

25-27 March 2015 Kuwait, Kuwait

# MID Annual Safety Report Third Edition

#### **Presented by:**

#### ASRT Rapporteur, Capt. Adnan Takrouri








### **Objectives of ASRT**

- Gather safety information from different stakeholders
- Identify the main aviation safety risks in the MID region
- Produce the annual safety report
  - ➤ 1st Edition, Nov 2012
  - 2nd Edition, Jan 2014
  - ➢ 3rd Edition, April 2015



# **Data Collection & Sources**

# Methodology

- Utilize existing safety databases
- Surveys
- Experts opinion
- Industry meetings

# Data sources for ASR (3rd edition)

• Airline operators, Boeing, IATA, ICAO, MID States







# Improvements to ASR (3<sup>rd</sup> edition)

- Better promotion for RASG-MID
- Enhanced report structure
- The reporting/classification criteria for the different stakeholders contributing with their datasets was clarified & all discrepancies were investigated & explained
- A complementary analysis approach was adopted

# ASR Content (3<sup>rd</sup> edition)

#### • Three main sections: (covering 2009-2013)

#### Reactive safety information:

- Accidents and serious incidents analysis
- A section per contributing organization (Boeing, IATA & ICAO)

#### Proactive safety information:


- ICAO USOAP-CMA audit results
- IATA IOSA and ISAGO audit results
- Incidents reported by air operators and states
- Laser attacks survey analysis

#### Predictive safety information:

Implementation status of SSP in the MID region



### **Reactive Safety Analysis**



- Increased Accident rate for 2013 vs 2012 (almost doubled)
- Above global rate for 2013
- Above global average rate (avg global = 3.72 while avg MID = 7.28)
- No fatalities in both 2012 & 2013

### **Reactive Safety Analysis**

#### • Focus Areas (2009 – 2013) aligned with GASP priorities

- Runway Safety (RS)
- Loss of Control In Flight (LOC-I)
- Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)

#### Additional regional emerging risks


- System/Component Failure or Malfunction (SCF)
- Airprox/TCAS Alert or Loss of Separation (which may lead to Mid Air Collision)
- Laser attacks



### **Proactive Safety Analysis - USOAP**

#### > 13 out of 15 States have been audited

#### Overall MID EI = 68.72% which is above Global average (61.71%)



### **Proactive Safety Analysis - IOSA**

all MID accidents rate among non-IOSA registered operators was above the world average by an average of 8.61

#	Area	Top findings
1	Organization & Management System (ORG)	Identification of the Accountable Executive Documentation management and control processes Contracts management processes
2	Maintenance (MNT)	Process to ensure the airworthiness of used parts
3	Cargo (CGO)	Dangerous goods information display
4	Security (SEC)	Corporate security policy Management and control of documentation under the security program Security training program
5	Flight Operations (FLT)	Continuing qualification training schedule Normal and non-normal procedures and maneuvers flight crew training Operator proficiency evaluation for flight crew members Wind shear avoidance and recovery flight crew training Terrain awareness and procedures flight crew training TCAS and ACAS procedures training

# **Proactive Safety Analysis - ISAGO**

#	Area	Top findings
1	Load control (LOD)	Provider shall ensure the Load sheet, when transmitted to the aircraft via ACARS, is in a standard format that is in accordance with requirements of the customer airline(s)
2	Passenger handling (PAX)	The Provider, in accordance with requirements of the customer airline(s), handles passengers that are law enforcement officers or other persons authorized to carry weapons onboard the aircraft in the performance of their duties, the Provider shall have procedures in accordance with applicable laws and/or requirements of the customer airline(s) for the check in, handling and boarding of such passengers carrying weapons Other non-conformances were also around the Provider having procedures in place to ensure security and address any security threats upon handling passengers
3	Baggage handling (BAG)	Provider having procedures in place to ensure security and address any security threats upon handling baggage
4	Aircraft Handling & Loading (HDL)	Aircraft Handling and Servicing Operations
5	Aircraft Ground Movement (AGM)	Aircraft Main Gear-Controlled Pushback Operations Aircraft Powerback Operations Aircraft Ground Movement Operations
6	Cargo & Mail Handling (CGM)	Cargo/Mail Acceptance and Handling
7	Organization & Management – Corporate (ORG–H)	Aircraft Turnaround Coordination Safety & Quality Management
8	Organization & Management – Station (ORG–S)	Ground Support Equipment Management (GSE) Unit Load Device Management (ULD) Event Response

### **Predictive Safety Analysis**

#### • SSP implementation

- A questionnaire was circulated to states for the establishment of RSOO
- > 11 out of 15 states replied
- SSP implementation progress is in the ASR

#### FDX data

Efforts are made to increase the levels of participation and improve statistical relevance (to be presented in a separate WP)



### Challenges

- Low response rate towards conducted surveys (for laser attacks only 7 states responded)
- Differences in the reporting/classification criteria used by the different contributing stakeholders
- Low reporting culture in the MID region
- Limited sources of information for predictive safety



#### **Future Improvements**



- Expand the scope of the analysis to General Aviation
- Enhance the reporting culture in the MID region and encourage voluntary reporting to be able to move to predictive safety management
- Adopt a collaborative approach in harmonizing taxonomy across the different aviation stakeholders

Thank you!