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North American, Central American and Caribbean Office

**Twenty First Meeting of Directors of Civil Aviation of the Eastern Caribbean
(21st E/CAR DCA)**

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E/CAR DCA/21 - WP/22

05/02/08

Agenda Item 5: Aviation Security (AVSEC) Matters

**DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ICAO UNIVERSAL SECURITY AUDIT PROGRAMME (USAP)
AND CONTINUED COOPERATION REQUIRED IN THE FIELD OF AVIATION SECURITY**

(Presented by the Secretariat)

SUMMARY

This working paper presents information on the progress achieved by the implementation of the Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) and on the continued need for the cooperation of Contracting States in the CAR Region with the implementation of programmes and measures developed by the Planning Coordination and Implementation (PCI) Branch and the Specification and Guidance Material (SGM) Section of the Air Transport Bureau of ICAO Headquarters in coordination with the NACC Regional Office. It also reminds States of certain obligations and responsibilities in order to enhance international civil aviation security aspects.

1. Introduction

1.1 This working paper presents, for consideration by the Meeting, a brief assessment of the development of the ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) and the implementation of the new security measures in order to enhance international civil aviation protection as part of ICAO Strategic Objective B, *Aviation Security – Enhance global civil aviation security*, and their relationship to civil aviation authorities of the Region in order to comply with this objective.

2. Discussion

2.1. Since the launch of the first cycle of USAP audits in 2002, 181 aviation security (AVSEC) audits have been conducted complying with the objective that all Contracting States benefit from an initial audit by the end of 2007. Only nine States worldwide have not been audited due to United Nations safety reasons, Haiti being one of those States. All E/CAR States/Territories have been audited, and as of 31 January 2008, 101 follow-up missions have been conducted. These missions take place two years after the initial audit with the purpose of validating the implementation of State corrective action plans and providing support to States in remedying deficiencies. They are normally conducted by the relevant Regional Office and coordinated through ICAO Headquarters. In this regard, it is important that States notify ICAO on the status of compliance of their corrective action plans.

2.2 The ICAO USAP has been implemented on schedule and within its budget allocation, thanks to the active participation of aviation security experts in the CAR Region that have been certified to assist as team members on USAP audits. The audits have proven to be instrumental in the identification of aviation security concerns and in providing recommendations for their resolution. From its inception, the USAP has enjoyed the support of Contracting States and is promoting positive change as States become increasingly sensitized to the international requirements. The USAP follow-up missions have validated a markedly increased level of implementation of ICAO security standards, thereby attesting to State commitment in achieving the objective of the USAP to strengthen aviation security worldwide. The USAP looks forward to the continued cooperation of States in the CAR Region as it commences its second cycle in 2008, adopting a new methodology where audits will focus primarily on a State's national oversight capabilities with regard to aviation security activities, where possible, and expanded to include relevant security-related provisions of Annex 9 – *Facilitation*. This second cycle started in the CAR Region in January 2008 with the audit of Jamaica.

2.3 The ICAO/Canada Security Awareness Training Programme, under the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Programme, began Phase II in January 2007. Several National Civil Aviation Security Programme and National Quality Control Programme (NQCP) workshops were conducted in the CAR Region during the second semester of 2007. These events have been designed to assist States in remedying Annex 17 deficiencies and enabling aviation security management personnel to establish an aviation security legal framework and develop effective aviation security quality control measures to implement ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices of Annex 17 and security elements of other Annexes.

2.4 As part of this same ICAO/DFAIT Training Programme and in order to assist States in resolving deficiencies regarding AVSEC personnel certification, various Aviation Security Screener Certification Workshops have been scheduled for the CAR States/Territories during 2008. States are encouraged to participate in this training.

2.5 The Aviation Security and Facilitation Branch continues to conduct training at the Regional Aviation Security Training Centres (ASTCs) in Buenos Aires, Quito and Port of Spain utilizing the standardized Aviation Security Training Packages (ASTPs) and topic specific workshops. Please refer to the ICAO website www.icao.int/atb/avsec for the schedule of courses. States are also encouraged to participate in this training.

2.6 States are encouraged to contribute to the AVSEC Action Plan. In addition to financial contributions, they are also urged to provide qualified human resources in the form of Short-Term Experts (STEs).

2.7 It is important to remind States of the following issues and the need for their respective follow-up and implementation:

- a) participation in the ICAO Point of Contact Network (PoC) (State letter Ref: SP 48/1-06/19 dated 24 March 2006, included as **Appendix A** to this working paper);
- b) the security control guidelines for screening of liquids, gels and aerosols recommended to States for implementation no later than 31 March 2007. (State letters Ref: AS 8/11-06/100 - Confidential dated 1 December 2006, and Ref: AS 8/11-07/26 - Confidential dated 30 March 2007, and recommended guidelines for the validation of supply chain security of liquids, aerosols and gels and security tamper-evident bags (STEBs) Ref: AS 8/11-07/53 – Confidential, dated 6 July 2007, included as **Appendices B, C and D** respectively to this working paper);

- c) the ICAO annual reports on acts of unlawful interference are based on official and non-official reports; therefore, it is important to remind States to provide the reports on acts of unlawful interference pursuant to their obligation under Article 11 of The Hague Convention, Article 13 of the Montreal Convention, as well as Standard 5.3.1 of Annex 17.

2.8 The Meeting is informed that the revision conducted by the Specifications and Guidance Material (SGM) Section of the seventh edition of Doc 8973 (Restricted) - *Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference* has been finalized, and that the initial English language version is planned to be ready for distribution to States by June 2008. This new version of the manual will be separated into five volumes, which will include:

- a) Volume I – National Organization and Administration;
- b) Volume II – Training, Selection and Recruitment;
- c) Volume III – Airports Design and Administration;
- d) Volume IV – Preventive Measures; and
- e) Volume V – Crisis Management and Response.

2.9 In order to complete the aforementioned, a new manual entitled *Establishment and Management of a State's Aviation Security Oversight* – Doc 9734 has been developed and was published in the third quarter of 2007.

3. Suggested Actions to the Meeting:

3.1 The Meeting is invited to note the contents of this working paper, and in order to enhance the international civil aviation security, States are urged to:

- a) continue supporting USAP and ensuring the implementation of their Corrective Action Plans regarding compliance with Annex 17 SARPs;
- b) provide qualified AVSEC Specialists in the form of Short-Term Experts to contribute to the AVSEC Action Plan through the ICAO Training Schedule for 2008;
- c) participate in the different courses and workshops on aviation security screener certification organized by ICAO at different States and ASTCs of the CAR/SAM Regions;
- d) provide ICAO with up-to-date information on their AVSEC and FAL points-of-contact (if they have not already done so);
- e) implement the recommended guidelines on security controls for screening liquids, gels and aerosols; and
- f) provide ICAO with timely information on acts of unlawful interference that have occurred within their territories.



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Tel.: +1 (514) 954-6130

Ref.: SP 48/1-06/19

24 March 2006

Subject: Aviation Security Point of Contact (PoC)
Network

Action required: To reply by 30 June 2006

Sir/Madam,

1. I have the honour to inform you that pursuant to the views expressed by the G8 Roma-Lyon Crime and Terrorism Group, an ICAO-wide Aviation Security Point of Contact (PoC) Network has been established for the communication of imminent threats to civil air transport operations. The objective of the PoC is to provide a network of international aviation security contacts within each State, who are designated as the appropriate authority to send and receive communications, at any time of the day or night, concerning imminent threat information, security requests of an urgent nature, and/or guidelines to support security requirements in the case of countering an imminent threat. Points of contact need to be available at all times, engaged in the threat assessment process and close to the decision-making process for aviation security procedures.


2. Due to the sensitivity of the information to be contained in the Network, strict control must be exercised as failure to do so may compromise efforts and future security implementation endeavours. Consequently, in order to maintain control over this information, participating States should take into account the following:

- a) access to the ICAO Aviation Security PoC Network will be confined to those States that have placed their own contact details in the database and have been issued a password by ICAO;
- b) Aviation Security PoC Network participants will have an obligation to ensure that their contact details are kept up to date;
- c) participating States will be required to ensure physical protection of access to the PoC Network, confining access to those with genuine need for it in order to discharge their duties;

- d) participating States will commit to having internal procedures for ensuring that contacts made via the PoC Network are handled expeditiously, consistent with their urgency; and
- e) participation in the PoC Network will be made conditional on the State agreeing to abide with the above directives.

3. Should you wish to participate in the ICAO Aviation Security PoC Network, please complete the attached form and send it directly to the Chief, Aviation Security and Facilitation Branch, ICAO, fax: + 1 (514) 954-6408, e-mail: avsec@icao.int.

Accept, Sir/Madam, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Taïeb Chérif
Secretary General

Enclosure:

Aviation Security Point of Contact
(PoC) Network Sign-up Form

ATTACHMENT to State letter SP 48/1-06/19

AVIATION SECURITY POINT OF CONTACT (PoC) NETWORK

Sign-up Form

Please complete the following form and ensure that the contact-point is not only knowledgeable but that he or she is available on a 24-hour basis.

1. CONTACT, TELEPHONE NUMBER, FAX and E-MAIL (*Example: "Country: Command Centre, Aviation Security Department, City, Country, Telephone: 1 - 555 - 555- 1212, Fax: 1 -555 - 555-1212, E-mail "*)

Contact Person (s) (up to 3 persons)

Name: _____

Position/Department: _____

Address: _____

Tel.: _____ Fax: _____

E-mail: _____

2. DESCRIPTION OF POINT OF CONTACT (*Example: "Country: Aviation Security Department is a telecommunications centre that is open 24 hours a day. Its personnel can immediately connect the caller to an appropriate investigator or expert. The Command Centre itself does not have electronic evidence investigators or experts."*)

3. LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES OF CONTACT (*Example: "Country: Command Centre personnel speak English only."*)

4. PLEASE PROVIDE E-MAIL CONTACT FOR DISTRIBUTION OF UPDATES TO CONTACT POINT LIST (*Example: "COUNTRY: Johndoe@xxx.gov and Marydoe@xxx.gov "*)

— END —



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Tel.: +1 (514) 954-6130

Ref.: AS 8/11-06/100 Confidential

1 December 2006

Subject: Recommended security control
guidelines for screening liquids, gels and
aerosols

Action required: To note and implement
not later than 1 March 2007

Sir/Madam,

I have the honour to draw to your attention the fact that the United Kingdom authorities reported on 10 August 2006 they had succeeded in disrupting an alleged terrorist plot against civil aircraft over the North Atlantic. The terrorist attack, judged to be imminent, would have involved the component parts of an Improvised Explosive Device, including a home-made liquid explosive, being taken through the passenger and cabin baggage security checkpoint for assembly airside, probably on the aircraft. The device would have been detonated aboard the aircraft whilst in flight, in an act of suicide.

On 10 August 2006, very tight controls were imposed by the United Kingdom Department of Transport on what passengers were able to take through the central screening point at United Kingdom airports. In the days and weeks which followed, some of these controls were eased, in line with a lessened threat. However, at mid-October there remained in place a ban on all but essential liquids, and a limit on the size of the single cabin bag passengers were allowed to carry through the screening point. Items purchased beyond the screening point were unaffected by the new rules as all goods sold in these areas of United Kingdom airports are subjected to separate security controls.

In response to the new threat, the ICAO Council convened a Special Session on 17 August 2006, at which it recognized the seriousness of the terrorist threat and requested the Aviation Security Panel to study it with the highest priority, and recommend possible action to mitigate such actions in the future.

The Aviation Security Panel, at its eighteenth meeting held in Montreal from 11 to 15 September 2006, considered the events in the United Kingdom and their wider implication for aviation security. The Panel stressed that the events in the United Kingdom had reconfirmed the terrorists' intent and capability to mount a spectacular, mass-fatality attack upon civil aviation. Whilst this particular threat had arisen in the United Kingdom, the *modus operandi* was not "home-grown" by those

apprehended, and such an attack could be mounted anywhere in the world, which poses a very serious challenge to global air transport. The use of components of innocuous appearance, including a peroxide-based liquid explosive element, carried through the screening checkpoint by one or more persons for subsequent assembly on board an aircraft, would be very unlikely to have been detected by any of the existing screening technologies and procedures.

The Panel concluded that an urgent reassessment of the existing world-wide aviation security regime had become necessary, and that the new threat needed to be reflected in augmented global security practices and procedures. The Panel underlined that any new arrangements should be effective, practicable and sustainable, and should take into account as far as possible the practices of other States, as well as facilitation issues. In this regard, the Panel identified the actions to be taken in the short-, medium- and longer-term.

The Council, at the ninth meeting of its 179th Session on 22 November 2006, considered the report of the eighteenth meeting of the Aviation Security Panel and agreed that security control guidelines for screening liquids, gels, aerosols, etc., as presented in the attachment to this letter, should be recommended to States for their implementation not later than 1 March 2007.

The Council also advised on enhancing the effectiveness of the security system by removing large electrical items from cabin baggage for separate screening. However, it also cautioned that new measures should not result in the improper placing of dangerous goods in the hold, thereby compromising aircraft safety. It has therefore been proposed that ICAO undertakes further work to revise the overall List of Prohibited Items for the consideration of the Council during its 181st Session.

I would further bring to your attention that work is under way towards the development of technologies and operational procedures for the detection of liquid, gel or aerosol explosives, within the framework of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group of Specialists on the Detection of Explosives. Work is also being carried out by the Panel Working Group on Training to develop new interim guidance material for screeners and others which will be incorporated into the Security Manual (Doc 8973).

Success for mitigating and eliminating **all** threats to civil aviation can only be achieved through the concerted effort of everyone concerned and a close working relationship between national agencies and aviation security regulators of all Contracting States. To this end, I would like once again to bring to your attention the establishment of the Aviation Security Point of Contact (PoC) Network. The main objective of the PoC is to provide a network of international aviation security contacts within each State who are designated as the appropriate authority to send and receive communications, at any time of the day or night, concerning an imminent security threat. If your State has not yet provided ICAO with the necessary information to participate in the PoC Network (State letter SP 48/1-06/19 refers), I strongly request you that you provide me, as a matter of urgency, with the contact details of persons authorized to send and receive security-related communications on behalf of your State.

Accept, Sir/Madam, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Taïeb Chérif
Secretary General

Enclosure:

Security control guidelines for screening liquids, gels, aerosols, etc. recommended as interim measures by the ICAO Council

ATTACHMENT to State letter AS 8/11-06/100 Confidential

**SECURITY CONTROL GUIDELINES FOR SCREENING
LIQUIDS, GELS, AEROSOLS, ETC. RECOMMENDED
AS INTERIM MEASURES BY THE ICAO COUNCIL**

The following security control guidelines for screening liquids, gels, aerosols, etc. are recommended to States for implementation not later than 1 March 2007:

- a) All liquids should be required to be carried in containers with a capacity not greater than 100 ml (or the equivalent in other volumetric measurements, e.g. fluid ounces). Liquids carried in containers larger than 100 ml are not to be accepted, even if the container is only part-filled;
- b) Containers should be placed in a transparent re-sealable plastic bag of a maximum capacity not exceeding 1 litre. The containers must fit comfortably within the transparent plastic bag, which should be completely closed;
- c) The plastic bag should be presented for visual examination at the screening point. Only one transparent plastic bag per passenger should be permitted; and
- d) Exemptions should be made for medications, baby milk/foods and special dietary requirements. An appropriate and proportionate means of verifying the nature of such liquids will need to be available.

In addition, States may also wish to consider exemptions in respect of liquids purchased either at airport duty free shops, or on board aircraft, on the condition that the liquid is packed in a sealed plastic bag that is both tamper-evident and displays satisfactory proof of purchase at airport duty free shops, or on board aircraft, on the day(s) of the journey for departing as well as transfer passengers.

To facilitate screening and avoid a cluttered x-ray image, such plastic bags containing liquid containers should be presented apart from other cabin baggage, coats and jackets or laptops for separate x-ray screening.

— END —



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Tel.: +1 (514) 954-8219 ext. 6130

Ref.: AS 8/11-07/26 Confidential

30 March 2007

Subject: Recommended security control
guidelines for screening liquids, gels and
aerosols

Action required: To note and implement
as soon as possible

Sir/Madam,


I have the honour to refer to State letter AS 8/11-06/100 Confidential, dated 1 December 2006 which contained security control guidelines for screening liquids, gels and aerosols, recommended to States for implementation not later than 1 March 2007. In order to further develop operational aspects of security controls for liquids, gels, and aerosols particularly exemptions to be implemented worldwide for liquids purchased either at airport retailers or on board aircraft and carried by transfer passengers, a Secretariat Study Group on the Carriage and Screening of Liquids, Gels and Aerosols was established.

The Council, at the sixteenth meeting of its 180th Session, on 16 March 2007, considered the recommendations of the Secretariat Study Group. It was agreed that these recommendations, including the specifications for tamper-evident bags, as presented in the Attachment to this letter, be sent to States for their immediate implementation as interim security measures until new detection technology is available.

- 2 -

The Council also agreed that further work by the Study Group is urgently needed to develop guidelines for harmonized procedures for validation of compliance with liquids, gels and aerosols carried by passengers during transfer.

Accept, Sir/Madam, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Taïeb Chérif
Secretary General

Enclosure:

Security Control Guidelines for Screening
Liquids, Gels and Aerosols recommended
as interim measures by ICAO

ATTACHMENT to State letter AS 8/11-07/26 Confidential

**SECURITY CONTROL GUIDELINES FOR SCREENING LIQUIDS, GELS AND AEROSOLS
RECOMMENDED AS INTERIM MEASURES BY ICAO**

**1. PROPOSED SECURITY MEASURES FOR THE
CONTROL OF LIQUIDS, GELS AND AEROSOLS**

1.1 All liquids, gels and aerosols (LAGs)¹ should be handled in accordance with ICAO's recommendations contained in State letter AS 8/11-06/100 dated 1 December 2006:

- a) All LAGs should be carried in containers with a capacity not greater than 100 ml each (or the equivalent in other volumetric measurements, e.g. fluid ounces);
- b) Any LAGs carried in a container larger than 100 ml are not to be accepted, even if the container is only part-filled;
- c) Containers² with LAGs should be placed in a transparent re-sealable plastic bag³ of a maximum capacity not exceeding 1 litre. The containers must fit comfortably within the transparent plastic bag, which should be completely closed;
- d) Each passenger is permitted to carry only one such bag which is to be presented separately for screening;
- e) All conventional security controls and checks, including random hand searches of passengers and cabin bags, are applicable;
- f) Flight crew in uniform and on duty the day(s) of the journey are exempted from these restrictions; and
- g) Exceptions are allowed for medications, baby milk/foods and special dietary or other medical requirements as enumerated in paragraph 2 of this document.

1.2 LAGs, in any volume, purchased at airport retail outlets or on board aircraft during the day(s) of the journey should not be allowed through security screening points unless they:

- a) are carried in a Security Tamper-Evident Bag (STEB); and
- b) have been protected from unlawful interference by a process of supply chain security, including the application of appropriate security measures at manufacturers and warehouses, during the delivery process for both LAGs and STEBs from the warehouse to the airport retail outlets and aircraft outlets, and while in stock/on display at those outlets.

¹ For the purpose of this document, liquids, gels and aerosols are referred to as LAGs and include but are not limited to: water and other drinks, soups, syrups, jams, stews, sauces and pastes; foods in sauces or containing a high liquid content; creams, lotions, cosmetics and oils; perfumes; sprays; gels including hair and shower gels; contents of pressurized containers, including shaving foam, other foam and deodorants; pastes including toothpaste; liquid-solid mixtures; mascara; lip gloss or lip balm; and any item of similar consistency at room temperature.

² Empty containers with a capacity greater than 100 ml are permitted.

³ Indicative size of the 1 litre re-sealable plastic bag: 20.5 cm x 20.5 cm or 25 cm x 15 cm, or equivalent.

1.3 ICAO's security guidelines, available in the ICAO *Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference* (Doc 8973) may be adopted for the development of specific measures and incorporated, if needed, into the relevant airport and airline security programmes, regulated agent regimes and quality control measures. A set of minimum security principles for manufacturers and retailers of LAGs and STEBs is in paragraph 5 of this document.

1.4 A harmonized validation template will be available on the ICAO AVSECNET⁴ secure website for use by States. Ensuring compliance with the security measures applied to LAGs and STEBs within a State is a matter for the State concerned. Recognition of the robustness of LAGs and STEBs security in another State (or States) could be conducted via bilateral, multilateral or other arrangements as appropriate, which could include on-site verification.

2. EXEMPTIONS FOR MEDICATIONS AND SPECIAL DIETARY REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING BABY FOODS

2.1 Passengers

2.1.1 Liquids, aerosols and gels of any kind carried in containers with a maximum volume of 100 ml should be placed in the 1 litre bag. However exemptions may be granted for LAGs which cannot be so carried, but which are needed during the journey, either for essential medical purposes or to meet special and essential dietary needs. When required to do so, the passenger or staff member should provide proof of authenticity of the exempted liquid.

2.1.2 This paragraph describes procedures which airports and airlines should follow in order to establish whether LAGs claimed to be essential may be taken by passengers through search points. Persons may be sensitive about medicines they are carrying, and so will need similarly sensitive handling. If, having followed the procedures in this guidance, doubts remain about the provenance of a LAG, the person in question should be told that they cannot take it into the cabin of the aircraft. It follows that, since the LAG was regarded as essential, he or she should also be advised not to fly.

- a) **Journey:** The liquid is to be used during the journey refers to the journey of the person and so should not, per se, be linked to the length of the flight. A passenger may only be taking a one-hour flight, but may be taking medicine greater than 100 ml. If the medicine is being carried in a container of more than 100 ml, whether or not it fits into the litre bag is irrelevant. He or she should be asked why the medicine is needed in this amount, and whether it could not be carried in the aircraft hold. Only if the responses give the necessary assurance should the LAG's carriage in the cabin be permitted.
- b) **Medical purposes:** Liquids required for medical purposes should be interpreted as meaning liquid medicines, both prescribed by a doctor and bought over-the-counter. In determining if medicine with a total volume of over 100 ml is indeed essential to be carried in the cabin, and that the amount being carried is no more than is necessary for the trip, the passenger should be questioned on the nature of the medicine; the reasons why it is claimed as essential; the dosage; and the frequency of dose necessary. However, in principle, derogations for over-the-counter medicines (e.g. nose sprays, cough medicines, contact lens solution) should be more restrictive in the quantity of liquid that is permitted since these are not "life-or-death" medicines. In addition, liquids that are not medicines but are used for medical

⁴ <http://icaosec.icao.int/> (registration required, conditions applicable) and template available by June 2007.

purposes are permitted, examples of which include ice (if used to maintain the temperature of, for example, a transplant organ), blood or blood products, and even “normal” liquids if their use is justified on medical grounds (e.g. an autistic traveller that “needs” to have a particular brand of drink).

- c) **Dietary needs:** Liquids as a special dietary need should be interpreted as meaning those foods without which the passenger’s health is threatened. Examples include baby food (provided, of course, that a baby is travelling), or foods such as special diets for lactose-intolerant passengers, or gluten-intolerant passengers. Where the volume of baby food is deemed excessive for the length of the journey, it is not to be allowed through the screening point. Baby products may include: baby milk; sterilised water; baby juice; baby food in liquid, gel or paste form; and wet wipes.
- d) **Proof of authenticity:** When requested to do so, the passenger should provide proof of authenticity of the exempted liquids. It should be established that the name on the label of the prescription medication matches the name on his/her boarding pass. Where the medication is non-prescription, a determination on reasonable amounts is required. Reasonable amounts include what is required for length of the flight taking into account possible delays and flight diversions. If doubts are felt about the quantity of liquid being carried by a passenger, or that the liquids are for medical purposes or special dietary needs, then a plausibility check should be performed. The passenger could be invited to sample the items or rub them on their skin to prove they are safe (hydrogen peroxide-based explosives are caustic, and thus could not be safely tasted or rubbed onto the skin). For medicine prescribed by a doctor, the passenger should be able to show that it is for his/her own use, for example by having their name on the label of the medicine or a note from a doctor. When verifying the proof of authenticity, the following should be taken into consideration:
 - 1) A passenger should not be asked to taste their medication if the dosage/usage instruction or advice from their doctor indicates that it would be dangerous to do so;
 - 2) Passenger should not be made to taste any medication, either their own or their child’s, against their wishes;
 - 3) For children’s prescription medication, the accompanying adult passenger should not be asked to taste the medicine, verification should instead be sought through questioning;
 - 4) If a container is marked in grams, it may be assumed that 100g corresponds to 100 ml; and
 - 5) Where a passenger has been asked to rub a small amount of the LAG onto their skin, the passenger’s skin should be monitored for at least two minutes to see if a reaction occurs.

2.2 Airport Staff

2.2.1 The personal items of airport staff entering a security restricted area and on board an aircraft (i.e. beverages, perfumes, cosmetics, medications and other similar items) should be subjected to the same restrictions and exemptions as passengers. However, tools of the trade are exempt from LAGs

restrictions. Tools of the trade are defined as articles in a person's possession which are required for the lawful purpose for which he or she is in the sterile area. Tools of the trade may include items such as cleaning products, sealants, degreasers, glues, paints and oils.

2.3 Exempt Persons

2.3.1 The State may decide to exempt from LAGs restrictions (e.g. law enforcement officers and emergency personnel responding to a crisis).

3. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR STEBS

3.1 Material to be used

- transparent (high impact low density polyethylene (LDPE) or equivalent);
- recyclable and environment-friendly products if possible; and
- size and thickness (minimum of 50 microns) to be adjusted to the needs.

3.2 On the top face of the STEB

3.2.1 Closure:

- red tamper evident tape (minimum 30 mm tape with 40 mm release liner);
- high tack pressure sensitive self adhesive; and
- integral security device/hidden graphic to show if tampered with.

3.2.2 Border:

- side and bottom weld be no less than 15 mm width in red; and
- printed border of minimum 5 mm with “DO NOT OPEN”, airport name, or any other continuous message or design which may bleed over the edge of the bag.
(Optional - integral security device/hidden graphic to show if borders are tampered with.)

3.2.3 Message:

- security sign⁵ in green in the middle of the security box; and
- box in red at bottom stating “Do not open until final destination – contents may be confiscated if bag is tampered with”.

3.2.4 Confirmation/identification features:

- Receipt space (*or jacket, optional*) inside the bag visible in the top left of the security box.

The receipt should contain the following information:

⁵ Available in different formats, free of charge, upon request to ICAO Aviation Security and Facilitation (S&F) Branch at <http://www.icao.int/atb/sfbranch>

- a) date of purchase (dd/mm/yy or dd/mm/yyyy);
- b) place of purchase (State, airport, airline) using international codes;
- c) flight number(s) and name of passenger, if possible;
- d) number and list of items purchased and placed in the STEB.

3.2.5 Origin of the bag:

- State three-letter code⁶ to determine the State of origin where the STEB was provided to the passenger, or airline international code (for duty free sales on board) to determine the origin of the STEB;
- Manufacturer name (in full pending ICAO's registration number); and
- Inventory code and security code or device to protect STEB at retailers and shops.

3.3 **On the back face of the bag**

- Individual airport/retailers/other branding or logos.

4. **OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE USE OF THE STEB**


4.1 Ideally, and in order to facilitate the visual inspection, only LAGs purchased at airport shops, and potentially subjected to security screening at a later stage of the journey, should be placed in the STEB. Other items which might not be confiscated should either be placed in another (regular) bag or, if placed inside the STEB, should not compromise the visual inspection performed at security screening points during the journey. No items other than those purchased at the airport shop should be placed in the STEB.

4.2 Receipts should be inside the STEB, face visible from outside, and securely placed in the left top of the security box (either with a jacket inside the bag, or fixed accordingly). If the receipt has moved and is not visible for security screening purposes, the bag will have to be opened and its contents may be confiscated (or placed in a new STEB by security staff at the security screening point).

4.3 State or airline and manufacturer codes are placed by the manufacturers. Inventory and security codes are the responsibility of the retailers. STEBs should be distributed to authentic parties only.

⁶ *Machine Readable Travel Documents*, Part 1 — Machine Readable Passports (Doc 9303)

Example of design of the ICAO Security Tamper-Evident Bag (STEB)



5. PROPOSED SECURITY PRINCIPLES FOR RETAIL LIQUID, AEROSOL AND GEL ITEMS FOR AIRPORT RETAILERS AND MANUFACTURERS

5.1 Security measures during manufacture and warehousing

5.1.1 In order to ensure the security integrity of LAGs and STEBs, the following security measures are recommended for implementation at the warehouse where retail LAGs and STEBs are consigned:

- a) Access control system, including screening procedures, allowing only authorized personnel into the premises, including verification of staff and visitors' identities (*for airport staff, Standard 4.2.6 of Annex 17, Eighth Edition, is applicable*);
- b) Surveillance systems (i.e. CCTV or equivalent) to monitor activities in the warehouse for preventing intrusion, tampering with and thefts of goods, or interference in processes; and
- c) Access control system upon exit from the warehouse so that nothing could be substituted or used to prepare an act of unlawful interference (*for airport staff, exit control measures could be carried out when exiting the Security Restricted Area*).

5.2 Security measures during shipments

5.2.1 Only sealed bins/containers and/or trucks should be used for shipments of LAGs or STEBs to airport shops or airline outlets. Any LAGs or STEBs taken out of the warehouse must be accompanied by appropriate documentation and a delivery manifest, which should be retained for possible future audit. Security tamper-evident bags at airport shops or airline outlets should always be protected and under surveillance before being used by authorized staff. Staff at airports with access to LAGs and/or STEBs should be subjected to appropriate background checks and physical search regime.

5.3 Quality control

5.3.1 All security measures for LAGs and STEBs should normally be incorporated into relevant security programmes (retailer security programme if considered as regulated agent according to Standard 4.6.3 of Annex 17, Eighth Edition, airport security programme and operator security programme for airline outlets). In addition, technical assessments/tests of the security measures on premises should be conducted in order to maintain an adequate level of protection. Retailers are encouraged to discuss such assessments/tests with the Appropriate Security Authority or Airport Authority. If a security breach is detected, security/duty supervisors, and the Appropriate Security Authorities or the police should be immediately alerted so that appropriate actions are taken. Any suspicious parcels should be dealt with under standard operating procedures.

5.3.2 Details on the implementation of the above-mentioned principles are being developed in the ICAO Security Manual, Seventh Edition, Volume IV.



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Ref.: AS 8/11-07/53 Confidential

6 July 2007

Subject: Recommended guidelines for the validation of supply chain security of liquids, aerosols and gels and security tamper-evident bags

Action required: To note and implement as soon as possible

Sir/Madam,

I have the honour to refer to State letter AS 8/11-07/26 Confidential, dated 30 March 2007 which contains security control guidelines for screening liquids, gels and aerosols, including the specifications for tamper-evident bags recommended to States for their immediate implementation as interim security measures until new detection technology is available.

In order to further develop operational aspects of security controls for liquids, gels, and aerosols, the Council, at the fifteenth meeting of its 181st Session, on 18 June 2007, considered proposed guidelines for harmonized procedures for validation of compliance with the guidelines for liquids, gels and aerosols and security tamper-evident bags carried by passengers during transfer, developed by the Secretariat Study Group on the Carriage and Screening of Liquids, Gels and Aerosols. It was agreed that these guidelines, as presented in the Attachment to this letter, be sent to States for implementation as soon as possible.

The Council also requested the Study Group on the Carriage and Screening of Liquids, Gels and Aerosols to develop detailed guidance material in order to assist States in the implementation of security controls guidelines for screening liquids, aerosols and gels.

Accept, Sir/Madam, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Taïeb Chérif
Secretary General

Enclosure:

Guidelines for the validation of supply chain
security of liquids, aerosols and gels and
security tamper-evident bags

ATTACHMENT to State letter as 8/11-07/53 Confidential

**GUIDELINES FOR THE VALIDATION OF SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY
OF LIQUIDS, AEROSOLS AND GELS AND SECURITY TAMPER-
EVIDENT BAGS**

1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1.1 Security guidelines for screening liquids, gels and aerosols (LAGs)¹ have been developed by ICAO and are set forth in State letters AS 8/11-06/100 Confidential dated 1 December 2006 and AS 8/11-07/26 Confidential dated 30 March 2007. These guidelines cover the following aspects:

- a) screening and other security measures for the control of LAGs carried on board aircraft;
- b) exemptions for medications and special dietary requirements, including baby food;
- c) technical specifications for Security Tamper-Evident Bags (STEBs);
- d) operational considerations for the use of STEBs; and
- e) security principles applicable to STEBs manufacturers and to the movement and sale of LAGs by airport retailers or airlines.

1.2 As more Contracting States are moving to implement the guidelines, it is essential that ICAO assist aviation authorities in recognizing sound supply chain security practices so that a minimum baseline is established and acknowledged by appropriate authorities. The intent of the guidelines is to help establish the responsibilities of a Contracting State concerning security measures applied to the sale of LAGs to passengers at airport outlets and onboard aircraft, for ensuring the security of flights leaving its territory, in line with the principle of host State responsibility, which has long underpinned international aviation security.

1.3 ICAO respects that each Contracting State and region have their own local and operational considerations, and therefore these guidelines are designed to provide flexibility for States to implement or validate the necessary security objectives for LAGs and STEBs.

1.4 It is noted that the appropriate authorities for aviation security of some States may not directly exercise oversight over the measures implemented by airport outlets. In such a case, oversight would be conducted by airport operators or other intermediary agencies over which the appropriate authorities do exercise regulatory control.

¹ For the purpose of this document, liquids, gels and aerosols are referred to as LAGs and include but are not limited to: water and other drinks, soups, syrups, jams, stews, sauces and pastes; foods in sauces or containing a high liquid content; creams, lotions, cosmetics and oils; perfumes; sprays; gels including hair and shower gels; contents of pressurized containers, including shaving foam, other foam and deodorants; pastes including toothpaste; liquid-solid mixtures; mascara; lip gloss or lip balm; and any item of similar consistency at room temperature.

2. SECURITY PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO STEBs

2.1 Security tamper-evident bags are to be manufactured in accordance with the technical specifications listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Attachment A to State letter AS 8/11-07/26 Confidential. The airport retailers and airlines should obtain assurance from STEB manufacturers on the quality of the STEBs, and implementation of reasonable security measures to prevent unauthorised access to, or interference with, the production, packing, storage and delivery of the STEBs to customer airports, airport retailers and airlines.

2.2 Security procedures should be implemented to ensure that STEBs are not subject to conditions for misuse, abuse or any other circumstances that could lead to an act of unlawful interference.

3. SECURITY PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO LAGS SOLD BY AIRPORT OUTLETS AND AIRLINES

3.1 Adequate supply chain security measures shall be applied to LAGs from the first point of entry on the airport airside until delivery to passengers which include:

Premise security: There should be access controls at airside entry points through which LAGs items are delivered to the airside outlets and aircraft. Measures should be in place at airside outlets and onboard aircraft to prevent LAGs from being tampered with and STEBs from being used inappropriately;

Personnel security: Procedures should be in place to screen prospective employees and to periodically check current employees, as well as to educate and train employees regarding security policies, recognition of deviations from these policies and to understand what actions must be taken in response to security lapses.

Security checks: Visual checks or security controls should be performed by security staff at the first point of entry on the airside for signs of interference, such as tampering with seals, theft, and the introduction of potentially dangerous devices, articles or substances. Appropriate checks should be made on all supplies of LAGs to establish that they have been protected, unless Known Suppliers have assumed responsibility for applying security controls, that there is no evidence or suspicion of tampering, and that the necessary documentation is in order.

Business partner security: Airport retailers and airlines should be encouraged to establish an understanding with LAGs suppliers; that the suppliers will implement appropriate security controls for LAGs consignment delivered to the retailers/airlines, including written assurance that LAGs consignments are safeguarded, associated information protected and security measures are in place.

Information security: Airport retailers and airlines should establish security policies and reasonable procedures to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of data and information used in the supply chain, including protection against unauthorized access, misuse and unauthorized alteration.

4. KNOWN SUPPLIER OF LAGs AND STEBs

4.1 Contracting States may adopt procedures for Known Supplier of LAGs and/or Known Supplier of STEBs, pursuant to which airport retailers and airlines, as entities known to the airport operators and/or appropriate aviation security authorities, will ensure the supply chain security of supplies of LAGs and supplies of STEBs from their first point of entry on airside until their delivery to passengers. The Known Supplier of LAGs and/or Known Supplier of STEBs are also required to provide a full declaration of the measures undertaken to ensure the implementation of supply chain security within the airside. The declaration could be a formal document signed by the legal representative or by the person responsible for security in the company, and approved by the appropriate authorities of the concerned State, for a time-limited period. This declaration may include the following:

- a) a person responsible for security in the company is appointed;
- b) all persons with access to supplies have received proper security awareness training before being given access providing an equal level of security;
- c) appropriate checks are conducted on supply chain security on airside; and
- d) Known Suppliers of LAGs adhere to the principles under paragraph 3 above.

4.2 Definitions of terms used in the description of procedures for Known Suppliers of LAGs and/or Known Supplier of STEBs are as follows:

- a) **Known Supplier of LAGs** and/or **Known Supplier of STEBs** are defined as an entity that ensures implementation of the security controls and protection from unauthorized interference with supplies of LAGs or supplies of STEBs, respectively, from their first point of entry on airside until their delivery to passengers. The Known Supplier of LAGs and/or the Known Supplier of STEBs fully accepts responsibility, by written declaration, for the implementation and quality control of LAGs and STEBs within the supply chain on the airside.
- b) **Supplies of LAGs** are defined as liquids, gels and aerosols, in any volume, for sale at airport outlets (excluding food and beverages for consumption in the airport premises and not intended for carriage into the aircraft passenger cabin) or on board aircraft during the day(s) of the journey, either in the airside area, or in a security restricted area.
- c) **Supplies of STEBs** are defined as security tamper-evident bags that should only be used for the sale of LAGs by airport outlets, or on board aircraft.
- d) **Security checks** include visual checks or security controls, performed by security staff, for signs of interference, in particular tampering with seals, theft and the introduction of potentially dangerous devices, articles or substances. The checks should be made at the first point of entry on the airside. The checks should be made on all supplies of LAGs and STEBs to establish that they have been protected, that there is no evidence or suspicion of tampering, and that the necessary documentation is in order.

5. VALIDATION PROCESS

5.1 Each State remains responsible for determining or recognizing compliance with the security measures applied within the State to LAGs and STEBs. States wishing to validate the security of LAGs being taken onto flights from their airports by passengers who started their journey in another State and are transferring between flights may approach the validation in a number of ways including:

- a) entering into a bilateral arrangement with the State in which the transferring passenger started his or her journey, to obtain the necessary assurances of the security afforded to LAGs and STEBs; and/or
- b) becoming a party to multilateral arrangement, whereby such assurances are sought by a regional/international body, on behalf of a number of States; and/or
- c) recognizing after verification, that may include on-site validation defined in paragraph 5.5, that states have complied with ICAO recommendations on the measures for LAGs and STEBs; and/or
- d) recognizing such assurances given by States that have declared compliance with ICAO's recommendations on the measures for LAGs and STEBs and their full implementation at airports and by airlines.

Such validation shall be based on technical assessment on matters related to aviation security and shall be applied in a fair manner.

5.2 Consistent with international practice, a State may elect to require additional measures for LAGs carried by transfer passengers through its airports, over and above those in place in the State where the passenger started his/her journey, or those accepted by other parties through an arrangement. Such additional measures might for example reflect the State's threat and risk assessment to aviation within its territory.

5.3 In seeking to provide the necessary assurances that appropriate security measures are being implemented, under any of the approaches listed above, a State may wish to share with the requesting State or requesting regional/international body the results of its assessment. These could be undertaken between States through bilateral or multilateral arrangements as they view necessary.

5.4 Concerning LAGs in STEBs carried by passengers transiting/transferring through several airports, States may also wish to seek confirmation from the State(s) where the passengers purchased the LAGs and States through which the passengers have transited or transferred that they have applied equally robust controls to their LAGs and STEBs.

5.5 Given the critical importance of the security of the supply chain, a State or regional/international body may consider it appropriate to seek the agreement of another State to undertake on-site validation of the effectiveness of security measures being applied by the other State, either directly or through an approved third party, in the territory of the State in question. Where permission for such validation is granted, the parties should establish in advance the terms and scope of the process of validation, including the secure handling of sensitive information.

A-5

5.6 It is ICAO's intention to establish and maintain on its secure website a location where States may place up-to-date information on their respective national supply chain security arrangements for LAGs and STEBs, or on the results of on-site validations if agreed by the parties involved. A second State or regional/international body may then access and consider the contents, as a first step towards reaching a bilateral or multilateral arrangement allowing LAGs and STEBs secured in the first State's territory to be accepted when in the possession of transfer passengers.

6. **AMENDMENT TO THE RECOMMENDED SECURITY CONTROL GUIDELINES FOR SCREENING LIQUIDS, GELS AND AEROSOLS CONTAINED IN THE ATTACHMENT TO STATE LETTER AS 8/11-07/26 CONFIDENTIAL, DATED 30 MARCH 2007**

6.1 The guidelines for supply chain security for LAGs as contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this document shall supersede those contained in paragraph 1.2 b) and Section 5 of the Attachment to State letter AS 8/11-07/26 Confidential dated 30 March 2007.

— END —