Appendix A: The more frequently identified findings in the audited areas

Area of findings	The more frequently identified findings	Consequences
Primary aviation legislation and civil aviation regulations	 Lack of up-to-date primary aviation legislation (civil aviation act, code of civil aviation, aeronautics code, etc.) to enable the State to give effect to the Convention. Lack of national regulations, implementing Standards and Recommended Practices contained in the Annexes to the Convention. Non availability of a system for analysing and integrating progressively the adopted Annex provisions into national regulations Inability to identify differences that may exist between the State regulations and relevant ICAO Annex provisions Non notification to ICAO of the existing differences Failing to adequately delegate the appropriate authority to inspectors to access aviation facilities and conduct inspections. 	➤ Failing to adequately empower the Director of Civil Aviation and civil aviation administrations to conduct inspections and to enforce civil aviation regulations.
Civil aviation organization	 In some States the CAA is not suitably established and does note have suitable technical capabilities for the aviation safety oversight. Non availability of adequately qualified and experienced technical staff. Non availability of adequate training policies and programmes for inspectors. Non availability of adequate written procedures and guidance. Lack of adequate and appropriate documents and equipment. Inadequate funding to civil aviation authorities which has long been identified as a reason for the deficiencies identified by ICAO audits and the difficulties experienced by civil aviation administrations. In many cases, funds raised are not directly re-invested in civil aviation activities, thus depriving civil aviation authorities of a viable source of funding for conducting their safety-related responsibilities in the most effective and efficient manner. Unsatisfactory staff conditions of work and wages. 	The tasks related to safety oversight are not complied because either the CAA and/or the operator do not have the required competences to ensure that flights authorized are safely conducted. Also flights often carried out by hired crew of wet leases aircraft are not subject to any effective technical control and supervision.

Appendix A: The more frequently identified findings in the audited areas

Area of findings	The more frequently identified findings	Consequences
Personnel licensing and training	 Lack of proper procedures and system relating to examinations and testing of licence applicants. Lack of appropriate regulations, requirements and procedures regarding medical assessments In many States there are no established systems for processing licence applications, validation of licences, and issuance of national licences on the basis of licences issued by other Contracting States. Several States have not established a system for the certification and supervision of aviation training institutes. 	 There is no follow-up on the knowledge or competences of the airlines flight crew members. Inappropriate issuance of licences remains a major problem, identified in many States. This has critical impact on the safety of aviation.
Aircraft operations	 Absence of a system for certification and the continued surveillance of air operators, in conformance to the provisions of Annex 6 parts 1 and 3 and in adherence to the ICAO document 8335. No requirement for an operator to develop an Operations Manual including a training programme, a Minimum Equipment List and a flight safety and accident prevention programme. Non availability of adequately trained Operations inspectors. No operations inspections prior to the certification of air operators in several States. Lack of adequate surveillance (which have been identified as contributing factors in several accident investigation reports). No requirement relating to aerodromes and route the qualifications nor for the maintaining competency of flight crew members No requirement relating to cabin crew members (training, competency, tasks on board, minimum number for each type of aircraft, etc). 	► In some States, air operator certificates (AOCs) have been issued virtually on request without requiring the applicant to demonstrate an adequate organization, method of control and supervision of flight operations, training programme and maintenance arrangements consistent with the nature and extent of the operations specified, as per by ICAO Standards.

Appendix A: The more frequently identified findings in the audited areas

Area of findings	The more frequently identified findings	Consequences
Airworthiness of aircraft	 A number of States did not have their own regulations and directives regarding issuance and renewal of Certificate of Airworthiness and did not adopted nor not adapted suitable airworthiness regulations applicable to aircraft registered on their register. No requirement for an operator regarding aircraft airworthiness and maintenance neither of requirement for an operator to prepare a maintenance control manual. No requirement for the approval of aircraft maintenance organisations. Lack of adequate surveillance of maintenance organizations and of a system for the approval of maintenance organizations. Several States have not established procedures and requirements for the issuance of flight permits or special authorizations. 	In certain States there is no oversight of the airworthiness status of aircraft flying in their airspace and it is often impossible to determine if the aircraft is really in a good airworthiness conditions: • no monitoring of the application of the Airworthiness directives nor Services Bulletins related to the type and the series of aircraft; • no monitoring of maintenance organisations; • no control of onboard communication and navigation equipment; • it was noted that aeroplanes were used for public transport with a flight permit instead of a valid C. of A. • it was noted that aeroplanes were used for public transport without valid C. of A. • special authorisations were issued without references nor the knowledge of the civil aviation authorities.