



- Agenda Item 4:** **Air navigation deficiencies in the CAR/SAM Regions**
- 4.1 Proposal of a new uniform methodology for the identification, assessment and reporting of air navigation deficiencies**
 - 4.2 Current status of air navigation deficiencies in the CAR/SAM Regions**

ASB/10 MEETING REPORT

(Presented by the Secretariat)

SUMMARY	
This working paper presents the results of the ASB/10 Meeting, held on 28 March 2011, which adopted one draft conclusion.	
References:	
➤ <i>Report of the ASB/10 Meeting – Punta Cana, Dominican Republic, 28 March 2011.</i>	
➤ <i>ASB/10 WP/02</i>	
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES	<i>THIS WORKING PAPER IS RELATED TO STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: A, SAFETY.</i>

1. Introduction

1.1 The Tenth Meeting of the Aviation Safety Board (ASB/10) was held in Punta Cana, Dominican Republic, on 28 March 2011. Mr. Normando Araújo de Medeiros, Chairman of GREPECAS, addressed the Meeting. Mr. Franklin Hoyer, ICAO Regional Director of the SAM Office and Secretary of GREPECAS, was assisted by Mrs. Loretta Martin, ICAO Regional Director of the NACC Office.

2. Discussion

Review of “U” priority air navigation deficiencies

2.1 The Secretariat presented WP/02 which submitted to the Aviation Safety Board (ASB) for review the list of Priority “U” air navigation deficiencies reported by ICAO in the GREPECAS Air Navigation Deficiencies Database (GANDD), as identified and assessed by States, ICAO, IATA and IFALPA. The Meeting recalled that GREPECAS Conclusion 15/47 had been completed which required a review of Priority “U” deficiencies by IATA and IFALPA based on safety risk assessment methodology. It was noted that half the Priority “U” deficiencies related to aerodromes, and half of those were reported for a single State, which was clarified to be a result of a recent multi-disciplinary assessment of that State undertaken by ICAO. However, no trends could be drawn from the wide range of aerodromes deficiency types. The Secretariat also highlighted the following issues related to the list of Priority “U” deficiencies:

- Imbalanced number between States
- Inconsistency in classification of priority
- Long-outstanding resolution by States
- Insufficient updates on resolution provided by States and Organizations
- Changes in State GANDD coordinators without notifying ICAO
- Inactive GANDD coordinators of the States/Territories

2.2 The above highlighted the need to revise the “Uniform Methodology for the Identification, Assessment and Reporting of Air Navigation Deficiencies”, approved by the ICAO Council, and to make a more systemic use of the current ICAO aviation safety risk assessment methodology, on a trial basis.

2.3 IATA commented that some long outstanding deficiencies has required aircraft operators to apply risk mitigation strategies resulting from analysis under their safety management systems to maintain safe operations.

2.4 In relation to the Priority “U” deficiencies which remain unresolved for many years, the ASB considered that States need to be reminded to seek assistance from ICAO by contacting the Regional Offices. In this regard, the Meeting proposed the following draft conclusion to GREPECAS:

DRAFT

CONCLUSION 16/XX

RESOLUTION OF AIR NAVIGATION DEFICIENCIES

That States/Territories having difficulty in resolving Priority “U” air navigation deficiencies, if required, request assistance from ICAO to prepare action plans for and coordinate support to resolve deficiencies.

Proposal of a new uniform methodology for the identification, assessment and reporting of air navigation deficiencies

2.5 The Board took note of the proposed revised uniform methodology for the identification, assessment and reporting of air navigation deficiencies presented in WP/03, and recalled that the existing methodology had been approved by the ICAO Council in 2001, when the ICAO audit programme had not been created yet and safety management concepts were in their initial evolution. It also recalled that any modification to the aforementioned methodology should be approved by the Council.

2.6 The Meeting became aware of the issues currently affecting the deficiency management mechanism and of the need to incorporate new tools and contemporary concepts.

2.7 Likewise, the Board considered that the proposed methodology was based on the concept of understanding deficiencies as safety hazards and applying hazard identification and risk analysis techniques to determine the corresponding mitigation action to be taken by States/Territories. The lack of an effective response by States/Territories to the deficiency reported by the Regional Office would be considered as evidence of non-compliance with international standards requiring service providers and States/Territories to implement an SMS or SSP, respectively. This evidence could increase the level of risk of a given State/Territory and trigger the need for an ICAO audit.

2.8 Following a short debate, the Board agreed that a period of three months would be enough for sending the completed risk analysis to the Regional Office. It also agreed on the need to amend the proposed form to expand the explanation in the “specific requirement” field of the form in Attachment A to Appendix A to ASB/10 WP/03, to include the ICAO Annex standard/recommended practice, or the reference to the Air Navigation Plan requirement associated with the deficiency, which would generate very valuable statistical information.

2.9 Furthermore, it agreed to review the flow chart to reflect that the Regional Offices can also send information to the ICAO ANC and Council in case of compliance problems, without necessarily having to wait for the meeting of GREPECAS or of the Programme and Project Review Committee.

3. Other matters

3.1 IATA expressed its concern regarding the poor response rate to Air Safety Reports (ASR). The Secretariat clarified that ASRs, including ATS Incident Reports, are not deficiencies by definition, but could nevertheless be caused by air navigation deficiencies. The Secretariat informed that ASRs would be an input to the proposed revised process for the identification and assessment of air navigation deficiencies.

3.2 ICAO informed that, according to the current process for ASRs, the Regional Offices forward reports received from IATA to the States where the incident occurred for investigation and clarification, involving if applicable, the air navigation service provider (ANSP). The responses received from States are submitted by ICAO to IATA. However, ICAO agreed that, in some cases, the response by the States was not as expected or was delayed. In this regard, the Secretariat informed that a report follow-up tracking mechanism was being implemented in the ICAO Regional Offices. Furthermore, the Secretariat also highlighted the following issues related to the reports:

- the standard ICAO format was not used (currently under review for simplification);
- incomplete and/or unclear reports; and
- reports were not submitted through the appropriate channel from IATA to the ICAO Regional Office accredited to the State where the incident occurred

3.3 The ASB felt that, if the current process was applied by submitting complete and clear reports in the ICAO format to the ICAO Regional Office, supplemented by a report tracking mechanism, the State response rate would improve significantly.

3.4 The ASB recognized that the proposed new organization of GREPECAS, endorsed by the Administrative Coordination Group (ACG) at its eighth meeting recently held in Mexico City, Mexico, from 26-27 January 2011, proposes to GREPECAS that the ASB Terms of Reference and member composition will be incorporated in the new GREPECAS Programmes and Projects Review Committee.

3.5 In this regard, the GREPECAS Chairman expressed his gratitude to ASB members for their contribution to the Board since its establishment in 2000.

4. Suggested action

4.1 The Meeting is invited to take note of the information presented in this working paper and to consider the approval of the Draft Conclusion in paragraph 2.4.

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