SOP was inappropriate to be included into this common AC.

# Current Status

- Took a re-look at the COSCAP-issued AC (Advisory Circular) **CSEA – 002A** on SOPs that was issued in March 2006.
- Used this COSCAP AC as starting point.
- Reviewed this AC in its entirety.
- Included LOC and CFIT SOPs into this AC as Appendices.
- Appendix 6 for LOC and Appendix 7 for CFIT.
- The new draft AC (**CSEA – 002B**) had been ready since APRAST 5 and was supposedly to be submitted to the RASG in November 2014.
- Will be put up to the forthcoming RASG.

# \* Cover Page of the Model Advisory Circular

RASG-APAC  
MODEL ADVISORY CIRCULAR FOR AIR OPERATORS  
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR FLIGHT DECK CREWMEMBERS

## NOTE

This Model Advisory Circular has been prepared under the authority of the Regional Aviation Safety Group – Asia and Pacific Regions (RASG-APAC)

National civil aviation administrations should consider this Model Advisory Circular when developing safety-related information and guidance for their own aviation industry.

A Model Advisory Circular may provide information and guidance material. It may provide an example of an acceptable means, but not the only means, of demonstrating compliance with internationally-recognized standards and recommended practices.

A Model Advisory Circular does not create, amend or permit deviations from internationally-recognized standards and recommended practices.

An Advisory Circular issued by a National civil aviation administration should be consistent with national regulations and standards.

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## LOSS OF CONTROL IN-FLIGHT (LOC-I)

### Example

#### GUIDANCE ON DEVELOPING SOPS TO PREVENT LOSS OF CONTROL IN-FLIGHT (LOC-I)

### Objective

This appendix aims to provide guidance to operators in the area of developing SOPs aimed at preventing LOC-I. It is premised upon:

- The knowledge of in-flight conditions that may eventuate into a LOC-I situation.
- Effective flight path management and consequently the avoidance of LOC-I situations through early recognition of cues that typically precede such scenarios.
- Standardised recovery techniques from LOC-I situations.

### Background

A Loss of Control (LOC) is the result of an aircraft operating in a flight regime beyond that of the normal flight envelope, usually, but not always at a high rate, thereby introducing an element of surprise for the flight crew involved. This is more commonly referred to as the “startle effect,” a physiological situation where pilots may over-react/control, in response to a sudden alert or warning (FSF, 2013).

Typically, LOC-I scenarios are not generic and may be induced by a number of different factors either distinctly or in combination. For example:

- Environmental: Mountain waves, severe turbulence, windshear and icing.
- Human factors: Spatial disorientation, fatigue, poor situational awareness and incapacitation.
- Technological: Malfunctioning flight control systems/instruments, automation failure/mismanagement, availability of flight-envelope protection features.
- Organisational: deficiencies in policies, procedures and training.

## CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN (CFIT)

### Introduction

The risk of CFIT must be effectively minimized at an organizational, individual and operational level by the application of sound risk management principles.

An organization should establish or provide:

- A positive learning safety culture supported at the highest levels of management
- CFIT hazard awareness training-including departure and destination hazard identification
- Flight training and checking program which focusses on CFIT risk mitigation
- A route and airport qualification program for the flight crew appropriate to the routes being flown
- Flight crew experience and pairing policies appropriate to the routes being flown
- A Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS)
- Positive interaction with Air Navigation Service Providers to understand their service capabilities and limitations - such as minimum vector altitude, terrain masking, Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) capability
- Aircraft equipment appropriate to the routes being flown
- Tailored (customised) approach charts to their flight crew which clearly identify:
  - that a particular instrument approach procedure is approved for use
  - the DA/H to be used by the flight crew prior to the application of corrections
- A non-punitive incident reporting program
- A non-punitive missed approach / diversion policy



# Questions





# Thank You